fix(pip-audit): keep index-url locks hashed and reject symlink parents

.github/workflows/python-security.yml

@@ -226,53 +226,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Run pip-audit (hard gate on any known vulnerability)
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          status=0
-
-          # Audit every discovered requirements file.
-          while IFS= read -r req; do
-            # A matching requirements-<tool>-ci-overrides.txt (a `uv pip compile --override`
-            # input, e.g. requirements-strix-ci-overrides.txt) means the *-hashes.txt this
-            # override applies to pins a version whose declared metadata range intentionally
-            # conflicts with another pin in the same file (verified safe at override time, not a
-            # resolution mistake). pip's own dependency resolver -- which pip-audit's default
-            # `-r` mode still calls even for fully hash-pinned files -- fails on that same
-            # declared-range conflict regardless of --require-hashes, and plain --no-deps does
-            # not suppress it (confirmed: --no-deps only skips fetching undeclared transitive
-            # packages, pip's resolver still cross-checks the packages that *are* listed
-            # together). --disable-pip bypasses pip's resolver entirely and audits the exact
-            # pins directly, but it requires every requirement to be an exact version (raises on
-            # any bare range) -- true for the compiled *-hashes.txt, not necessarily true for the
-            # hand-maintained raw input (e.g. requirements-strix-ci.txt intentionally leaves
-            # protobuf as a range). So: hashed output files with an override get
-            # --disable-pip --no-deps; their raw, non-hash input counterpart is skipped here
-            # (it is never itself a `pip install --require-hashes` target -- only its compiled
-            # *-hashes.txt is installed -- and that compiled file is the one audited with full
-            # transitive coverage).
-            base="${req%.txt}"
-            unhashed_base="${base%-hashes}"
-            if [ "$base" != "$unhashed_base" ] && [ -f "${unhashed_base}-overrides.txt" ]; then
-              echo "::group::pip-audit -r ${req} (--disable-pip --no-deps: overridden lock)"
-              pip-audit --strict --desc=on --no-deps --disable-pip -r "${req}" || status=1
-              echo "::endgroup::"
-            elif [ "$base" = "$unhashed_base" ] && [ -f "${unhashed_base}-overrides.txt" ]; then
-              echo "::notice::Skipping pip-audit for ${req}: it is the raw input to an overridden lock (${unhashed_base}-hashes.txt), never itself a pip install --require-hashes target, and its compiled hashes file is audited separately with full resolution."
-            else
-              echo "::group::pip-audit -r ${req}"
-              pip-audit --strict --desc=on -r "${req}" || status=1
-              echo "::endgroup::"
-            fi
-          done < <(find . -type f -name 'requirements*.txt' -not -path './.git/*')
-
-          # Audit the project itself when a PEP 621 / lock manifest exists.
-          if find . -maxdepth 2 -type f \
-              \( -name 'pyproject.toml' -o -name 'pylock.*.toml' \) \
-              -not -path './.git/*' -print -quit | grep -q .; then
-            echo "::group::pip-audit . (project manifest)"
-            pip-audit --strict --desc=on . || status=1
-            echo "::endgroup::"
-          fi
-
-          if [ "${status}" != "0" ]; then
-            echo "::error::pip-audit reported known-vulnerable Python dependencies."
-            exit 1
-          fi
+          # Hashed complete locks are audited with --disable-pip so pip cannot
+          # re-apply a stale Requires-Dist bound and label ResolutionImpossible
+          # as a known vulnerability (ContextualWisdomLab/.github#961).
+          python3 scripts/ci/pip_audit_requirements.py

AGENTS.md

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ commit and exposed without running build hooks; a lone `--require-hashes`
 directive is not trust evidence. See
 [`docs/doctoring/opencode-exact-vcs-dependency-evidence.md`](docs/doctoring/opencode-exact-vcs-dependency-evidence.md).
 Conflict-scope roots fail closed when the immediate parent directory is a symbolic link.
+Hashed-lock pip-audit uses `--disable-pip` only when every package line is an exact SHA-256 pin; `--index-url` is configuration; directory-symlink hops fail closed. See [`docs/doctoring/strix-hashed-lock-no-deps.md`](docs/doctoring/strix-hashed-lock-no-deps.md).
+
 All 18 product hourly review-repair callers (OriginWeave at minute 10, nonnest2 at minute 16, and 16 others) are one file, [`.github/workflows/hourly-review-repair.yml`](.github/workflows/hourly-review-repair.yml), a `github.event.schedule` lookup table rather than 18 near-copy-pasted files. See [`docs/doctoring/hourly-review-repair-single-file-consolidation.md`](docs/doctoring/hourly-review-repair-single-file-consolidation.md); the per-repository doctoring records (e.g. [`docs/doctoring/originweave-hourly-review-caller.md`](docs/doctoring/originweave-hourly-review-caller.md), [`docs/doctoring/nonnest2-hourly-review-caller.md`](docs/doctoring/nonnest2-hourly-review-caller.md)) remain as historical background per repository.
 Organization edge runtimes use Cloudflare Pingora. Do not add or preserve active Nginx containers, packages, commands, service/config files, or Kubernetes Nginx ingress annotations/classes. Read [`docs/policies/PINGORA_EDGE_POLICY.md`](docs/policies/PINGORA_EDGE_POLICY.md) and ADR-0019 before changing HTTP edge, static-serving, ingress, TLS, or proxy deployment behavior.
 

ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -109,6 +109,13 @@ protected `master`) are three of the 18 resolved targets; every target maps
 only established scheduler credentials. The reusable engine stays
 product-neutral.
 
+## Hashed-lock pip-audit
+
+`scripts/ci/pip_audit_requirements.py` audits complete hashed locks with
+`--disable-pip`. Resolver flags such as `--index-url` are not package
+lines. `-r` includes and directory-symlink parents fail closed so pip
+cannot relabel `ResolutionImpossible` as a known vulnerability.
+
 ## Hourly contextual-orchestrator repair gate
 
 ```mermaid
@@ -262,6 +269,8 @@ resolver conflict.
   — import-only exact source dependencies for networkless coverage.
 - [`docs/doctoring/fast-mlsirm-hourly-review-caller.md`](docs/doctoring/fast-mlsirm-hourly-review-caller.md)
   — product-specific psychometric repair heartbeat and scientific gates.
+
+
 - [`docs/doctoring/exact-artifact-sbom-attestation.md`](docs/doctoring/exact-artifact-sbom-attestation.md)
   — current increment's attestation decision and APA 7th citations.
 - [`docs/doctoring/sandboxed-web-readiness-loopback-boundary.md`](docs/doctoring/sandboxed-web-readiness-loopback-boundary.md)

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1265,10 +1265,11 @@ Semantic Versioning where the repository publishes a release.
 - Download the pinned `uv` 0.12.1 exporter from the official GitHub Releases URL instead of `releases.astral.sh`, which now returns HTTP 403 and blocks org-wide OpenCode `coverage-evidence`. The SHA-256 pin is unchanged. The opener may follow one hop onto `release-assets.githubusercontent.com` or `objects.githubusercontent.com` and still rejects every other host, userinfo, non-HTTPS scheme, and nondefault port (ContextualWisdomLab/.github#1109).
 - Compared the trusted `uv` executable's post-install `--version` output against the real GitHub Releases build's full string, `uv 0.12.1 (x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu)`, instead of the bare `uv 0.12.1` the prior check required; the genuine release binary always prints the target triple, so every installation was failing the pin check immediately after the archive download itself was fixed (ContextualWisdomLab/.github#1109).
 - Excluded relative `-r` and `--requirement` referrers from generated flat base-lock publication while retaining bounded include syntax diagnostics and discovering independently complete direct `.txt` children of `requirements` directories.
+- Audit complete hashed Python locks with `--disable-pip` so `--index-url` stays configuration, `-r` includes do not earn resolver bypass, and directory-symlink parents fail closed before pip-audit can label `ResolutionImpossible` as a known vulnerability.
 - Bound the central Semgrep job to one `SEMGREP_IMAGE` digest for log evidence, manifest inspection, and `docker run`, so a buyer reconstructing the scan can prove the logged scanner is the scanner that ran.
 - Published substantive OpenCode LLM probes when they already carried an independent proof and exact source-line digest but omitted a duplicated `path:line` citation, so NVIDIA NIM / OpenCode review evidence is no longer discarded as `NO_CONCLUSION`.
-- Refused a conflict-scope repository root whose immediate parent is a symbolic link, so a swapped parent cannot redirect the canonical worktree after the last-component check (CWE-367).
 - Materialized base Python locks only when every package line is an exact SHA-256 pin or a bounded relative `-r`/`--requirement` include. A lone `--require-hashes` directive, a dotted include such as `./lock.txt`, or `-r other-hashes.txt` no longer enters the trusted build context.
+- Refused a conflict-scope repository root whose immediate parent is a symbolic link, so a swapped parent cannot redirect the canonical worktree after the last-component check (CWE-367).
 - Bounded the Strix quality self-test's deterministic timeout fixtures to 3-second process and 5-second fake-sleep budgets so exact-head policy evidence completes inside the existing job limit without changing production Strix scanner timeouts, providers, credentials, or review semantics.
 - Allowed commas and ASCII parentheses in the bounded Strix changed-file path policy so legal tracked Packrat fixtures can receive exact-head security analysis, while rejecting raw `..` components before normalization and keeping controls, backslashes, whitespace ambiguity, and shell punctuation fail-closed.
 - Bound each review-agent invocation key to the wrapper's complete canonical payload, including the base branch and requesting actor; altered fields with a valid-format key now fail before durable-leader election or forwarding, and wrapper write permission is job-scoped.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ repeatable compile command.
 - **Product hourly callers** stay thin. Do not hard-code OriginWeave, aFIPC, naruon, or Keyverse
   into `pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml`. The model credential remains `NVIDIA_NIM_API_KEY`
   on the worker, never `COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN`.
+- **pip-audit** of hashed locks goes through `scripts/ci/pip_audit_requirements.py`.
+  Do not call `pip-audit -r` on a complete lock (that re-resolves and can false-fail).
 - **Central review routes through the vendored contextual-orchestrator gateway.**
   `pr-review-autofix.yml` provisions `scripts/ci/contextual_orchestrator_review_sidecar.sh`
   (the five provider secrets flow into its KV; the writer runs

docs/doctoring/strix-hashed-lock-no-deps.md

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# Strix hashed-lock install and pip-audit without pip re-resolution
+
+검토 기준일: **2026-08-16**
+
+## Incident
+
+The required Strix workflow is `pull_request_target`: GitHub runs the **base
+branch** copy of `.github/workflows/strix.yml` against the pull-request head
+tree. ContextualWisdomLab/.github#961 therefore compiled a complete lock of
+`strix-agent==1.5.3` plus `cryptography==50.0.0` (override for CVE-2026-39892
+and CVE-2026-69247) and added `--no-deps` to the PR copy of the installer, but
+the live required job still executed main's installer:
+
+```text
+pip install --require-hashes -r requirements-strix-ci-hashes.txt
+```
+
+pip re-applied `strix-agent 1.5.3 depends on cryptography<49 and >=48.0.1`
+and exited `ResolutionImpossible`. The same resolver path is what
+`python-security.yml` used for every `requirements*.txt` file. pip-audit then
+printed `::error::pip-audit reported known-vulnerable Python dependencies`
+even though no advisory was returned. A buyer watching the required security
+dashboard saw two red X marks on an honest lock.
+
+## Decision
+
+1. Land `--require-hashes --no-deps` on **main's** Strix installer first, with
+   no lock change. The current main lock (`strix-agent==1.0.4` +
+   `cryptography==50.0.0`) is already a complete hashed set, so `--no-deps`
+   does not widen the install. After this lands, a later 1.5.3 lock can
+   install under the required base-branch workflow.
+2. Audit hashed locks with `pip-audit --disable-pip` via
+   `scripts/ci/pip_audit_requirements.py`. Compile-time `*-overrides.txt`
+   files and unhashed inputs that already have a `*-hashes.txt` sibling are
+   not separate install sets.
+3. Do not drop `cryptography==50.0.0` to satisfy the stale `<49` metadata
+   bound. Do not treat `ResolutionImpossible` as a vulnerability.
+
+`python-security.yml` is `pull_request` (not `_target`), so the helper takes
+effect on the same head that introduces it. Strix still needs this installer
+line on the protected base before #961 can go green.
+
+## Trust boundary
+
+- `--no-deps` is not an unhashed install: every wheel remains hash-pinned.
+- `--disable-pip` still queries the advisory database for every pinned name
+  and version; it only skips pip's metadata resolver.
+- NVIDIA NIM / OpenCode review-agent credentials are untouched.
+- No operational PII is masked.
+
+## Verification contract
+
+`tests/test_pip_audit_requirements.py` reconstructs the #961 lock shape and
+requires `--disable-pip` for that file, a skip for the override/input pair,
+and the `--no-deps` installer line on `strix.yml`. A `*-hashes.txt` name
+or a lone `--require-hashes` directive without `--hash=` is not treated
+as a complete lock. A mixed file with one hashed line beside unhashed
+packages, a filename-only wheel path, a `-r`/`-c`/`-e` include, or a pip
+option carrying hash-shaped text also stays on the resolver path. A
+complete lock that only adds resolver configuration such as `--index-url`
+still receives `--disable-pip`. An unhashed compile input is skipped
+only when its regular, non-symlink sibling is itself a valid complete lock.
+Invalid UTF-8 and symlink/special-file requirement inputs fail before any
+audit command. Discovery does not descend directory symbolic links, and a
+presented path whose intermediate parent is a symlink or whose resolved
+target leaves the audit root fails closed (CWE-22 / CWE-59).
+Repository-controlled filenames are JSON-escaped before GitHub Actions
+group titles. Discovery skips `.venv` trees.
+
+## References (APA 7th)
+
+GitHub. (2026). *Cryptography vulnerable to buffer overflow if
+non-contiguous buffers were passed to APIs (CVE-2026-39892,
+GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq)*. GitHub Advisory Database.
+https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p423-j2cm-9vmq
+
+GitHub. (2026). *PKCS#7 decryption timing oracle in pyca/cryptography
+(CVE-2026-69247, GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5)*. GitHub Advisory Database.
+https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5
+
+National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2026).
+*CVE-2026-69247*. National Vulnerability Database.
+https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69247
+
+pypa. (2025). *pip-audit: ``--disable-pip`` (hashed requirements / ``--no-deps``
+only)*. https://github.com/pypa/pip-audit
+
+MITRE. (2026). *CWE-22: Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted
+directory ('Path Traversal')*. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
+
+MITRE. (2026). *CWE-59: Improper link resolution before file access
+('Link Following')*. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html
+
+Python Packaging Authority. (n.d.). *Hash-checking mode*. pip documentation.
+https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/topics/secure-installs/#hash-checking-mode