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Merged
Ark0N merged 1 commit into from
Oct 27, 2026
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fix(tunnel): give the unauthenticated tunnel its own acknowledgement #718

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5 changes: 5 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/tunnel-own-acknowledgement.md
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---
'aicodeman': patch
---

Security fix: `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` (and `--allow-unauthenticated-network`) no longer lets the Cloudflare tunnel start without a password. It now acknowledges only an unauthenticated network bind, which is what the installer writes it for on a LAN install without a password, so on those installs one click on the welcome screen's tunnel link published full terminal control to a public URL with no login and no confirm. An unauthenticated tunnel has its own opt-in now, `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL=1` or `codeman web --allow-unauthenticated-tunnel` (carried by `codeman web -d` and `codeman service install`), which the installer never writes. If you relied on the network variable to start the tunnel without a password, set one of those instead. Without it the server still accepts an enable that carries `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel: true`, as before. With no password and no multi-user mode, the browser now asks before every tunnel enable from the welcome link, the tunnel panel and App Settings, whatever the server would accept, using the new `loginConfigured` field of `GET /api/tunnel/status`.
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion CLAUDE.md
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Expand Up @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
| **Rate limit** | 10 failed auth/IP → 429 (15min decay). Multi-user mode instead checks 50/IP (`AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX`) and 10 per (username, IP) BEFORE the password, so past either even a correct password from that IP waits (the account still logs in from another IP), plus 10 per username AFTER it (429 to wrong guesses from any IP, never to a correct password). QR and hook-secret have separate buckets, so neither can lock out login |
| **Hook bypass** | `/api/hook-event` + `/api/status-telemetry` skip Basic auth (localhost-only, schema-validated), but when auth is active the loopback bypass requires `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` **unconditionally** (Codeman cannot detect a user's own loopback reverse proxy) |
| **Lost-frame page** | The THIRD unauthenticated 200, beside the two hook routes, and the only one decided by request headers alone: a `GET`/`HEAD` carrying `Sec-Fetch-Dest: iframe\|frame`, `Accept: text/html` and mode `navigate` (or none), for a path that is NOT a registered route (never `/api/`, `/ws/`, `/q/`), is answered BEFORE the credential checks with the static web-tab recovery page (`lostWebviewFramePage`: no reflected input, `default-src 'none'` plus its own script hash, `no-store`). `/` is the one registered route also admitted, only when the request carries neither `codeman_session` nor `Authorization` (nothing in Codeman frames its own root; a sandboxed frame has neither), since the landing page masks to exactly `/` and its reload otherwise rendered Codeman inside the web tab. ⚠️ A non-browser client can set those headers, so an unauthenticated caller can tell a registered route (401) from a non-route (200) and enumerate the route table; accepted, the routes are public in `docs/api-reference.md`. Pinned by `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts` + `test/webview-lost-root-frame.test.ts` |
| **Tunnel** | Enabling a tunnel **refuses** without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` unless exposure is acknowledged via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` or the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (never persisted) |
| **Tunnel** | Enabling a tunnel **refuses** without a login (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` or multi-user mode) unless exposure is acknowledged via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL=1` / `--allow-unauthenticated-tunnel` or the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (never persisted). `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` acknowledges the BIND only and never satisfies this guard (#706: `install.sh` writes it for every passwordless LAN install). The authorization is decided ONCE per request, running or not, and required again at the `start()` site: the settings-file awaits between them let a concurrent stop land, and an unauthorized enable never writes `tunnelEnabled:true`. With no login the browser asks before every enable (welcome link, tunnel panel, App Settings save that turns it on) through ONE helper, `_confirmTunnelEnable()` (settings-ui.js), which reads `loginConfigured` from `GET /api/tunnel/status` (computed in the route by the guard's own test, never in `TunnelManager`); the 403 handler is the fallback when that read fails |
| **Validation** | Zod schemas, Unicode-aware path allowlist regex, env prefix allowlist (`CLAUDE_CODE_*`/`OPENCODE_*`/`CODEX_*`/`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`/`ANTIGRAVITY_*`/`PI_*`/`GROK_*`/`XAI_*`/`DSH_*`/`DEEPSEEK_*`/`OMP_*`/`COPILOT_*`) |
| **Headers** | CORS localhost-only, CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS if HTTPS |

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3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion docs/api-reference.md
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Expand Up @@ -1218,7 +1218,8 @@ A local case whose folder is the top of a git repository can keep **worktrees**
| Method | Path | Body | Notes |
| ------ | ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------ | ----- |
| `GET` | `/api/settings` | none | The stored settings object. Never writes. For a non-admin in multi-user mode, without `voiceSettings.apiKey`, `caseOrder` and `lastUsedCase`. |
| `PUT` | `/api/settings` | partial settings (strict schema) | Merged into the stored file; services (watchers, tunnel, tmux history limit) reconcile to the merged result. `403 FORBIDDEN` for a non-admin in multi-user mode. A tunnel enable without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` is refused separately (`403 OPERATION_FAILED`, resend with `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel: true`). |
| `PUT` | `/api/settings` | partial settings (strict schema) | Merged into the stored file; services (watchers, tunnel, tmux history limit) reconcile to the merged result. `403 FORBIDDEN` for a non-admin in multi-user mode. A tunnel enable with no login (no `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`, not multi-user) is refused separately (`403 OPERATION_FAILED`, resend with `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel: true`) unless the server runs with `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL=1` or `--allow-unauthenticated-tunnel`. `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK` does not count; when it is set, the refusal says so. An enable without that authorization is accepted only while the tunnel is already running and never stores `tunnelEnabled: true`; if the tunnel stops before the request would start it, it is not restarted and the answer is the same `403 OPERATION_FAILED` (the request's other settings are saved). |
| `GET` | `/api/tunnel/status` | none | `{ running, url, ..., loginConfigured }`. `loginConfigured` is `true` when a login protects the server (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set or multi-user mode on), the same test the tunnel guard above applies; with `false` the browser asks before every tunnel enable. Neither opt-in variable makes it `true`. |
| `GET` | `/api/execution/model-config` | none | `modelConfig` (cron's and the plan orchestrator's default model). |
| `PUT` | `/api/execution/model-config` | `{ defaultModel?, agentTypeOverrides?, ... }` | Replaces `modelConfig`. `403 FORBIDDEN` for a non-admin in multi-user mode. |
| `PUT` | `/api/cases/order` | `{ order: string[] }` | The one case order every user's `GET /api/cases` is sorted by. `403 FORBIDDEN` for a non-admin in multi-user mode. |
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion docs/architecture-invariants.md
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Expand Up @@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ Tests: `test/mobile-prompt-composer.test.ts` (in the CI gate, deliberately not u
| **QR Auth** | Single-use 6-char tokens (60s TTL) for tunnel login. See `docs/qr-auth-plan.md` |
| **Sessions** | 24h cookie (`codeman_session`), auto-extend, device context audit |
| **Rate limit** | 10 failed logins/IP → 429 (15min decay). Multi-user mode instead has two gates checked before scrypt, so past either even a correct password from that IP gets 429: 50/IP (`AUTH_IP_FAILURE_MAX`) and 10 per (username, IP) (`AUTH_FAILURE_MAX`; the same account still logs in from another IP). A 10-per-username bucket (multi-user only) is checked after the verify: 429 to failed guesses from the 10th on, from any IP, never to a correct password. QR has separate limiter |
| **Hook bypass** | `/api/hook-event` (and `/api/status-telemetry`, the statusLine exporter) skip Basic auth (localhost-only, schema-validated). When auth is active (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set), the loopback bypass requires the per-instance `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header **unconditionally** — COD-54 introduced it tunnel-gated; COD-91 (PR #127) made it always-on because Codeman can't detect a user's own loopback reverse proxy (own cloudflared/`tailscale serve`/nginx → 127.0.0.1), closing that residual plain-bypass gap. Hook curls cat the secret file at exec time via `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` (session env, `config/hook-secret.ts`); a missing/wrong secret gets 401 and rate-limits in a dedicated bucket (never locks out login). Tunnel enable **refuses** without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` unless exposure is acknowledged — via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` (env, COD-55) **or** the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (1.1.9): the welcome/settings tunnel toggle pops a security confirm dialog and, on confirm, resends with that flag (server logs a loud warning on every passwordless tunnel start; curl/API stay refused without password/env/flag). The flag is an action field, never persisted |
| **Hook bypass** | `/api/hook-event` (and `/api/status-telemetry`, the statusLine exporter) skip Basic auth (localhost-only, schema-validated). When auth is active (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set), the loopback bypass requires the per-instance `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header **unconditionally** — COD-54 introduced it tunnel-gated; COD-91 (PR #127) made it always-on because Codeman can't detect a user's own loopback reverse proxy (own cloudflared/`tailscale serve`/nginx → 127.0.0.1), closing that residual plain-bypass gap. Hook curls cat the secret file at exec time via `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` (session env, `config/hook-secret.ts`); a missing/wrong secret gets 401 and rate-limits in a dedicated bucket (never locks out login). Tunnel enable **refuses** without a login (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` or multi-user mode) unless exposure is acknowledged — via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_TUNNEL=1` / `--allow-unauthenticated-tunnel` (#706; until then the guard took `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1`, COD-55, which `install.sh` writes for every passwordless LAN install, so the bind acknowledgement silently published the tunnel too) **or** the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (1.1.9). With no login the browser asks BEFORE every enable (welcome link, tunnel panel, an App Settings save that turns it on) through `_confirmTunnelEnable()`, reading `loginConfigured` from `GET /api/tunnel/status`, and on confirm sends that flag; the 403 handler stays the fallback when the status read fails (server logs a loud warning on every passwordless tunnel start; curl/API stay refused without password/env/flag). The flag is an action field, never persisted |
| **Env vars** | `CODEMAN_MUX` (managed session), `CODEMAN_API_URL` (auto-set for hooks), `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (extra Host/Origin allowlist entries for reverse proxies, comma-separated; bare `.suffix` matches subdomains), `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS`=1 (opt-in hooks-only listener on the docker bridge gateway so in-container hooks reach a loopback-bound server; bind IP from `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST` or auto-detect) |
| **Validation** | Zod schemas, Unicode-aware path allowlist regex, env prefix allowlist (`CLAUDE_CODE_*`/`OPENCODE_*`/`CODEX_*`/`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`/`ANTIGRAVITY_*`/`PI_*`) |
| **Headers** | CORS localhost-only, CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS if HTTPS |
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