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🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Add input validation to prevent information disclosure #77

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🛡️ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Add input validation to prevent information disclosure #77

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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
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Expand Up @@ -12,3 +12,7 @@
**Vulnerability:** Raw `stop()` and `warning()` calls without `call. = FALSE` in `llcont.R` and `vuongtest.R` exposed execution stack/call details when raised.
**Learning:** While some instances of `stop()` inside `tryCatch()` were previously fixed to hide the call stack, other standalone exceptions and warnings still leaked call context. Security must be consistently applied across the entire codebase.
**Prevention:** Always set `call. = FALSE` when using `stop()` or `warning()` to enforce a secure-by-default boundary and prevent internal execution paths from being disclosed to the end user.
## 2024-08-04 - Fix Information Disclosure and Logic Errors via Missing Input Validation
**Vulnerability:** Unvalidated arguments (`nested`, `adj`, `conf.level`) passed to exported functions `vuongtest()` and `icci()` could bypass top-level guards or cause `if()` length > 1 warnings/errors, leaking internal execution contexts.
**Learning:** In R codebases, unvalidated arguments passed to exported functions can bypass top-level safeguards and trigger raw R errors deep inside internal logic, leaking internal execution contexts.
**Prevention:** Always strictly validate the type, length, and bounds of user inputs at the very beginning of exported functions to fail securely and use `stop(..., call. = FALSE)` to prevent information disclosure.
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions R/icci.R
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Expand Up @@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
#' @export
icci <- function(object1, object2, conf.level=.95, ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont) {

if(!is.numeric(conf.level) || length(conf.level) != 1 || is.na(conf.level) || conf.level <= 0 || conf.level >= 1) {
stop("Argument 'conf.level' must be a single numeric value strictly between 0 and 1.", call. = FALSE)
}

## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA
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7 changes: 7 additions & 0 deletions R/vuongtest.R
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Expand Up @@ -98,6 +98,13 @@
#' @export
vuongtest <- function(object1, object2, nested=FALSE, adj="none", ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont, score1=NULL, score2=NULL, vc1=vcov, vc2=vcov) {

if(!is.logical(nested) || length(nested) != 1 || is.na(nested)) {
stop("Argument 'nested' must be a single logical value.", call. = FALSE)
}
if(!is.character(adj) || length(adj) != 1 || !(adj %in% c("none", "aic", "bic"))) {
stop("Argument 'adj' must be a single character string: 'none', 'aic', or 'bic'.", call. = FALSE)
}

## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA
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