Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately to oss@brightbeam.com. Do not open a public issue for security reports. You will receive an acknowledgement within five working days.

Reports of particular interest, given what Brevet protects:

• any way to raise a capability's authority without a recorded human or mission-group identity (invariant I2 in SPEC.md section 2)
• Evidence-layer material resolving into a lockfile (invariant I1), or recalled material reaching a lockfile or a running agent (SPEC.md section 7)
• a decision, release or register change accepted without the approver signatures the workspace requires, including a change to a mission group made without that group's quorum
• evidence-chain manipulation that brevet verify fails to detect, including a chain cut short, rewritten or replaced behind its anchors
• an agent running, outside the shadow channel, anything other than its latest signed release: a modified manifest, lock or harness that still verifies
• a tool call that escapes the tool tiers a release declares

The rules a conforming deployment enforces are in SPEC.md; how each control is switched on is in ABOUT.md under "Signed approvals" and "Running in production". Approver keys live outside the workspace, encrypted with a passphrase or held as the approver's own SSH key, and can be checked against an allowed-signers file or GitHub. Where anchors are configured, the evidence chain's head is anchored outside the workspace, in a file the agent cannot write or a CHAP coordinator's audit log. Brevet assumes an attacker who controls the workspace does not also hold an approver's unlocked key or write access to every anchor target.