The first execution network where every block ships with a mathematical proof of its own correctness — built post-quantum from genesis, no migration required.
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BLEEP is a distributed execution protocol built on three invariants: every block ships with a cryptographic proof of its own correctness, every instruction is expressed as intent rather than bytecode, and the entire cryptographic foundation survives a quantum computer — by construction, from genesis. Every block produced by BLEEP includes a Winterfell STARK proof of its own validity — generated before broadcast, verified independently by every validator, requiring no trusted setup and no privileged operator. Transaction signing, peer authentication, key encapsulation, and zero-knowledge proof verification are each secured exclusively by NIST-finalised post-quantum standards — FIPS 205 (SPHINCS+) and FIPS 203 (Kyber-1024/ML-KEM-1024) — at Security Level 5.
BLEEP is post-quantum from genesis. There is no classical fallback. There is no migration path needed — because the problem was solved before the protocol accumulated economic value and ecosystem dependencies.
| The harvest-now, decrypt-later threat is real and accumulating. Every signed transaction on a classically secured blockchain is a permanent public record. An adversary can archive those records today and apply quantum decryption retroactively when capable hardware arrives. BLEEP's historical record carries no such liability — by design.|
| Property | What it means | How it's implemented |
|---|---|---|
| Proven Execution | Every block ships with a cryptographic proof of correctness | Winterfell STARK BlockValidityProof — generated pre-broadcast, verified pre-vote |
| Intent Native | Users and agents express outcomes, not instructions | PAT engine + 7-tier VM router — intent resolved to optimal execution path automatically |
| Quantum Foundation | No classical public-key primitive on any sensitive path | SPHINCS+ (FIPS 205) + Kyber-1024 (FIPS 203) at Security Level 5 — from block zero |
| Constitutional Integrity | Supply cap, inflation ceiling, finality threshold cannot be changed by anyone | Rust const_assert! — violations do not compile |
| Property | Non-PQ chains | Naoris Protocol | BLEEP |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transaction signing | ECDSA — broken by Shor's | Dilithium-5 overlay | SPHINCS+-SHAKE-256f (FIPS 205, SL5) — native |
| Key encapsulation | ECDH / x25519 — broken by Shor's | Additive layer | Kyber-1024 / ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203, SL5) — native |
| ZK proof system | Groth16 / PLONK — trusted setup | Not applicable | Winterfell STARK — transparent, no ceremony |
| Block validity | Assumed | Not proven | Proven — STARK proof per block |
| Intent execution | Not supported | Not supported | Native — PAT engine + 7-tier VM |
| Quantum migration | Required (coordination risk) | Overlay — doesn't fix base chain | Not needed — PQ from genesis |
| Supply cap enforcement | Governance-changeable | Governance-changeable | Compile-time const_assert |
| Trusted operators | Bridge multisigs | Centralised nodes | None — 4-tier trustless bridge |
A protocol that launches with classical cryptography and plans a post-quantum migration inherits a coordination problem that history shows cannot be cleanly solved. Validators, wallets, bridges, indexers, and all tooling must upgrade simultaneously. HTTPS migration took over a decade and is still incomplete.
BLEEP eliminates this problem by not having it. Post-quantum from genesis means no migration coordination, no ecosystem split, no retroactive cryptographic liability.
# Ubuntu / Debian
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y \
build-essential cmake clang libclang-dev \
libssl-dev pkg-config librocksdb-dev \
protobuf-compiler perl nasm
# Rust toolchain (reads rust-toolchain.toml automatically)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh
source "$HOME/.cargo/env"git clone https://github.com/BleepEcosystem/BLEEP-v1.git
cd BLEEP-v1
cargo run --release16-step startup sequence (Protocol Version 5):
[1/16] ✅ SPHINCS+-SHAKE-256f-simple keypair (PK=64 bytes, SK=128 bytes — FIPS 205 SL5)
[1/16] ✅ Kyber-1024 keypair (PK=1,568 bytes — FIPS 203 SL5)
[2/16] ✅ Genesis block #0 — blockchain, mempool, tx-pool ready
[3/16] ✅ Wallet services online
[4/16] ✅ PAT engine running (6-layer intent-driven architecture)
[5/16] ✅ AI advisory ready (deterministic mode, governance-gated)
[6/16] ✅ Governance online (1B total stake)
[7/16] ✅ ValidatorRegistry + SlashingEngine initialised
[8/16] ✅ STARK prover/verifier ready — no trusted setup required
✅ STARK block circuit ready (48-column trace, f128 field)
✅ STARK batch tx circuit ready
[9/16] ✅ BleepEconomicsRuntime — fee market, oracle, emission schedule
[10/16] ✅ BLEEP Connect: ETH, BSC, SOL, COSMOS, DOT adapters registered
[11/16] ✅ Telemetry (Prometheus-compatible) active
[12/16] ✅ P2P node listening on 0.0.0.0:7700
[13/16] ✅ MempoolBridge active (500ms drain cycle)
[14/16] ✅ BlockProducer online (3s slots, PoS-BFT, STARK proofs, P2P gossip)
[15/16] ✅ Consensus engine — PoS-Normal mode
[16/16] ✅ JSON-RPC server on 0.0.0.0:8545 — 46 endpoints active
# Set a real deployed Sepolia contract address (0x + 40 hex chars)
# The node will warn at startup if this is missing or malformed
export SEPOLIA_BLEEP_FULFILL_ADDR=0x<your_deployed_contract>
export SEPOLIA_RPC_URL=https://...
cargo run --releasebash ./demo_interchain.shbash ./test_tps.shBLEEP is a 29-crate Cargo workspace with an acyclic dependency graph enforced at build time. Each crate has a single defined responsibility. A vulnerability in networking cannot directly access private key material. A change to execution cannot modify cryptographic behaviour.
graph TB
subgraph EXT["External"]
USER["User / Agent"]
PEER["P2P Peers"]
ETH["Ethereum / Sepolia"]
end
subgraph NET["Network Layer"]
P2P["bleep-p2p\nKademlia DHT · Gossip · Onion Routing"]
RPC["bleep-rpc\n46 JSON-RPC Endpoints"]
AUTH["bleep-auth\nJWT · RBAC · Audit Log"]
end
subgraph EXEC["Execution Layer"]
PAT["bleep-pat\nPAT Engine · 6-Layer Intent"]
VM["bleep-vm\n7-Tier Intent Router"]
AI["bleep-ai\nAI Advisory (deterministic)"]
end
subgraph CONSENSUS["Consensus Layer"]
CON["bleep-consensus\nPoS-BFT · Slashing · Epochs"]
ZKP["bleep-zkp\nWinterfell STARK Prover/Verifier"]
SCHED["bleep-scheduler\n20 Maintenance Tasks"]
end
subgraph STATE["State Layer"]
ST["bleep-state\nSparse Merkle Trie · RocksDB"]
IDX["bleep-indexer\nBlock · Tx · Account Indexes"]
end
subgraph CRYPTO["Cryptographic Foundation"]
CRY["bleep-crypto\nSPHINCS+ · Kyber-1024 · AES-256-GCM"]
WALLET["bleep-wallet-core\nKey Lifecycle · BIP-39"]
end
subgraph ECON["Economics & Governance"]
ECO["bleep-economics\nFee Market · Oracle · Tokenomics"]
GOV["bleep-governance\nConstitution · ZK Voting · Upgrades"]
end
subgraph INTEROP["Interoperability"]
BC["bleep-interop\nBLEEP Connect · 4-Tier Bridge · 10 Sub-crates"]
end
USER --> RPC
PEER <--> P2P
ETH <--> BC
RPC --> EXEC
RPC --> AUTH
P2P --> CON
PAT --> VM
VM --> CON
AI --> GOV
CON --> ZKP
CON --> ST
ST --> CRY
WALLET --> CRY
ECO --> CON
GOV --> CON
BC --> ZKP
BC --> CRY
SCHED --> CON
SCHED --> ECO
IDX --> ST
crates/
├── bleep-core # Block types, ZKTransaction, mempool, shared data structures
├── bleep-crypto # SPHINCS+, Kyber-1024, AES-256-GCM, SHA3-256, BLAKE3
├── bleep-zkp # Winterfell STARK block validity circuit — BlockValidityProver/Verifier
├── bleep-consensus # PoS-BFT (primary), PBFT, PoW fallback; slashing; epoch management
├── bleep-state # Sparse Merkle Trie (256-level), RocksDB, cross-shard 2PC, self-healing
├── bleep-vm # 7-tier intent-driven VM: Native/Router/EVM/WASM/STARK/AI/Cross-Chain
├── bleep-pat # Programmable Asset Token engine — 6-layer intent-driven architecture
├── bleep-ai # Deterministic AI advisory — AIConstraintValidator, DeterministicInferenceEngine
├── bleep-p2p # Kademlia DHT (k=20), Plumtree gossip (fanout=8), onion routing
├── bleep-rpc # 46 JSON-RPC endpoints — health, state, proof, governance, bridge, AI
├── bleep-auth # Credentials, JWT, RBAC, tamper-evident audit log, validator binding
├── bleep-scheduler # 20 built-in protocol maintenance tasks
├── bleep-economics # Tokenomics, EIP-1559-style fee market, validator incentives, oracle bridge
├── bleep-governance # Constitution, ZK voting, proposal lifecycle, forkless upgrades
├── bleep-indexer # Block, Tx, Account, Governance, Validator, Shard indexes
├── bleep-wallet-core # SPHINCS+ key management, BIP-39 wallets, transaction signing
├── bleep-telemetry # Prometheus-compatible metrics, load balancer
├── bleep-cli # Validator staking, governance, AI, ZKP, faucet commands
├── bleep-interop/ # BLEEP Connect — 10 sub-crates across 4 bridge tiers
│ ├── bleep-connect-types
│ ├── bleep-connect-crypto
│ ├── bleep-connect-adapters
│ ├── bleep-connect-commitment-chain
│ ├── bleep-connect-executor
│ ├── bleep-connect-layer1-social
│ ├── bleep-connect-layer2-fullnode
│ ├── bleep-connect-layer3-zkproof
│ ├── bleep-connect-layer4-instant
│ └── bleep-connect-core
| Subsystem | Crates | Responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| Cryptography | bleep-crypto, bleep-zkp, bleep-wallet-core |
PQ signatures, KEM, STARK proofs, key lifecycle |
| Consensus | bleep-consensus, bleep-scheduler |
Block production, STARK proof pipeline, finality, slashing |
| State | bleep-state, bleep-indexer |
Sparse Merkle Trie, RocksDB, shard lifecycle, self-healing |
| Execution | bleep-vm, bleep-pat, bleep-ai |
Multi-engine VM, intent resolution, deterministic AI advisory |
| Network | bleep-p2p, bleep-rpc, bleep-auth |
Node discovery, gossip, onion routing, authentication |
| Interop | bleep-interop (10 sub-crates) |
4-tier cross-chain bridge, intent pool, ZK proof relay |
| Economics | bleep-economics, bleep-governance |
Tokenomics, fee market, ZK voting, forkless upgrades |
All cryptography on sensitive paths is post-quantum. No classical fallback exists.
graph LR
subgraph PQ["Post-Quantum Secure ✅"]
direction TB
TX_SIGN["Transaction Signing\nSPHINCS+-SHAKE-256f\nFIPS 205 · SL5"]
BLK_SIGN["Block Signing\nSPHINCS+-SHAKE-256f\nFIPS 205 · SL5"]
P2P_AUTH["P2P Authentication\nSPHINCS+-SHAKE-256f\nFIPS 205 · SL5"]
KEM["Key Encapsulation\nKyber-1024 / ML-KEM-1024\nFIPS 203 · SL5"]
ONION["Onion Routing\nKyber-1024 per-hop\n+ AES-256-GCM"]
ZKP_BLOCK["Block Validity Proofs\nWinterfell STARK\nHash-based · No ECC"]
ZKP_BRIDGE["Cross-Chain Bridge Proofs\nSPHINCS+-bound STARK\ntranscripts"]
AUDIT["Audit Log\nSHA3-256 Merkle chain\nsync=true · RocksDB"]
SMT["Identity Proofs\nSHA3-256 Sparse Merkle Trie\n256-level · fixed-size paths"]
end
subgraph CLASSICAL["Classical Primitives ❌ Not Present"]
direction TB
RSA["RSA"]
ECDSA["ECDSA / secp256k1"]
X25519["x25519 / ECDH"]
BLS["BLS"]
G16["Groth16 / PLONK"]
SRS["Trusted SRS"]
end
style PQ fill:#0a2f1a,color:#4ade80,stroke:#22c55e
style CLASSICAL fill:#2f0a0a,color:#f87171,stroke:#ef4444
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| NIST Standard | FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) |
| Security Level | 5 — ≥256-bit post-quantum security |
| Security Assumption | One-wayness of SHAKE-256 (hash-based) |
| Public Key | 64 bytes |
| Secret Key | 128 bytes (Zeroizing<Vec<u8>> — zeroed on drop) |
| Signature | 49,856 bytes |
| Crate | pqcrypto-sphincsplus v0.7.2 |
| Usage | Transaction signing, block signing, P2P message authentication |
Bandwidth note: At 4,096 transactions per block with one signature per transaction, aggregate signature data per block is approximately 204 MB. This is the direct, quantified cost of hash-based post-quantum security with no trusted setup. Signature aggregation is a medium-term research direction tracked in Phase 8 roadmap.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| NIST Standard | FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) |
| Security Level | 5 — ≥256-bit post-quantum security |
| Security Assumption | Hardness of Module-LWE (lattice-based) |
| Public Key | 1,568 bytes |
| Secret Key | 3,168 bytes (Zeroizing<Vec<u8>> — zeroed on drop) |
| Ciphertext | 1,568 bytes + 32-byte shared secret |
| Crate | pqcrypto-kyber v0.8.1 |
| Usage | Validator binding, peer KEM, wallet key management, onion routing |
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Construction | FRI-based STARK over 128-bit prime field |
| Trusted Setup | None — fully transparent |
| Post-Quantum Secure | Yes — reduces to collision resistance of BLAKE3 / SHA3-256 |
| Trace Width | 48 columns |
| Public Inputs | block_index, epoch_id, tx_count, merkle_root_hash, validator_pk_hash |
| Proof Generation | ~850 ms on reference hardware (8-core, 32 GB RAM) |
| Proof Verification | ~12 ms |
| Slot Budget | 3,000 ms — proof generation fits within one slot |
| Crate | winterfell v0.13.1 |
| Usage | Block validity proofs, cross-chain bridge verification (Tier 3) |
BLEEP's VM resolves intent — not bytecode. Callers declare what they want. The Router (Tier 2) determines how it executes, selecting the optimal engine automatically.
flowchart TD
INTENT["Typed Intent Struct\n(caller declares outcome)"]
INTENT --> T2
subgraph DISPATCH["VM Router — bleep-vm/src/router/vm_router.rs"]
T2["Tier 2 · Router\nIntent parsing · Engine selection\nCircuit breakers · Gas validation"]
end
T2 -->|"BLEEP transfer\nstake · vote"| T1["Tier 1 · Native\nNo gas · Direct state write"]
T2 -->|"Solidity contract"| T3["Tier 3 · EVM\nrevm · Ethereum gas semantics"]
T2 -->|"WASM contract"| T4["Tier 4 · WASM\nWasmer + Cranelift\nConfigurable fuel metering"]
T2 -->|"ZK execution\nproof verification"| T5["Tier 5 · STARK\nWinterfell · Fixed cost per verifier op"]
T2 -->|"Governance constraint\ncheck (advisory)"| T6["Tier 6 · AI-Advised\nDeterministic · No gas\nOff-chain only"]
T2 -->|"Cross-chain intent\ninstant dispatch"| T7["Tier 7 · Cross-Chain\nBLEEP Connect Tier 4\nProtocol fee in bps"]
T1 --> SD["StateDiff\n(isolated — no direct state write)"]
T3 --> SD
T4 --> SD
T5 --> SD
T6 --> SD
T7 --> SD
SD -->|"Committed atomically\nafter validator quorum"| STATE["bleep-state\nSparse Merkle Trie · RocksDB"]
style DISPATCH fill:#1a1f2e,stroke:#4f6ef7
style SD fill:#1a2a1a,stroke:#4ade80
sequenceDiagram
participant U as User / Agent
participant RPC as POST /rpc/tx/submit
participant MEM as Mempool
participant BP as BlockProducer
participant ZK as STARK Prover
participant VAL as Validators (BFT)
participant ST as StateManager
U->>RPC: Typed intent (SPHINCS+-signed)
RPC->>MEM: nonce check · balance check<br/>min base fee · SPHINCS+ verify
MEM-->>RPC: admitted
Note over MEM,BP: drain every 500ms
BP->>MEM: select up to 4,096 txs (fee-descending)
BP->>ST: compute SMT root
BP->>ZK: BlockValidityProver.prove()<br/>(~850ms on ref hardware)
ZK-->>BP: BlockValidityProof (48-col trace)
BP->>BP: SPHINCS+ sign completed block
BP->>VAL: broadcast (block + STARK proof + SPHINCS+ sig)
VAL->>ZK: BlockValidityVerifier.verify() — ~12ms
VAL->>VAL: prevote (SPHINCS+-signed)
VAL->>VAL: precommit (SPHINCS+-signed)
Note over VAL: Finalised when >6,667 bps<br/>of total stake precommit
VAL->>ST: StateDiff committed atomically
ST-->>U: finalised · irreversible
Every validator carries:
- A SPHINCS+ verification key — transaction and block signing
- A Kyber-1024 encapsulation key — peer channels and onion routing
- A stake in microBLEEP — determines vote weight and slashing exposure
Safety guaranteed when Byzantine stake f < S/3 (total staked supply S).
flowchart LR
subgraph SLOT["3,000 ms Slot"]
direction TB
SEL["Proposer Selection\nStake-proportional VRF"]
BP["BlockProducer\nSelect ≤4,096 txs\nCompute SMT root"]
STARK["STARK Prover\n~850ms · 48-col trace\n5 public inputs"]
SIGN["SPHINCS+ Block Sign\n49,856-byte signature"]
BCAST["P2P Broadcast\nGossip fanout=8"]
end
subgraph VALIDATE["Validator Verification"]
direction TB
VSIG["Verify SPHINCS+ sig"]
VZKP["Verify STARK proof\n~12ms"]
VSMT["Verify SMT root transition"]
end
subgraph BFT["BFT Finality"]
direction TB
PREV["Prevote\n(SPHINCS+-signed)"]
PREC["Precommit\n(SPHINCS+-signed)"]
FIN["Finalise\n>6,667 bps stake\nIrreversible"]
end
SEL --> BP --> STARK --> SIGN --> BCAST
BCAST --> VALIDATE
VSIG --> VZKP --> VSMT
VALIDATE --> BFT
PREV --> PREC --> FIN
NORMAL["PoS-Normal\n>67% validators online"] --> SEL
EMERGENCY["Emergency (PBFT)\n<67% online\nSafety-first"] -.->|fallback| BP
RECOVERY["Recovery (PoW)\nPost-partition re-anchor"] -.->|last resort| FIN
style SLOT fill:#1a1f2e,stroke:#4f6ef7
style VALIDATE fill:#1f1a2e,stroke:#a855f7
style BFT fill:#1a2a1a,stroke:#4ade80
| Mode | Trigger | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| PoS-Normal | Primary — >67% validators responsive | Stake-proportional proposer selection, 3,000ms slots |
| Emergency | <67% validators responsive | Reduced validator set, safety-first, PBFT |
| Recovery | Post-partition re-anchor | Deterministic re-synchronisation from last finalised block |
Finalisation requires precommits representing >6,667 bps (66.67%) of total staked supply. Finalisation is irreversible. Long-range reorgs rejected at FinalityManager — verified in the adversarial test suite at depths of 10 and 50 blocks.
| Violation | Penalty | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Double-sign | 33% of stake burned; validator tombstoned | double_signing_penalty: 0.33 |
| Equivocation | 25% of stake burned | equivocation_penalty: 0.25 |
| Downtime | 0.1% per consecutive missed block | downtime_penalty_per_block |
| Tier 4 bridge executor timeout | 30% of executor bond | EXECUTION_TIMEOUT = 120s |
Source: crates/bleep-consensus/src/slashing_engine.rs
The bleep-scheduler crate runs 20 maintenance tasks including:
| Task | Description |
|---|---|
epoch_advance |
Rotate validators, reset epoch state, emit boundary events |
validator_reward_distribution |
Compute and mint epoch rewards; enforce 200M BLEEP supply cap |
slashing_evidence_sweep |
Apply pending double-signing, equivocation, downtime evidence |
supply_state_verify |
SAFETY CRITICAL — halts node if circulating supply exceeds 200M BLEEP |
token_burn_execution |
Execute scheduled fee burns (default 0.5% burn rate) |
self_healing_sweep |
Detect shard faults; classify severity; trigger recovery |
cross_shard_timeout_sweep |
Force-abort 2PC coordinators that have exceeded timeout height |
governance_proposal_advance |
Advance proposals through lifecycle state machine |
fee_market_update |
Recompute base fee from shard congestion metrics |
peer_score_decay |
Decay P2P peer trust scores; remove stale/disconnected peers |
audit_log_rotation |
Archive auth audit log entries older than 30 days |
mempool_prune |
Remove stale, under-priced, and invalid-nonce transactions |
Four-tier bridge architecture. No permanently privileged operator. No trusted multisig key set. Implemented across 10 sub-crates in crates/bleep-interop/.
flowchart TB
subgraph BLEEP_CHAIN["BLEEP Chain"]
INTENT["Cross-Chain Intent\n(SPHINCS+-signed)"]
POOL["L4 Intent Pool\n/rpc/connect/intents/pending"]
BATCH["L3 Proof Batcher\n32 intents per bundle"]
NULL["GlobalNullifierSet\ndouble-spend prevention\nWriteBatch sync=true"]
end
subgraph T4["Tier 4 — Instant (✅ Sepolia Live)"]
direction LR
AUC["Executor Auction\n15s window"]
ESC["Escrow Lock\n30% bond posted"]
EXEC["Execution\n≤120s timeout"]
SLASH["Bond Slash\n30% if timeout"]
AUC --> ESC --> EXEC
EXEC -->|timeout| SLASH
end
subgraph T3["Tier 3 — ZK Proof (✅ Sepolia Live)"]
direction LR
TRANSCRIPT["SPHINCS+-bound\nSTARK transcript"]
PROOF["Winterfell STARK\nproof bundle"]
VERIFY_ETH["Ethereum Verifier\nSolidity contract"]
TRANSCRIPT --> PROOF --> VERIFY_ETH
end
subgraph T2["Tier 2 — Full-Node (🔲 Mainnet)"]
MULTI["Multi-client verification\n≥3 independent nodes\n90% consensus threshold"]
end
subgraph T1["Tier 1 — Social (🔲 Mainnet)"]
GOV_TIER["Stakeholder governance\n7 days / 24h emergency"]
end
subgraph EXT_CHAIN["Ethereum / Sepolia"]
FULFILL["BleepFulfill\nContract"]
RELEASE["Asset Release"]
end
INTENT --> POOL
POOL --> T4
POOL --> BATCH
BATCH --> T3
T4 --> FULFILL
T3 --> FULFILL
FULFILL --> RELEASE
RELEASE --> NULL
T2 -.->|high-value| FULFILL
T1 -.->|dispute resolution| FULFILL
style T4 fill:#1a2a1a,stroke:#4ade80
style T3 fill:#1a2a1a,stroke:#4ade80
style T2 fill:#2a2a1a,stroke:#facc15,stroke-dasharray:5 5
style T1 fill:#2a2a1a,stroke:#facc15,stroke-dasharray:5 5
| Tier | Protocol | Latency | Security Basis | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 — Instant | Executor auction + escrow | 200ms – 1s | Economic: 30% bond slashed on timeout | ✅ Sepolia testnet |
| 3 — ZK Proof | SPHINCS+-bound STARK commitment | 10 – 30s | Cryptographic: PQ-secure, zero trusted operators | ✅ Sepolia testnet |
| 2 — Full-Node | Multi-client verification (≥3 nodes) | Hours | 90% consensus across independent nodes | 🔲 Mainnet target |
| 1 — Social | Stakeholder governance | 7 days / 24h emergency | Full governance consensus | 🔲 Mainnet target |
Chain adapters registered at boot: ETH, BSC, SOL, COSMOS, DOT
Tier 4 parameters: 15s auction window · 120s execution timeout · 10 bps protocol fee · 30% bond slash on timeout
Tier 3: Batches 32 intents per STARK proof bundle · GlobalNullifierSet prevents double-spend · no setup ceremony required
These four parameters are enforced by Rust const_assert!. A code change that violates them does not compile. They cannot be altered by governance vote, software upgrade, or validator supermajority.
| Parameter | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maximum supply | 200,000,000 BLEEP | MAX_SUPPLY in tokenomics.rs |
| Maximum per-epoch inflation | 500 bps (5%) | MAX_INFLATION_RATE_BPS |
| Fee burn floor | 2,500 bps (25%) | FEE_BURN_BPS in distribution.rs |
| Minimum finality threshold | >6,667 bps | FinalityManager |
| Allocation | Tokens | % | Launch Unlock | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validator Rewards | 60,000,000 | 30% | 10,000,000 | Emission decay schedule |
| Ecosystem Fund | 50,000,000 | 25% | 5,000,000 | 10-year linear; governance disbursement |
| Community Incentives | 30,000,000 | 15% | 5,000,000 | Governance-triggered release |
| Foundation Treasury | 30,000,000 | 15% | 5,000,000 | 6-year linear; governance spending |
| Core Contributors | 20,000,000 | 10% | 0 | 1-year cliff + 4-year linear; immutable on-chain |
| Strategic Reserve | 10,000,000 | 5% | 0 | Governance-controlled unlock |
| Year | Rate | Annual Emission |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 12% | 7,200,000 BLEEP |
| 2 | 10% | 6,000,000 BLEEP |
| 3 | 8% | 4,800,000 BLEEP |
| 4 | 6% | 3,600,000 BLEEP |
| 5+ | 4% | ~2,400,000 BLEEP/yr |
EIP-1559-style base fee with compile-time verified split: 25% burned / 50% validator rewards / 25% treasury (splits must sum to exactly 10,000 bps — enforced by const_assert!).
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Minimum base fee | 1,000 microBLEEP |
| Maximum base fee | 10,000,000,000 microBLEEP |
| Max base fee change per block | 1,250 bps (12.5%) |
| Initial circulating supply | 25,000,000 BLEEP (12.5%) |
| Testnet faucet | 10 BLEEP / address / 24 hours |
flowchart LR
SUB["Submit\n≥10,000 BLEEP deposit\nTyped proposal struct"]
AI["AIConstraintValidator\nPre-flight check\n(deterministic rule engine)"]
ACT["Active\nVoting period:\n1,000 blocks (~50 min)"]
TALLY["Tally\nStake-weighted\nZK Voting"]
EXEC["Execute\nForkless at epoch boundary"]
REC["Record\nOn-chain result\nAudit log entry"]
REJ["Rejected\nConstitutional violation\nVeto >33.33%\nQuorum <10%"]
SUB --> AI
AI -->|"passes constitutional\ninvariants check"| ACT
AI -->|"MaxInflationBps > 500\nor other violation"| REJ
ACT --> TALLY
TALLY -->|"Yes > 66.67%\nQuorum ≥ 10%\nVeto < 33.33%"| EXEC
TALLY -->|"fails threshold"| REJ
EXEC --> REC
style REJ fill:#2f0a0a,stroke:#ef4444
style EXEC fill:#0a2f1a,stroke:#22c55e
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Voting period | 1,000 blocks (~50 min at 3s block time) |
| Quorum | 1,000 bps (10% stake participation) |
| Pass threshold | 6,667 bps (66.67% of participating stake) |
| Veto threshold | 3,333 bps (33.33%) |
| Minimum deposit | 10,000 BLEEP |
Votes are cast as EncryptedBallot structs. EligibilityProof establishes voting power without revealing validator identity. TallyProof enables independent tally verification without revealing individual votes.
Voter roles: Validator (1.0×) · Delegator (0.5×) · Community token holder (0.1×)
Four parameters are constitutionally immutable, enforced by Rust const_assert!. A code change that violates them does not compile. They cannot be altered by any governance vote, software upgrade, or validator supermajority.
ForklessUpgradeEngine activates hash-committed upgrade payloads at epoch boundaries only. Version progression is monotonically enforced — a version mismatch halts the chain. No node restart required.
16,127 lines of Rust across six crates reviewed.
| Severity | Count | Resolved | Acknowledged |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 2 | ✅ 2 | 0 |
| High | 3 | ✅ 3 | 0 |
| Medium | 4 | ✅ 3 | 1 (SA-M4: EIP-1559 design property; documented in THREAT_MODEL.md) |
| Low | 3 | ✅ 3 | 0 |
| Informational | 2 | ✅ 1 | 1 (SA-I2: NTP drift guard — mainnet gate) |
All Critical and High findings resolved. Cleared for Phase 6 public testnet preparation.
Full report: docs/SECURITY_AUDIT_SPRINT9.md · Threat model: docs/THREAT_MODEL.md
| Scenario | Result | Invariant Verified |
|---|---|---|
ValidatorCrash(1) |
✅ Pass | f=1 < 2.33; consensus resumed |
ValidatorCrash(2) |
✅ Pass | f=2 < 2.33; consensus resumed |
NetworkPartition(4/3) |
✅ Pass | Majority partition continued; healed cleanly |
LongRangeReorg(10) |
✅ Pass | Rejected at FinalityManager |
LongRangeReorg(50) |
✅ Pass | Rejected at FinalityManager |
DoubleSign(validator-0) |
✅ Pass | 33% slashed; tombstoned |
TxReplay |
✅ Pass | Rejected by nonce check |
InvalidBlockFlood(1000) |
✅ Pass | Rejected at SPHINCS+ gate; peer rate-limited |
STARKProofTamper |
✅ Pass | Tampered proof rejected at BlockValidityVerifier |
LoadStress(10,000 TPS, 60s) |
✅ Pass | Max throughput; STARK proofs within slot budget |
SafetyVerifier in bleep-economics/src/game_theory.rs evaluates five attack models: Equivocation, Censorship, NonParticipation, Griefing, and Cartel formation. A CI build fails if any model returns is_profitable = true at current parameters.
fuzz_merkle_insert— Sparse Merkle Trie insertion under malformed inputsfuzz_state_apply_tx— state transition under malformed transactionsfuzz_tx_sign— transaction signing under malformed inputsfuzz_merkle_commitment— Merkle commitment verification
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Configuration | 10 shards, 4,096 tx/block, 3,000ms interval |
| Average TPS | 10,921 (target ≥10,000) |
| Peak TPS | 13,200 |
| Sustained minimum TPS | 9,840 |
| Full-capacity block ratio | 82.3% |
| STARK proof generation (avg) | ~850 ms per block |
| STARK proof verification (avg) | ~12 ms per block |
Note: These are projections from simulated workloads — 7 validators, controlled network latency, geographically concentrated nodes, uniform transaction mix. Actual throughput on a geographically distributed public testnet will be measured and published during Phase 6. STARK timings on reference 8-core, 32 GB RAM hardware.
- 10 shards (
NUM_SHARDS) in testnet configuration - Each shard maintains an independent RocksDB instance
- Cross-shard transactions use
TwoPhaseCommitCoordinatorwith deterministic coordinator selection from transaction hash — no privileged coordinator election - Stalled coordinators force-aborted by
cross_shard_timeout_sweepevery 60 seconds
SelfHealingOrchestrator tracks protocol health: Healthy → Degraded → Critical → Recovering. Low and medium severity faults self-correct. High and critical require quorum approval. All recovery actions are deterministic — identical fault evidence produces identical recovery actions on all honest validators.
Two AI-assisted components exist. Neither participates in block production, consensus voting, or any state-modifying operation without a prior governance vote. AI outputs are inputs to the governance process, not outputs of it.
A deterministic rule engine that checks governance proposals against the four constitutional invariants before they enter the vote queue. Not a trained model — it applies explicit rules. A proposal setting MaxInflationBps above 500 is rejected with a descriptive error before any vote is cast.
An ONNX-based inference runtime enforcing six invariants: SHA3-256 model hash verification, deterministic input normalisation, deterministic output rounding, CPU-only execution, governance-approval gating, and no dynamic model loading.
Every inference produces an auditable InferenceRecord (model hash, normalised inputs, raw outputs, deterministic seed) queryable at GET /rpc/ai/attestations/{epoch}.
Every security-relevant event is written to a tamper-evident audit log backed by RocksDB with synchronous writes (sync=true). Log entries are SHA3-256 Merkle-chained. Mutating any stored entry causes chain verification to fail. The log survives node restarts — on startup, the chain tip and sequence counter are restored and the most recent 10,000 entries warm the in-memory cache.
46 JSON-RPC endpoints on 0.0.0.0:8545. Full specification: docs/specs/rpc_api_spec.md.
Core
GET /rpc/health
GET /rpc/state/{address}
GET /rpc/proof/{address} Sparse Merkle Trie membership proof
POST /rpc/tx/submit
Block & Chain
GET /rpc/block/{index}
GET /rpc/block/latest
GET /rpc/validator/list
Economics
GET /rpc/economics/supply
GET /rpc/economics/distribution
GET /rpc/oracle/price/BLEEP%2FUSD
BLEEP Connect
GET /rpc/connect/intents/pending Tier 4 live intent pool
GET /rpc/layer3/intents Tier 3 ZK bridge intent queue
Governance
GET /rpc/governance/proposals
POST /rpc/governance/propose
POST /rpc/governance/vote
AI Attestation
GET /rpc/ai/attestations/{epoch}
Protocol Hardening
GET /rpc/chaos/status
GET /rpc/benchmark/latest
GET /rpc/audit/report
GET /rpc/ceremony/status STARK proof-system transparency status
(no MPC ceremony — transparent, no trusted setup)
DevNet UI
GET /explorer
POST /faucet/{address} 10 BLEEP / address / 24 hours
GET /metrics Prometheus-compatible
| Parameter | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Block interval | 3,000 ms | BLOCK_INTERVAL_MS |
| Max transactions per block | 4,096 | MAX_TXS_PER_BLOCK |
| Blocks per epoch (mainnet) | 1,000 | BLOCKS_PER_EPOCH |
| Blocks per epoch (testnet) | 100 | testnet-genesis.toml |
| Finality threshold | >6,667 bps of total stake | FinalityManager |
| Active shards | 10 | NUM_SHARDS |
| Double-sign slash | 33% of stake | double_signing_penalty |
| Equivocation slash | 25% of stake | equivocation_penalty |
| Downtime slash | 0.1% per missed block | downtime_penalty_per_block |
| Gossip fanout | 8 | bleep-p2p |
| Kademlia k-bucket size | 20 | bleep-p2p |
| Onion routing max hops | 6 | bleep-p2p |
| Parameter | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| SPHINCS+ signature size | 49,856 bytes | pqcrypto-sphincsplus v0.7.2 |
| SPHINCS+ public key | 64 bytes | pqcrypto-sphincsplus v0.7.2 |
| SPHINCS+ secret key | 128 bytes | pqcrypto-sphincsplus v0.7.2 |
| Kyber-1024 public key | 1,568 bytes | pqcrypto-kyber |
| Kyber-1024 secret key | 3,168 bytes | pqcrypto-kyber |
| State trie depth | 256 levels | TRIE_DEPTH |
| Merkle proof size | 8,192 bytes (fixed) | SparseMerkleTrie |
| Gossip max message size | 2,097,152 bytes (2 MiB) | MAX_GOSSIP_MSG_BYTES |
| STARK trace columns | 48 | BlockValidityAir |
| STARK proof setup | None | bleep-zkp |
| JWT entropy minimum | 3.5 bits/byte (Shannon) | session.rs |
| Phase | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 | Foundation — workspace, crypto primitives, core types | ✅ Complete |
| Phase 2 | Consensus & State — PoS-BFT, Sparse Merkle Trie, epoch management | ✅ Complete |
| Phase 3 | VM & Interoperability — 7-tier VM, PAT engine, BLEEP Connect | ✅ Complete |
| Phase 4 | Self-Healing & AI Advisory — cross-shard 2PC, STARK circuit, DeterministicInferenceEngine | ✅ Complete |
| Phase 5 | Hardening & Audit — chaos testing, fuzz targets, internal security audit | ✅ Complete |
| Phase 6 | External Audit & Public Testnet | 🔄 In progress (Q2 2026) |
| Phase 7 | Mainnet Candidate — TGE, Ethereum bridge, SDKs | 🔲 Planned (Q3–Q4 2026) |
| Phase 8 | Ecosystem Expansion — Cosmos/Polkadot bridges, Move VM, zkEVM | 🔲 Planned (2027) |
| Phase 9 | Quantum-Safe Mainnet — mandatory PQ enforcement, Ed25519 sunset | 🔲 Planned (2028+) |
Full details: ROADMAP.md
BLEEP is self-funded and fully open-source.
- Core protocol: Apache 2.0
bleep-vm: BSL-1.1 — converts to Apache 2.0 on 2028-07-13bleep-ai: MIT
# Full test suite
cargo test --workspace --all-features
# Linter
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
# Formatter
cargo fmt --allSee CONTRIBUTING.md for the contribution guide, SECURITY.md for responsible disclosure, and CODE-OF-CONDUCT.md for community standards.
| Channel | Link |
|---|---|
| Discord | discord.gg/bleepecosystem |
| Telegram | t.me/bleepecosystem |
| Twitter / X | @BleepEcosystem |
| Website | bleepecosystem.com |
| Zealy | zealy.io/c/bleepecosystem |
- Shor, P.W. (1994). Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoring. FOCS 1994.
- NIST (2024). Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization. FIPS 203, FIPS 205.
- Mosca, M. (2018). Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers. IEEE Security & Privacy, 16(5).
- Winterfell STARK library (2024). https://github.com/facebook/winterfell
- Lamport, L., Shostak, R., Pease, M. (1982). The Byzantine generals problem. ACM TOPLAS, 4(3).
- Fischer, M.J., Lynch, N.A., Paterson, M.S. (1985). Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process. JACM, 32(2).
- Ben-Sasson, E. et al. (2018). Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity. IACR ePrint 2018/046.
BLEEP · Quantum Trust Network · Protocol Version 5 · Pre-Testnet
This repository is provided for informational and development purposes only. It does not constitute financial or investment advice.
© 2026 BLEEP Project — Muhammad Attahir — Apache 2.0 Licence