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Security: AIops-tools/Inference-AIops

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Disclaimer

Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by the vLLM or Ray projects. Product and trademark names belong to their owners. Source is publicly auditable under the MIT license.

Reporting Vulnerabilities

Report privately via a GitHub Security Advisory on github.com/AIops-tools/Inference-AIops or email zhouwei008@gmail.com. Please do not open public issues for security reports.

Security Design

Credential Management

  • A bearer token is optional (many on-prem inference stacks run open). When used, per-target tokens live encrypted in ~/.inference-aiops/secrets.enc (Fernet/AES-128 + scrypt-derived key; chmod 600), never in config.yaml and never in source. The master password is never stored — only a per-store random salt and the ciphertext are on disk.
  • A legacy plaintext env var INFERENCE_<TARGET_NAME_UPPER>_TOKEN is still honoured as a fallback with a deprecation warning (migrate with inference-aiops secret migrate).
  • When present, the token is sent as an Authorization: Bearer header and held only in memory; it is never logged or echoed. The config file holds only host, Ray/vLLM ports, scheme, and TLS settings.

Governed Operations

Every MCP tool runs through the bundled @governed_tool harness (inference_aiops.governance):

  • Audit — every call logged to a local SQLite DB under ~/.inference-aiops/ (relocatable via INFERENCE_AIOPS_HOME), agent-attributed, secret-redacted.
  • Token/runaway budget — hard ceilings (INFERENCE_MAX_TOOL_CALLS / INFERENCE_MAX_TOOL_SECONDS) plus an on-by-default guard that trips a tight poll/retry loop, preventing unbounded API consumption (e.g. polling a slow session).
  • Graduated risk tiers~/.inference-aiops/rules.yaml risk_tiers gate writes by environment/tag; the highest tiers require a recorded approver.
  • Undo-token recording — reversible writes capture the BEFORE state and record an inverse descriptor (e.g. a scale op → restore the prior replica count, autoscale_config_update → restore prior bounds, routing_policy_update → restore the prior policy) so the change can be rolled back.

State-Changing Operations

Destructive/traffic-affecting writes — scale_replicas_down, scale_to_zero, drain_replica, lora_unload, model_hot_swap, model_undeploy, deployment_redeploy, replica_restart — are risk_level=high, accept a dry_run preview, and (under risk_tiers) require a recorded approver (INFERENCE_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY + INFERENCE_AUDIT_RATIONALE). The CLI additionally double-confirms serve scale-to-zero and supports --dry-run. Reversible medium/low writes capture before-state and record an undo token.

SSL/TLS Verification

verify_ssl is off by default (inference stacks commonly serve plain HTTP on a trusted network); set scheme: https + verify_ssl: true for TLS endpoints.

Prompt-Injection Protection

All server-returned text (model ids, deployment/replica names, job entrypoints, Prometheus label values) is passed through a sanitize() truncate + control-character strip before reaching the agent.

Network Scope

No webhooks, no telemetry, no outbound calls beyond the configured Ray dashboard and vLLM endpoints. No post-install scripts or background services.

Static Analysis

uvx bandit -r inference_aiops/ mcp_server/
uv run ruff check .

Supported Versions

The latest released version receives security fixes. This is a preview (0.x); pin a version in production.

There aren't any published security advisories