Security Review 07/02/2026

SECURITY_REVIEWS.md

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+# Security Remediation TODO
+
+> Penetration test conducted on 2025-02-07 against `0http-bun@1.2.2`.
+> **43 vulnerabilities found** — 6 Critical, 13 High, 13 Medium, 7 Low, 4 Info.
+> **Overall Security Grade: D → B+ — All identified vulnerabilities resolved.**
+
+## Remediation Progress
+
+> **Fixed:** 6/6 Critical, 13/13 High, 13/13 Medium, 7/7 Low, 4/4 Info = **43/43 vulnerabilities resolved** ✅
+
+---
+
+## CRITICAL (Must fix immediately)
+
+### ✅ CRIT-1: Unbounded Route Cache — Memory Exhaustion DoS
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/router/sequential.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Added LRU-style cache eviction with configurable `config.cacheSize` (default 1000). When cache exceeds max size, oldest entries are evicted.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ CRIT-2: JSON Nesting Depth Check Bypass via String Content
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Nesting depth scanner now tracks `inString`/`escape` state to correctly ignore braces inside JSON string literals.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ CRIT-3: Rate Limit Bypass via Spoofable IP Headers
+
+- **Status:** FIXED — ⚠️ BREAKING CHANGE
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/rate-limit.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `defaultKeyGenerator` now uses `req.ip || req.remoteAddress || 'unknown'` — no proxy headers trusted by default. Users behind reverse proxies must supply a custom `keyGenerator`.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ CRIT-4: Rate Limit Store Injection via `req.rateLimitStore`
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/rate-limit.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Removed `req.rateLimitStore` backdoor. Always uses constructor-configured store.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ CRIT-5: API Key Timing Side-Channel Attack
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Added `crypto.timingSafeEqual()` for all API key comparisons with constant-time length mismatch handling.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ CRIT-6: JWT Default Algorithms Enable Algorithm Confusion
+
+- **Status:** FIXED — ⚠️ BREAKING CHANGE
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Default algorithms changed from `['HS256', 'RS256']` to `['HS256']`. Throws error if mixed symmetric+asymmetric algorithms are configured.
+
+---
+
+## HIGH (Must fix before next release)
+
+### ✅ H-1: Default Error Handler Leaks `err.message` to Clients
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/router/sequential.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Default error handler now returns generic `"Internal Server Error"` and logs full error via `console.error`.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-2: `this` Binding Bug in `router.use()` Breaks Middleware Chaining
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/router/sequential.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Changed `return this` → `return router` in arrow function `router.use()`.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-3: Content-Length Bypass — Full Body Read Before Size Enforcement
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Added `readBodyWithLimit()` streaming helper that reads body chunks incrementally and aborts immediately when cumulative size exceeds the limit. Replaces `await req.text()` + post-hoc size check in JSON, text, URL-encoded, and custom JSON parser paths.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-4: Custom `jsonParser` Bypasses All Security Controls
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Custom `jsonParser` now enforces size limits before calling the custom parser function.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-5: Multipart Parser Reads Entire Body Before Validation + Double Memory
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Merged the validation and extraction loops into a single pass. Field count, size limits, filename sanitization, and prototype pollution checks all run in one iteration of `formData.entries()` instead of two.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-6: Multipart Parser Has No Prototype Pollution Protection
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Uses `Object.create(null)` for body/files objects and added prototype pollution blocklist for field names.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-7: JWT Path Exclusion Bypass via Prefix Collision
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Path exclusion now uses exact match or `path + '/'` boundary checking.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-8: JWT Token in Query Parameters Leaks via Logs/Referrer
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Emits a `console.warn` deprecation warning at middleware construction time when `tokenQuery` is configured, advising migration to Authorization header or custom `getToken`.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-9: Optional JWT Mode Silently Swallows Invalid/Forged Tokens
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Now sets `req.ctx.authError` and `req.ctx.authAttempted = true` on invalid tokens in optional mode.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-10: Sliding Window Rate Limiter — Unbounded Map Growth
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/rate-limit.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Added `maxKeys` (default 10000), periodic cleanup with `setInterval` + `unref()`, and eviction of stale entries.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-11: CORS `null` Origin Bypass via Sandboxed Iframe
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/cors.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `null`/missing origins are now rejected before calling validator function or checking array.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-12: Rate Limiter TOCTOU Race Condition
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/rate-limit.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `MemoryStore.increment` changed from `async` to synchronous.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ H-13: Async Errors Bypass Custom Error Handler
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/next.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Async middleware errors now caught via `.catch()` on returned promises and forwarded to `errorHandler`.
+
+---
+
+## MEDIUM (Should fix soon)
+
+### ✅ M-1: Shared Mutable `emptyParams` — Cross-Request Data Leakage
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/router/sequential.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `emptyParams` now uses `Object.freeze({})`.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-2: No URL Path Normalization — Route Filter Bypass
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/router/sequential.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Added URL path normalization (double-slash collapse, `decodeURIComponent`, preserves `%2F`).
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-3: Multipart Filename Not Sanitized for Path Traversal
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Filenames sanitized (strips `..`, path separators, null bytes; preserves `originalName`).
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-4: Content-Type Broad Matching Routes Non-JSON to JSON Parser
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Internal JSON parser type changed from `'application/'` to `'application/json'`.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-5: `parseLimit` Silently Defaults for Unexpected Types
+
+- **Status:** FIXED — ⚠️ BREAKING CHANGE
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Now throws `TypeError` on unexpected types instead of silently defaulting.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-6: Raw JWT Token Stored on Request Context
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Raw JWT token removed from `req.ctx.jwt` and `req.jwt`.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-7: API Key Stored in Plain Text on Request Context
+
+- **Status:** FIXED — ⚠️ BREAKING CHANGE
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `req.ctx.apiKey` and `req.apiKey` now store a masked version (`xxxx****xxxx`). Raw key is available only via `req[API_KEY_SYMBOL]` (exported `Symbol.for('0http.apiKey')`) to prevent accidental serialization/logging.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-8: JWKS URI Not Validated (Allows HTTP)
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** JWKS URI is validated at construction time. Throws an error if non-HTTPS URI is used when `NODE_ENV=production`. Emits a `console.warn` in non-production environments.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-9: JWT Error Messages Reveal Validation Oracle
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Unified JWT error messages to `'Invalid or expired token'`.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-10: `jwtOptions` Spread Overrides Security-Critical Defaults
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `...jwtOptions` spread now applied first, security-critical options override after.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-11: Rate Limit `excludePaths` Uses Prefix Matching
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/rate-limit.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `excludePaths` uses exact or boundary matching.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-12: CORS Headers Leak Method/Header Lists When Origin Rejected
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/cors.js`
+- **Fix applied:** CORS headers (methods, allowed headers, credentials, exposed headers) only set when origin is allowed.
+
+---
+
+### ✅ M-13: `apiKeyValidator.length` Arity Check Is Unreliable
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Removed unreliable `Function.length` arity check; always calls validators with `(apiKey, req)`.
+
+---
+
+## LOW (Consider fixing)
+
+### ✅ L-1: `fast-querystring` `__proto__` in Query Can Pollute Downstream
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/router/sequential.js`
+- **Fix applied:** After parsing query string, dangerous keys (`__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype`) are deleted from `req.query`, mirroring the existing protection on `req.params`.
+
+### ✅ L-2: Empty JSON Body Silently Becomes `{}`
+
+- **Status:** FIXED — ⚠️ BREAKING CHANGE
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Empty or whitespace-only JSON bodies now set `req.body` to `undefined` instead of `{}`, letting the application decide the semantics.
+
+### ✅ L-3: `_rawBodyText` Publicly Accessible
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/body-parser.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Raw body text now stored via `Symbol.for('0http.rawBody')` (`RAW_BODY_SYMBOL`) instead of `req._rawBodyText`, preventing accidental serialization/logging. Symbol is exported for programmatic access.
+
+### ✅ L-4: Missing JWT Token Type (`typ`) Header Validation
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Added `requiredTokenType` option to `createJWTAuth`. After successful JWT verification, validates the `typ` header claim (case-insensitive). Rejects tokens with missing or incorrect type when configured.
+
+### ✅ L-5: Internal Functions Exported, Expanding Attack Surface
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/jwt-auth.js`
+- **Fix applied:** Internal functions removed from module exports.
+
+### ✅ L-6: Rate Limit Headers Disclose Exact Config/Counters
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/rate-limit.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `standardHeaders` now accepts `true` (full headers — default, backward compatible), `false` (no headers), or `'minimal'` (only `Retry-After` on 429 responses). Minimal mode prevents disclosing exact rate limit configuration and usage counters.
+
+### ✅ L-7: Missing `Vary: Origin` for Static String CORS Origins
+
+- **Status:** FIXED
+- **File:** `lib/middleware/cors.js`
+- **Fix applied:** `Vary: Origin` now set for all non-wildcard origins (not just function/array).
+
+---
+
+## INFO (Awareness)
+
+- ✅ **I-1:** `'unknown'` fallback in rate limiter now generates unique per-request keys to prevent shared bucket DoS; logs a security warning on first occurrence (`rate-limit.js`) — FIXED
+- ✅ **I-2:** `allowedHeaders` function now resolved once per preflight request instead of 3 times, preventing inconsistency and wasted resources (`cors.js`) — FIXED
+- ✅ **I-3:** Pointless `try/catch` blocks that only re-throw in body parser — FIXED (removed)
+- ✅ **I-4:** Empty `catch` blocks in JWT `handleAuthError` now log errors via `console.error` to aid debugging (`jwt-auth.js`) — FIXED
+
+---
+
+## Positive Observations
+
+- Prototype pollution protection on route params is well-implemented with `hasOwnProperty.call()` guard
+- `fast-querystring` uses null-prototype objects for query results
+- Security test suite exists for prototype pollution scenarios
+- Body parser has comprehensive limits (parameter counts, field counts, key lengths)
+- JWT error messages are partially sanitized (enumerated messages, not raw errors)
+- CORS correctly blocks `credentials: true` + `origin: '*'` combination
+- Lazy loading of heavy dependencies reduces startup attack surface
+- `parseLimit` regex is anchored and bounded (not vulnerable to ReDoS)
+
+---
+
+## Breaking Changes Summary
+
+| Vulnerability | Breaking Change                                                         | Impact                                                              |
+| ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| CRIT-3        | Default rate limit key generator no longer trusts proxy headers         | Users behind reverse proxies must supply custom `keyGenerator`      |
+| CRIT-6        | Default JWT algorithms changed from `['HS256', 'RS256']` to `['HS256']` | Users relying on RS256 must explicitly configure algorithms         |
+| M-5           | `parseLimit` throws `TypeError` on invalid types                        | Code passing `false`, `null`, or objects to `parseLimit` will throw |
+| M-7           | `req.ctx.apiKey` / `req.apiKey` now stores masked value                 | Code reading raw API key must use `req[API_KEY_SYMBOL]` instead     |
+| L-2           | Empty JSON body now sets `req.body` to `undefined` instead of `{}`      | Code checking `req.body` for empty JSON must handle `undefined`     |
+
+---
+
+## Suggested Next Steps
+
+1. ~~**Fix remaining HIGH issues:** H-3 (streaming body read), H-5 (single-pass multipart), H-8 (query token deprecation)~~ ✅ All HIGH issues fixed
+2. ~~**Fix remaining MEDIUM issues:** M-7 (mask API key in context), M-8 (JWKS HTTPS validation)~~ ✅ All MEDIUM issues fixed
+3. ~~**Address LOW/INFO issues** as part of ongoing maintenance~~ ✅ All LOW and INFO issues fixed
+4. **Write security regression tests** for each fix ✅ Completed — 483 tests passing
+5. **Bump version to 1.3.0** with security changelog