Security Research & Exploit Development

A general-purpose security research repository spanning browser exploit chains, post-exploitation tradecraft, identity and cloud attacks, and the assessment work that surrounds them. The contents are organized into three broad bodies of work:

• CVE reproductions — patch analysis, triggers, and full chains for Chrome and Firefox bugs from 2024 through 2026.
• Tooling — a catalog of offensive modules (C2, lateral movement, AD CS, cloud identity, evasion, LLM attacks, kernel LPE, and more), each paired with detection guidance.
• Assessment deliverables — written reports for stakeholders, including a Databricks Apps platform review aimed at security leadership.

Every offensive component ships with a defender-side counterpart. The repository is meant to feed scheduled enterprise log-scan agents and red-team tabletop work, so breadth is intentional.

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Purpose & Disclaimer

This repository exists to support internal security education and risk awareness. The exploit reproductions, attack chain demonstrations, and assessment tooling are built as red-team exercises that show stakeholders — including non-technical business users — what can go wrong when production systems lack adequate human oversight and governance controls.

All materials are for educational purposes and authorized security testing only. Research was conducted under explicit written authorization. Exploit code is provided to support defensive research, vulnerability reproduction, and security assessment. Do not use any code or technique against systems you do not own or have explicit written authorization to test. See SECURITY.md for the full responsible-disclosure policy and containment architecture.

Safeguards in place:

• Every CVE here targets an already-patched browser version with a publicly available PoC. No zero-days are published. The contribution is in the chaining, primitives, and delivery infrastructure built around them.
• All tool networking is loopback-only (127.0.0.0/8 or the Docker bridge). This is enforced in code by ContainmentGuard — not by convention.
• The Docker Compose lab runs on an internal: true network with no internet gateway.
• The beacon refuses to run its exec command outside of a Docker container, and every other beacon command is on a hardcoded allowlist.
• The IDOL persistence demo (--plant) only installs a harmless cron heartbeat that --cleanup removes.
• The GitHub Pages dashboard runs entirely on simulated data — there is no live C2 connectivity in the public site.

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Contained Lab Environment

A Docker Compose lab provides a fully isolated environment for running tools end-to-end. All services run on an internal Docker network with no internet access, so tools that "phone home" simply talk to mock services running alongside them.

make lab-up       # Start: C2 server, 2 beacons, exploit server, 2 target apps
make lab-down     # Destroy everything
make lab-status   # Show running services + C2 status
make lab-logs     # Tail all logs

The lab can be brought up incrementally — the base make lab-up is enough for most C2 and exploit-server work, and additional mock IdPs and OAuth issuers come up via dedicated targets so you only run what your scenario needs.

Service	Port	Description	How to start
C2 server	127.0.0.1:8443	Operator API + beacon protocol	make lab-up
Exploit server	127.0.0.1:9090	Serves CVE exploits, receives callbacks	make lab-up
Target app 1	127.0.0.1:8501	Simulated Databricks Streamlit app	make lab-up
Target app 2	127.0.0.1:8502	Second target for lateral movement	make lab-up
Mock Entra IdP	127.0.0.1:9100	Device code, token, PRT SSO endpoints	make lab-up
Mock IMDS	127.0.0.1:9200	AWS / GCP / Azure metadata service mock	make lab-up
LLM copilot app	127.0.0.1:8080	Ollama-backed enterprise copilot (injection target)	make lab-llm-up
Mock OIDC issuer	127.0.0.1:9300	GitHub Actions OIDC simulation (WIF abuse)	make lab-oidc-up
Mock SAML SP/IdP	127.0.0.1:9400	SAML assertion target (Golden SAML demo)	make lab-saml-up
Mock Databricks	127.0.0.1:9500	Databricks Apps OAuth/OBO mock	make lab-databricks-up
AD CS lab	192.168.56.10	Windows DC + Enterprise CA (Vagrant, host-only)	make lab-adcs-up

Containment. tools/lib/containment.py — and its Rust counterpart in tools/rust/containment/ — is the trust boundary. It enforces loopback-only networking, non-root execution, tmpdir isolation, and Docker environment detection across every tool. If a tool tries to step outside the sandbox (talk to a real tenant, reach a real metadata service, write outside the fixture root), the guard refuses before any side effect happens.

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Tools

Each tool below ships under tools/ and has a sibling detection/ directory containing Sigma rules, KQL queries, or other defender-side guidance for the same technique. The brief descriptions are intentionally compact — each linked README expands on usage, lab requirements, and detection.

C2 & Infrastructure

• C2 Server & Beacon — tools/c2/. Modular C2 with pluggable transports (HTTP polling, WebSocket, gRPC, SMB / Unix pipe, DNS-over-HTTPS, HTTP/3, DoQ, Telegram Bot, Teams Graph), YAML transport profiles with hot-reload, and a P2P relay topology. Flask server with X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 session crypto, hardcoded command allowlist, and loopback-only enforcement.
• C2 Transports — tools/c2/transports/. One subdirectory per transport (http_polling/, websocket/, grpc/, passive_smb_pipe/, dns_over_https/, http3/ for QUIC, doq/ for DNS-over-QUIC, telegram-bot/ and teams-graph/ mocks). Each ships with Sigma / KQL detection alongside the offensive code.
• C2 Framework Profiles — tools/c2/profiles/framework-mimics/. Transport-signature profiles that mimic AdaptixC2, emp3r0r, APEX, Mythic, Havoc, Brute Ratel C4, and NightHawk. Use them with the beacon to validate detection rules against specific framework footprints.
• C2 Relay — tools/c2/relay/. P2P relay node that supports beacon chains of depth ≥2, for testing detections that key off intermediate hops rather than direct callbacks.
• Dashboard — tools/dashboard/. Session management console with multi-transport session view, profile editor, and a relay topology graph.

Active Directory & Kerberos

• AD CS Abuse — tools/ad-cs/. The full ESC1 through ESC16 toolkit: an LDAP-based template enumerator following Certipy patterns, per-ESC exploit modules, a chain orchestrator, and the Shadow Credentials 2026 update covering January 2026 NGC key-write hardening. Every module is gated to the corp.lab.local lab domain.
• Kerberos Lateral Movement — tools/kerberos/. S4U2self / S4U2proxy abuse, RBCD chain, NTLM relay with EPA recon (RelayInformer-class), the CVE-2025-33073 NTLM reflection LPE, AES-only Kerberoasting (post CVE-2026-20833 RC4 enforcement), and service-account triage tooling.

Lateral Movement

• Lateral Movement — tools/lateral-movement/. RPC-based DCOM / TSCH / SCMR / WMI execution; SCCM ELEVATE1/2 plus the TAKEOVER-5 Entra-integration chain (SpecterOps, November 2025); Azure Arc MSI pivot with CVE-2026-26117 (himds pipe DACL); Exchange hybrid evoSTS token forge.

Cloud Identity

• Cloud Identity Attacks — tools/cloud-identity/. The modern cloud-identity surface: Workload Identity Federation wildcard sub abuse, Golden SAML, Silver SAML (secondary cert), SyncJacking via ImmutableId takeover, EvilTokens-style device-code 2026 PhaaS (Broker client ID FOCI path), FOCI Conditional Access bypass, PRT extraction via dev tools, and a CloudTrail-blinding catalog. Talks to the lab mocks: mock-oidc (9300), mock-saml (9400), mock-entra (9100/9102).
• Entra ID Abuse (legacy) — tools/entra-abuse/. Earlier device-code phishing, PRT simulation, and token-replay work. Kept for historical reference; current Entra work lives under cloud-identity/.

Kernel LPE (Windows)

• Kernel LPE — tools/kernel-lpe/. Research notes and harnesses for the AFD.sys pool-grooming family (CVE-2026-20810 / -20831 / -20860 / -21241), the CLFS buffer overflow CVE-2025-60709, and the I/O Ring arbitrary-R/W primitive CVE-2025-21333. Includes pool feng-shui and NT-structure reference docs. All of this is gated behind EXPLOIT_LAB_KERNEL=1 and a kern-lab-* hostname, validated by safety_harness.py before anything dangerous runs.

Phishing & Initial Access

• AiTM Kits — tools/phishing/aitm-kits/. Simulators for the major adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits — Tycoon2FA (against mock-aitm-proxy 8100 / mock-m365-login 8101), Sneaky2FA's browser-in-browser variant, and Rockstar2FA — plus reference docs for Evilginx3. Importantly, this section also documents the defender controls that actually break these kits: passkey mitigation and Conditional Access token protection.
• Social Engineering — tools/phishing/social-engineering/. The "Fix" delivery family: ClickFix (clipboard → Run dialog), FileFix (Explorer address-bar primitive), and ConsentFix (OAuth-consent bypass simulated against mock-entra). Tracks how these chains evolved from 2023 through 2026.
• Passkey Phish-Resistance — tools/phishing/passkey-resistance/. WebAuthn origin-binding fundamentals, a phish-resistance matrix that scores common attack types against MFA factors, the downgrade attack surface, and the cross-device QR-relay risk that has emerged with passkey rollouts.
• Vishing Tabletop — tools/phishing/vishing/. Tabletop scripts for CFO-impersonation and Scattered-Spider helpdesk scenarios. Discussion-only — no voice synthesis is included.

Supply Chain

• GitHub Actions — tools/supply-chain/github-actions/. pull_request_target ("pwn_request") simulation against a mock on 8120, the UNC6426 OIDC chain (mock-oidc 9300 → mock-imds 9200), self-hosted-runner persistence, and the tj-actions-class supply-chain compromise pattern.
• npm Worm — tools/supply-chain/shai-hulud-class/. Shai-Hulud-class postinstall harvest-and-propagate worm simulator running against a mock npm registry on 8110.
• PyPI .pth Stealer — tools/supply-chain/pypi-pth-class/. LiteLLM-style .pth persistence simulator with a runtime-detector defender tool, exercised against mock-pypi on 8111.

Evasion (Rust)

• HW-BP Syscalls — tools/rust/syscalls-hwbp/. Hardware-breakpoint syscall dispatch that bypasses userland EDR hooks. Windows-specific.
• Modern Sleep Masks — tools/rust/sleep-mask-modern/. Cronos (fiber + RC4), RustyCronos, and HWBP-driven sleep variants.
• Threadless Injection — tools/rust/threadless-inject/. Module stomping, Transactional NTFS, and DLL-notification-callback hijack approaches.
• ETW-TI Awareness — tools/rust/etw-ti-aware/. ETW provider enumeration keyed on EDR GUIDs — useful for understanding what telemetry the host is feeding into ETW-TI.
• Call Stack Spoofing — tools/rust/callstack-spoof/. SilentMoonwalk-pattern gadget finder plus a with_spoofed_stack() RAII wrapper for hiding suspicious frames.
• Call Stack Detection — tools/rust/callstack-detect/. The defender-side pair of the spoof crate: a kernel-ETW call-stack collector and unwind validator, with a spoof-vs-detect matrix showing which spoof patterns survive which detections.
• Patchless AMSI / ETW Bypass — tools/rust/amsi-patchless/. HWBP (DR0 / DR1) arm and disarm primitives. Both the SetThreadContext and NtContinue variants are documented.
• BOF / COFF Loader — tools/rust/bof-loader/. Goblin-based COFF parser, symbol allowlist, and OutputSandbox capture. See also tools/bofs/ for safe BOF implementations that exercise the loader.
• BYOVD Framework — tools/byovd/. Hash-only manifest, HVCI blocklist checker, LOLDrivers sync (hash-only — no driver bytes are committed), HVCI-bypass enumeration, and the EDR-killer class targeting the broader 2026 BYOVD market.

LLM & Agent Attacks

• M365 Copilot — tools/llm-attacks/m365-copilot/. EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711, zero-click email → Copilot → exfil) and ShareLeak (CVE-2026-21520, Copilot Studio form-field injection). Both run against mock-copilot on 8090.
• Agentforce — tools/llm-attacks/agentforce/. PipeLeak public lead-form hijack simulation against mock-agentforce on 8091.
• MCP Abuse — tools/llm-attacks/mcp-abuse/. Tool poisoning and capability-confusion patterns, plus the Git MCP server CVE class (CVE-2025-68143 / -68144 / -68145 — commit-message injection, diff injection, path traversal).
• Eval Harness — tools/llm-attacks/eval/. AgentDojo-format harness paired with a PromptArmor adapter (instruction hierarchy + cosine similarity), an MCPSec adapter (schema validation + capability enforcement), and a defense-benchmark runner.
• Indirect Injection Corpus — tools/llm-attacks/indirect-injection/. Prompt-injection payloads organized by delivery channel — PDF, DOCX, HTML, email (plaintext and HTML), calendar invites, and image alt text — including a m365_copilot channel for the Copilot-specific surface.

Browser

• Browser Extension Supply-Chain — tools/browser-ext-attacks/. MV3 lab catalog: cookie theft, session hijack, form-grab, DNR redirect abuse, and the Cyberhaven-pattern update-hijack simulation.
• Browser-Native Post-Exploitation — tools/browser-native-postex/. WASM post-exploitation payload, with delivery via MV3 extension, service worker, or XSS.
• Exploit Framework — tools/framework/. Equation Group–inspired exploit orchestration glue.
• Fuzzing — tools/fuzzing/. JIT (GVN, LICM, Range Analysis), IPC, and V8 Turbofan fuzzers.

Kubernetes & Cloud-Native

• Kubernetes Post-Exploitation — tools/kubernetes-postex/. Runc container breakout (CVE-2025-31133 / -52565 / -52881) chained to kubelet, the NodeRestriction admission bypass (CVE-2025-4563 / -5187), and the AKS CVE-2026-33105 work (CVSS 10, Azure CNI IPAM socket). Gated behind EXPLOIT_LAB_K8S=1.

Linux Post-Exploitation

• eBPF Rootkit — tools/linux-postex/ebpf-rootkit/. LinkPro-class XDP / TC + magic-packet C2 analysis, a Boopkit / TripleCross / ebpfkit corpus comparison, and a Rust simulation stub. Gated behind EXPLOIT_LAB_EBPF=1.

macOS / Mobile / Firmware (Research)

• macOS — tools/macos-postex/. TCC bypass research: CVE-2025-43530 VoiceOver and an entitlement-overreach catalog cataloging real applications that ship with TCC-relevant permissions; SLAP / FLOP side-channel analysis; SysBumps KASLR break. Documents only — no PoC.
• Mobile Landscape — docs/analysis/mobile-landscape-2026/. iOS DarkSword chain, Coruna kit, Pixel 9 zero-click, Pwn2Own Ireland 2025, and Lockdown Mode effectiveness. Research-only.
• Firmware — docs/analysis/firmware-landscape-2026/. Hydroph0bia (Insyde H2O SMM), LogoFAIL successors, the June 2026 UEFI cert expiry, and a defender-side inventory.

Persistence

• RMM Abuse — tools/persistence/rmm-abuse/. ScreenConnect / AnyDesk / QuickAssist attacker patterns with persistence mechanics and detection. Cross-tool kill-chain correlation makes the case that an RMM install combined with BYOVD is a strong pre-ransomware indicator.
• ESXi Post-Exploitation — tools/persistence/esxi-postex/. VM kill chain, ESXi lifecycle post-ex, and Nutanix AHV parallels.

Legacy & Support

• IDOL — tools/idol/. Lateral-movement PoC covering credential harvest, persistence, and C2 beaconing.
• Rust Target Tools — tools/rust/. The Rust workspace. Build with cd tools/rust && cargo build --release.
• Post-Exploit Staging — tools/post-exploit-staging/. Three-tier staging architecture.
• Forensic Analysis — tools/forensic-analysis/. Artifact detection and audit-gap analysis.
• Validator — tools/validator/. Pre-exploitation browser fingerprinting.

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CVE Index

The repository tracks Chrome and Firefox CVEs from 2024 through 2026 — patch analysis, triggers, and complete chains. The full table is collapsed below; for the canonical index with implementation status, see cves/README.md.

CVE reproductions across Chrome and Firefox (2024–2026) — click to expand

CVE	Target	Year	Technique	Level	Path
CVE-2024-0517	Chrome V8 Maglev	2024	OOB Write	ACE	cves/chrome/2024/CVE-2024-0517/
CVE-2024-1939	Chrome V8 Wasm S128	2024	Type Confusion	ACE	cves/chrome/2024/CVE-2024-1939/
CVE-2024-5830	Chrome V8 Object Transitions	2024	Type Confusion	ACE	cves/chrome/2024/CVE-2024-5830/
CVE-2025-5959	Chrome Wasm JSPI	2025	Sandbox Escape	ACE	cves/chrome/2025/CVE-2025-5959/
CVE-2025-6558	Chrome ANGLE WebGL2	2025	UAF	UAF	cves/chrome/2025/CVE-2025-6558/
CVE-2025-13223	Chrome V8 Property Array	2025	Type Confusion	ARW	cves/chrome/2025/CVE-2025-13223/
CVE-2026-2441	Chrome CSS FontFeatureValuesMap	2026	UAF	UAF	cves/chrome/2026/CVE-2026-2441/
CVE-2026-3909	Chrome Skia Glyph Atlas	2026	OOB Write	OOB	cves/chrome/2026/CVE-2026-3909/
CVE-2024-8381	Firefox SpiderMonkey	2024	Type Confusion	Trigger	cves/firefox/2024/CVE-2024-8381/
CVE-2024-9680	Firefox AnimationTimeline	2024	UAF	UAF	cves/firefox/2024/CVE-2024-9680/
CVE-2024-29943	Firefox JIT Range Analysis	2024	BCE	ARW	cves/firefox/2024/CVE-2024-29943/
CVE-2024-29944	Firefox Privileged JS	2024	Sandbox Escape	ACE	cves/firefox/2024/CVE-2024-29944/
CVE-2025-2857	Firefox IPC	2025	Sandbox Escape	Trigger	cves/firefox/2025/CVE-2025-2857/
CVE-2025-4918	Firefox Promise	2025	OOB	OOB	cves/firefox/2025/CVE-2025-4918/
CVE-2025-4919	Firefox IonMonkey BCE	2025	OOB	ARW	cves/firefox/2025/CVE-2025-4919/
CVE-2026-2795	Firefox Wasm GC	2026	UAF	ACE	cves/firefox/2026/CVE-2026-2795/
CVE-2026-2796	Firefox Wasm JIT	2026	Type Confusion	Trigger	cves/firefox/2026/CVE-2026-2796/

Level key: ACE = arbitrary code execution, ARW = arbitrary read/write, UAF = use-after-free demonstrated, OOB = out-of-bounds access, Trigger = bug trigger only.

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Directory Structure

exploits/
├── reports/                        # Security assessment reports
│   └── databricks-apps-assessment/ # Streamlit dashboard (src/ → build.py → app.py)
├── cves/                           # CVE reproductions, organized by target/year/CVE-ID
│   ├── chrome/
│   └── firefox/
├── tools/                          # Standalone security tooling
│   ├── lib/                        # Shared: ContainmentGuard
│   ├── rust/                       # Rust workspace
│   │   ├── beacon/                 # Beacon client binary
│   │   ├── containment/            # ContainmentGuard (Rust)
│   │   ├── syscalls/               # Hell's Gate + Tartarus Gate
│   │   ├── syscalls-hwbp/          # Hardware-breakpoint syscall dispatch
│   │   ├── sleep-mask/             # Ekko / Foliage
│   │   ├── sleep-mask-modern/      # Cronos / RustyCronos / HWBP sleep
│   │   ├── threadless-inject/      # Module stomping / TxF / DLL-notify
│   │   ├── etw-ti-aware/           # ETW-TI + EDR provider enumeration
│   │   ├── callstack-spoof/        # Call stack spoofing
│   │   ├── callstack-detect/       # Defender-side call-stack validator
│   │   ├── amsi-patchless/         # HWBP AMSI/ETW bypass
│   │   ├── bof-loader/             # COFF/BOF executor
│   │   ├── telemetry-patch/        # ETW/AMSI prologue patching
│   │   ├── cookie-theft/           # Chrome app-bound cookie decryption
│   │   └── crypto/                 # Shared crypto primitives
│   ├── c2/                         # Modular C2 server + transports + relay
│   │   ├── transports/             # WebSocket, gRPC, SMB pipe, DoH, HTTP
│   │   ├── relay/                  # P2P relay node + topology graph
│   │   └── profiles/               # Dynamic YAML transport profiles
│   ├── ad-cs/                      # AD CS ESC1–ESC16 exploitation
│   │   ├── enum/                   # LDAP-based template enumerator
│   │   └── exploit/                # esc01/ through esc16/ + chain.py
│   ├── kerberos/                   # Kerberos lateral movement
│   │   ├── s4u/                    # S4U2self / S4U2proxy
│   │   ├── rbcd/                   # RBCD attack chain + ACL scanner
│   │   ├── relay/                  # NTLM relay modernization
│   │   └── roasting/               # Targeted Kerberoasting / AS-REP roasting
│   ├── cloud-identity/             # Modern cloud identity attacks
│   │   ├── wif/                    # Workload Identity Federation abuse
│   │   ├── oidc-trust/             # OIDC trust confusion
│   │   ├── golden-saml/            # Golden SAML + OIDC token forging
│   │   ├── entra-2026/             # Modern Entra reality check
│   │   └── databricks/             # Databricks OAuth OBO chain abuse
│   ├── llm-attacks/                # LLM and agent abuse tooling
│   │   ├── indirect-injection/     # Prompt injection corpus + delivery harness
│   │   ├── mcp-abuse/              # MCP server tool poisoning / rug-pull
│   │   ├── agent-confusion/        # Confused-deputy + transcript detector
│   │   └── eval/                   # Injection benchmark harness
│   ├── browser-ext-attacks/        # Browser extension supply-chain
│   │   ├── cookie-theft/           # MV3 chrome.cookies exfil
│   │   ├── session-hijack/         # webRequest header capture
│   │   ├── form-grab/              # Content-script form grabber
│   │   ├── dnr-redirect/           # DeclarativeNetRequest abuse
│   │   ├── update-hijack/          # Mock Web Store + permission differ
│   │   └── eval/                   # Manifest analyzer + CDP runtime monitor
│   ├── byovd/                      # BYOVD orchestration framework
│   ├── edr-silencing/              # EDR silencing via policy
│   │   ├── wdac-abuse/             # WDAC policy generator / analyzer
│   │   ├── ppl-bypass/             # PPL bypass research + timeline
│   │   ├── blind-spot-enum/        # EDR coverage map + gap advisor
│   │   └── callback-integrity/     # Kernel callback enum + integrity check
│   ├── lateral-movement/           # Lateral movement modules
│   │   ├── rpc-movement/           # DCOM/TSCH/SCMR/WMI via Impacket 0.12
│   │   ├── sccm-abuse/             # SCCM ELEVATE1/ELEVATE2
│   │   ├── azure-arc/              # Azure Arc MSI pivot
│   │   └── exchange-hybrid/        # evoSTS token forging (Storm-0558)
│   ├── browser-native-postex/      # WASM browser post-exploitation
│   │   ├── wasm-payload/           # Rust → WASM (wasm-bindgen)
│   │   └── delivery/               # MV3 ext / service worker / XSS
│   ├── bofs/                       # BOF implementations for bof-loader
│   ├── entra-abuse/                # Device-code phishing, PRT (legacy)
│   ├── framework/                  # Exploit orchestration framework
│   ├── dashboard/                  # Session management dashboard
│   ├── post-exploit-staging/       # Three-tier staging architecture
│   ├── forensic-analysis/          # Forensic artifact detection
│   ├── fuzzing/                    # Fuzzing harnesses
│   ├── idol/                       # IDOL lateral movement PoC
│   ├── validator/                  # Pre-exploitation validation
│   └── win-remote/                 # Windows remote agent
├── docs/
│   ├── analysis/                   # Deep-dive technical analysis
│   └── methodology/                # Attacker + defender methodology docs
├── infra/
│   └── lab/
│       ├── ad-cs/                  # Vagrant AD CS lab (DC + CA + workstations)
│       ├── llm-target/             # Ollama + copilot Flask app
│       ├── mock-databricks/        # Mock Databricks Apps OAuth
│       ├── mock-saml/              # Mock SAML SP/IdP
│       ├── mock-entra/             # Mock Entra IdP (device code, token, PRT)
│       ├── mock-imds/              # Mock AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS
│       ├── mock-sccm/              # Mock SCCM management point (port 9600)
│       └── kind-cluster/           # K8s post-ex kind cluster
├── site/                           # GitHub Pages static site
└── cves/                           # CVE reproductions

For more granular indexes, see tools/, docs/analysis/, and docs/methodology/ — each has its own README.

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Getting Started

1. Clone the repository and install lab dependencies: pip install -r requirements-lab.txt
2. Bring up the contained lab (requires Docker): make lab-up. Use make lab-status to confirm everything is healthy and make lab-down when you are finished.
3. To run tools locally without the full lab, start the C2 server in one terminal (python3 tools/c2/server.py) and a beacon in another (python3 tools/c2/beacon/beacon_client.py).
4. Browse cves/ for specific CVE reproductions. Each CVE directory contains its own README with setup instructions.
5. For the Databricks assessment dashboard, see the section below.

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Databricks Apps Assessment

A secondary deliverable in this repository is an interactive security assessment of the Databricks Apps platform, prepared for security leadership. It lives at reports/databricks-apps-assessment/ and is rendered as a Streamlit dashboard.

• Run it. cd reports/databricks-apps-assessment && pip install -r requirements.txt && streamlit run app.py
• Build flow. Source files live under src/ (_00_header.py … _99_dispatch.py); python build.py concatenates them into the deployable app.py. Edit the src/ files, never app.py directly. python build.py --check verifies the build is up to date.

Findings the report covers include OAuth On-Behalf-Of (OBO) token-abuse paths in Databricks Apps, the Databricks app identity chain and service-principal exposure, detection gaps in the Databricks audit logs, and concrete recommendations for monitoring, governance, and access-control improvements.

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Links

• Repository: github.com/AndrewAltimit/exploits
• GitHub Pages: andrewaltimit.github.io/exploits
• Live Dashboard: andrewaltimit.github.io/exploits/dashboard — runs in-browser via WebAssembly

License

Dual-licensed under Unlicense and MIT.