v0.6.0

Release notes — truenas-aiops 0.6.0

Previous release: 0.5.0.

BREAKING — the authorization layer is removed

This tool no longer decides whether a write is permitted. Read-only mode
(<PREFIX>_READ_ONLY), the graduated-approval / approver gate, and the
rules.yaml deny engine are all gone. Whether an operation runs is the
agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you connect it with — point
it at a read-only credential and the write fails at the server, the place that
actually owns the permission.

What the tool guarantees instead is that nothing is silent: every operation,
over MCP and the CLI alike, lands a row in the audit log — there is no
unaudited entry point. Destructive writes still capture their before-state and
record an undo token where a clean inverse exists.

• If you set <PREFIX>_READ_ONLY=1, it now has no effect and the MCP server
  logs a warning at startup. Restrict writes via the connecting account instead.
• <PREFIX>_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY / <PREFIX>_AUDIT_RATIONALE still work, but are now
  optional audit annotations — recorded on the row when set, never required.
• The declared risk_level is carried into the audit row as a descriptive tier
  (a label, not a gate).

The governance harness is now: audit (MCP+CLI, unbypassable) · runaway/budget
safety guard · undo recording · output sanitize. policy.py is a small
risk-tier classifier; governance/readonly.py is deleted.

Also in this tool

• New scheme: (default https).

v0.5.0

Release notes — truenas-aiops 0.5.0

Previous release: 0.4.0.

In this tool

• TrueNAS 26 removes the REST API this tool speaks. REST was deprecated in 25.04 and is gone in 26 (in beta now), replaced by JSON-RPC over WebSocket. doctor now reads the server version and warns on 25.10.1+ (which raises a deprecation alert on every call) and errors on 26+; the connection layer explains the removal instead of returning a pile of 404s. The transport migration is not in this release — it is a second backend, not a path change, and it is tracked separately.
• restart_service validates the service name. It previously forwarded any string, and the code that looks like a guard was only capturing prior state. ssh — the operator's out-of-band recovery path — now needs an explicit confirm. A /service read that fails proceeds rather than blocking.
• New scheme: (default https) — the base URL was hardcoded.

Every tool in the line: previews and undetermined outcomes

This release fixes three harness defects that were silently degrading the audit
trail and the undo store.

A write that loses its response is no longer recorded as a failure. The
harness assumed a sanitized error meant nothing had happened. That assumption is
false in exactly the case that matters most: when a write severs its own
connection, the request has already landed, the response cannot come back, and
the operation was recorded as status=error with no undo token created at
all. Transport-level failures are now audited as status=unknown, the result
says plainly that the operation may have taken effect and should be verified
before retrying, and a write that stashed its before-state has its inverse
recorded anyway — flagged effectVerified: false, which undo_list and
undo_apply both surface. Existing undo.db files are migrated in place; their
rows read as verified, which is accurate, since the old code only ever recorded
on the confirmed path.

A dry-run no longer writes an undo token. Previews were recording inverses
built from a before-state they never had: the undo callback's permissive default
filled the gap with a guess, producing a real, applicable token for an operation
that never happened.

A dry-run no longer demands a named approver. Requiring an approval in order
to ask whether something needs approval inverts what a preview is for. The tier
is still computed and still audited, so the preview can tell you an approver
will be needed; it just no longer refuses to answer. The write itself is gated
exactly as before.

The invariant, now stated: a dry_run may read; it must never write. Guards
run on the preview path, which means a preview can and does report that an
operation would be refused.

Also line-wide

• Truncated text now ends in an ellipsis instead of being cut silently. This
  line already treats a silent cut as a defect for lists; it was doing exactly
  that to strings.
• Error messages are capped at 800 characters, not 300. These messages end
  with what to do instead, so the cap was removing the most useful sentence of
  every long refusal.

Verification status

The version detection is built from TrueNAS's published deprecation notes
(deprecated 25.04, removed in 26) and is not verified against a 26 appliance
— 26 is in beta and not available here. The thresholds and the messages are
doc-modelled; the REST paths themselves remain as previously documented in
docs/VERIFICATION.md.

v0.4.0

Release notes — truenas-aiops 0.4.0

Previous release: 0.3.0.

Headline: read-only mode

export TRUENAS_READ_ONLY=1

With this set the 6 write tools are never registered — an MCP
client lists 19 tools instead of 25. The writes are not hidden
behind a flag and not merely refused on call: they are absent from the session,
so a model cannot invoke one and cannot be argued into one. For a reviewer this
is checkable rather than promised — connect, list the tools, and the writes are
not there.

Enforcement is two layers deep: the @governed_tool harness refuses every
non-read operation (covering the CLI and in-process callers too), and the MCP
server removes write tools from list_tools(). Changing entry point does not
get around it.

BREAKING — return shapes changed

This release changes payloads that callers may be parsing. Both changes exist
to stop a result from misrepresenting itself:

1. Absent fields are now null, not "". A missing value and an empty value
   were previously indistinguishable, which invited consumers to invent the
   difference. Keys are still always present — only the value may be null.
2. Anything with a limit now returns an envelope —
   {"<items>": [...], "returned": N, "limit": L, "truncated": bool}. Truncation is
   measured (one extra row is fetched), never inferred from the page happening to
   be full. Where a genuine pre-cap total is knowable it is reported as total;
   where it isn't, total is deliberately omitted rather than echoing returned.

New: read-only diagnostics / RCA

Two new read-only analyses — pool_health_rca and alert_and_capacity_rca — plus a
diagnose CLI group. Every finding cites the measured number that tripped it
along with a cause and a concrete action, ranked worst-first with an explicit
rank field, so priority is stated in the payload rather than implied by list
order. Transparent heuristics, not a black-box verdict.

Also in this release

• docs/VERIFICATION.md — what the mock suite actually guarantees, a live
  verification checklist, and the criteria for claiming this tool verified.
• skills/truenas-aiops/references/agent-guardrails.md — for driving this tool with a
  smaller / local model: which guardrails are now enforced for you, and a
  ready-made system prompt for the rest.
• Expanded operator playbooks in the skill documentation.
• The advertised tool count now matches what an MCP client actually lists
  (it includes undo_list / undo_apply), and a release gate keeps it honest.
• The (preview) label has been dropped. It never meant unreleased; verification
  status now lives in docs/VERIFICATION.md where it can be specific.

v0.3.0

Undo executor (undo list / undo apply) line-wide + this tool's platform/framework expansion + coverage. See CHANGELOG.md.

v0.2.1

Fix release: secrets.enc follows _AIOPS_HOME; sanitized failures audit as status=error (no undo recorded for failed calls); doctor/init fully test-covered. Tool-specific fixes in CHANGELOG.md.

v0.2.0

Security-hardening release from a line-wide code review. Highlights: secure-by-default approver gate for high/critical operations (init seeds a starter rules.yaml), percent-encoded URL path segments, single-sourced version, governance persistence + CLI write-path tests. See CHANGELOG.md for the full list. BREAKING: fresh installs with no rules.yaml now deny high/critical writes until an approver is recorded.

TrueNAS-AIops v0.1.1

Patch: config.yaml now honors the *_AIOPS_HOME env var; CLI writes are now audited + undo-recorded through the governance path (previously MCP-only). See CHANGELOG.

v0.1.0

Governed TrueNAS SCALE AIops (preview): pools/datasets/snapshots/disks/alerts/services, encrypted credential store, init wizard, governance harness (audit/budget/risk-tier/undo). Mock-validated; verify against live TrueNAS.