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🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix DOM XSS vulnerability in dashboard rendering - #1410
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* Enforce `Number()` coercion for numerical values (`total`, `deploy_blocking`, `new_blocking`, `CRITICAL` count) injected into `innerHTML`. * Add `esc()` escaping for string values like `s.id`. * Safe-case untrusted `severity` strings before map lookup: `String(f.severity).toUpperCase()`.
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🚨 Severity
HIGH
💡 Vulnerability
DOM XSS vulnerability in
scanner/dashboard/console.html.The dashboard dynamically rendered values retrieved from the backend API directly into
innerHTMLproperties using string interpolation without type coercion.Although attributes like
deploy_blocking,new_blocking, andtotalare semantically numerical, an attacker controlling the API output (via malicious JSON payloads or man-in-the-middle) could inject string-based XSS payloads. Because numeric interpolation lackedesc()sanitization or explicit coercion, it allowed arbitrary script execution within the dashboard.🎯 Impact
An attacker could execute arbitrary JavaScript within the context of a user's browser viewing the dashboard. This leads to complete compromise of the session, enabling the theft of
ag_key(API keys stored insessionStorage), which grants full access to the control plane and organizational secrets.🔧 Fix
Number()for all interpolated properties expected to be numeric (e.g.,Number(s.total)||0,Number(s.deploy_blocking)). This neutralizes any string payload by converting it toNaNwithout breaking numeric rendering.esc()HTML escaping to string properties likes.idthat were previously unescaped.SEV[String(f.severity).toUpperCase()]) to prevent prototype pollution orundefinedevaluation issues.✅ Verification
pytest tests/test_console_dashboard_security.pywhich passes all assertions related to strict string formatting and DOM interpolation.pnpm testandpytest). Code coverage remains at 96% and 1381 tests pass.PR created automatically by Jules for task 16245861543080469311 started by @seonghobae