fix(security): scan data URIs linearly without a cutoff

CHANGELOG.d/document-diff-review-data-uri-redos.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Fixed CodeQL `py/polynomial-redos` in `document_diff_review`: the inline data-URI leak check used an unbounded `data:[^,\s]*,`, which `search()` rescans to the end of the text from every `data:` occurrence. A fixed-token state scan now recognizes the same data-URI language in linear time without a header-length cutoff, so long valid data URIs still fail closed as `inline_binary_content`.

contextual_orchestrator/document_diff_review.py

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
 _REPO = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}")
 _BLOB = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}(?:[0-9a-f]{24})?")
 _OBJECT_HASH = re.compile(r"sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}")
-_DATA_URI = re.compile(r"data:[^,\s]*,", re.IGNORECASE)
+_DATA_URI_TOKEN = re.compile(r"data:|[,\s]", re.IGNORECASE)
 _BASE64_RUN = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9+/_-]{200,}={0,2}")
 _RESIDENT_REGISTRATION_NUMBER = re.compile(r"(?<!\d)\d{6}-[1-4]\d{6}(?!\d)")
 # ZIP (DOCX/HWPX), PDF, PNG, JPEG, GIF, and OLE (HWP) signatures as decoded text.
@@ -111,6 +111,21 @@ def _reject(code: str, message: str, status: int = 400) -> DocumentDiffReviewErr
     return DocumentDiffReviewError(code, message, status)
 
 
+def _contains_data_uri(value: str) -> bool:
+    """Recognize a data URI in one token scan without a header-length cutoff."""
+    header_open = False
+    for match in _DATA_URI_TOKEN.finditer(value):
+        token = match.group()
+        if token.casefold() == "data:":
+            header_open = True
+        elif token == ",":
+            if header_open:
+                return True
+        else:
+            header_open = False
+    return False
+
+
 def _exact_object(value: Any, allowed: frozenset[str], field: str, *, required: frozenset[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Require a JSON object whose keys are known and whose required keys exist."""
     if type(value) is not dict:
@@ -126,7 +141,7 @@ def _exact_object(value: Any, allowed: frozenset[str], field: str, *, required:
 
 def _scan_for_leaks(value: str, field: str) -> None:
     """Reject inline binary/media, credentials, and resident identifiers."""
-    if any(signature in value for signature in _BINARY_SIGNATURES) or _DATA_URI.search(value) or _BASE64_RUN.search(value):
+    if any(signature in value for signature in _BINARY_SIGNATURES) or _contains_data_uri(value) or _BASE64_RUN.search(value):
         raise _reject("inline_binary_content", f"{field} must not carry inline binary or media data", 422)
     if any(pattern.search(value) for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS):
         raise _reject("secret_detected", f"{field} matches a credential pattern", 422)

docs/product-technical-gap-baseline.md

@@ -7491,3 +7491,22 @@ serving loop and closed the injected embedding backend but did not release the
 test-owned listening socket. The fixture now calls `server_close()` in
 `finally` after the serving thread joins. This changes no production server
 lifecycle policy and keeps ResourceWarning visible as a failure signal.
+
+## 2026-09-30 Data-URI leak scan without a heuristic cutoff
+
+PR [#1340](https://github.com/ContextualWisdomLab/contextual-orchestrator/pull/1340)
+at reviewed head `240ce0845e126d11843e70ecd09ca913b7b7800d` removed CodeQL
+`py/polynomial-redos` by limiting the data-URI header to 256 characters. That
+made runtime linear but introduced an undocumented security decision: a valid
+data URI with a longer header was treated as ordinary text and could cross the
+document-review boundary. The existing test explicitly approved that false
+negative.
+
+The proposed owner repair replaces the bounded expression with a single scan
+over fixed `data:`, comma, and whitespace tokens. It recognizes the original
+`data:[^,\s]*,` language without rescanning suffixes and without a header-length
+threshold. A header beyond the former cutoff was observed RED before the
+repair; the focused long-header, repeated-prefix, whitespace, and varied-input
+contracts are GREEN afterward. Protected exact-head CodeQL/Security Checks,
+independent approval, and ordinary merge remain required, so this record is
+**Proposed** rather than released evidence.

tests/test_document_diff_review.py

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
 import hashlib
 import io
 import json
+import random
+import re
 import sys
 import threading
 import urllib.error
@@ -28,7 +30,9 @@
 
 from contextual_orchestrator import ModelAgent, TaskOrchestrator  # noqa: E402
 from contextual_orchestrator.document_diff_review import (  # noqa: E402
+    _contains_data_uri,
     DocumentDiffReviewError,
+    _scan_for_leaks,
     validate_document_diff_envelope,
     validate_document_diff_findings,
 )
@@ -261,6 +265,7 @@ def _mutated(**changes) -> dict:
     [
         (_mutated(**{"objects.0.head_text": ""}), 422, "inline_binary_content"),
         (_mutated(**{"objects.0.head_text": "data:image/png;name=" + "x" * 101 + ";base64,AAAA"}), 422, "inline_binary_content"),
+        (_mutated(**{"objects.0.head_text": "DATA:,x"}), 422, "inline_binary_content"),
         (_mutated(**{"objects.0.head_text": base64.b64encode(HEAD_DOCX).decode()[:4000]}), 422, "inline_binary_content"),
         (
             _mutated(**{"objects.0.head_text": base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + bytes(range(256)) * 8).decode()}),
@@ -302,6 +307,7 @@ def _mutated(**changes) -> dict:
     ids=[
         "data_uri",
         "long_data_uri_header",
+        "uppercase_empty_data_uri",
         "base64_docx",
         "urlsafe_base64_image",
         "secret",
@@ -473,3 +479,60 @@ def test_total_extracted_text_budget_rejects_individually_bounded_objects() -> N
         validate_document_diff_envelope(envelope)
     assert (error.value.status, error.value.code) == (413, "request_too_large")
     assert "envelope text" in str(error.value)
+
+
+def test_data_uri_scan_handles_repeated_scheme_without_comma() -> None:
+    """A repeated scheme without a comma is not inline media."""
+    pathological = "data:" * 20_000
+    assert not _contains_data_uri(pathological)
+    _scan_for_leaks(pathological, "objects[0].head_text")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value",
+    [
+        "",
+        "DATA:,x",
+        "Data:text/plain;charset=utf-8,hello",
+        "see data:,x inline",
+        "data:" + "a;" * 128 + ",AAAA",
+        "data:" + "a;" * 150 + ",AAAA",
+    ],
+    ids=[
+        "png_base64",
+        "uppercase_empty",
+        "mixed_case_charset",
+        "embedded",
+        "header_at_256_bound",
+        "header_over_256_bound",
+    ],
+)
+def test_data_uri_is_rejected_as_inline_binary(value) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(DocumentDiffReviewError) as error:
+        _scan_for_leaks(value, "objects[0].head_text")
+    assert (error.value.status, error.value.code) == (422, "inline_binary_content")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value",
+    [
+        "data:" + "a;" * 150,
+        "data: image/png, not a uri",
+        "the data, as reported",
+    ],
+    ids=["long_header_without_comma", "whitespace_in_header", "no_scheme"],
+)
+def test_non_data_uri_text_is_not_flagged(value) -> None:
+    """Whitespace or an absent comma prevents a data-URI match."""
+    assert not _contains_data_uri(value)
+    _scan_for_leaks(value, "objects[0].head_text")
+
+
+def test_data_uri_scanner_matches_the_contract_on_varied_short_text() -> None:
+    """The linear scanner preserves the original data-URI language."""
+    unbounded = re.compile(r"data:[^,\s]*,", re.IGNORECASE)
+    rng = random.Random(1262)
+    alphabet = ["data:", "DATA:", "Data:", ",", ";", "/", " ", "\n", "a", "b64", "="]
+    for _ in range(3000):
+        value = "".join(rng.choice(alphabet) for _ in range(rng.randint(0, 40)))
+        assert _contains_data_uri(value) == bool(unbounded.search(value)), value