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…ssip blocks A block with an unknown parent is decoded, hashed, cached and handed to unknown parent sync before its proposer signature is checked, so a peer without a validator key can make the node retain arbitrary blocks. Move the registry and signature checks ahead of the parent lookup, count a retained unknown parent block as the proposer's proposal for the slot so a second one is an equivocation instead of another retained block, and report peers that send blocks with an invalid signature.
nflaig
commented
Sep 14, 2026
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| if (e.type.code === BlockErrorCode.PROPOSAL_SIGNATURE_INVALID) { | ||
| // An honest peer never forwards a block with an invalid proposer signature | ||
| core.reportPeer(peerIdStr, PeerAction.LowToleranceError, "InvalidBlockSignature"); |
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this could probably use PeerAction.Fatal?
wemeetagain
reviewed
Sep 14, 2026
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| if (e.type.code === BlockErrorCode.PROPOSAL_SIGNATURE_INVALID) { | ||
| // An honest peer never forwards a block with an invalid proposer signature | ||
| core.reportPeer(peerIdStr, PeerAction.LowToleranceError, "InvalidBlockSignature"); |
This was referenced Sep 15, 2026
Base automatically changed from
nflaig/prune-unimported-repeat-proposals
to
unstable
September 17, 2026 01:41
…ck-signature-before-parent # Conflicts: # packages/beacon-node/src/network/processor/gossipHandlers.ts # packages/beacon-node/test/unit/network/processor/gossipHandlers.test.ts
Since #10059 the validator wrapper reports the peer for every REJECT by topic and code, Fatal for an invalid proposer signature on beacon_block, so the handler-level LowToleranceError report was a second, weaker penalty for the same rejection.
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Performance Report🚀🚀 Significant benchmark improvement detected
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Gossip block validation checks the proposer signature only after the parent is known, and the handler caches the block and hands it to unknown parent sync on
PARENT_BLOCK_UNKNOWN. A peer without any validator key can therefore make the node decode, hash, cache and sync-fetch arbitrary current-slot blocks with an unknown parent, at up to 10 MiB per message and with no penalty since the result is an IGNORE. This is the precondition behind ethereum-bounty/lodestar#22 and ethereum-bounty/lodestar#23.verifyBlockProposerSignatureworks without a state and the signing root reuses the cached block root, so this reorders existing work rather than adding anyREPEAT_PROPOSALwith the equivocation recorded instead of another retained block, and a repeat proposal whose parent is unknown is not imported and is pruned from the cachesFatalpenalty the gossip validator applies toPROPOSAL_SIGNATURE_INVALIDsince feat: penalize peers for forwarding REJECTED gossip messages #10059, an honest peer never forwards such a block, so a spamming peer is banned on the first oneA peer with no validator key now gets every block rejected and nothing retained. A peer with validator keys retains at most one block per key per slot and hands us slashable evidence with the second. The decode and hash cost of a message before it is rejected is unchanged and is the subject of a follow-up that bounds in-flight block gossip work per peer.
Builds on #10083.