diff --git a/.github/workflows/dependabot-auto-merge.yml b/.github/workflows/dependabot-auto-merge.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e510a64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/dependabot-auto-merge.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+name: Dependabot Auto-Merge
+
+# Reusable workflow: safely auto-merges Dependabot PRs after CI passes.
+# Scope is narrow:
+#  - Only runs when github.actor == 'dependabot[bot]' (not spoofable;
+#    GitHub sets this from the authenticated user).
+#  - Only auto-merges patch + minor updates; major-version bumps are
+#    left open for manual review.
+#  - Uses pull_request_target so the BASE-branch workflow runs, not
+#    the PR branch's — a PR modifying this file cannot bypass itself.
+#  - Never executes PR code; the only actions taken are `gh pr review`
+#    and `gh pr merge --auto`, both GitHub-side API calls.
+#
+# DO NOT add `actions/checkout` to this workflow. It uses
+# `pull_request_target`, which runs with base-branch secrets available.
+# It is currently safe BECAUSE no PR-controlled code is ever executed —
+# only API calls (fetch-metadata, gh pr review, gh pr merge). Checking
+# out PR code here would expose those secrets to malicious dependency
+# PRs (see the Ultralytics, nx, and tj-actions incidents). This
+# invariant is also enforced by a CI guardrail — see self-review.yml's
+# `guard-no-checkout` job in this repo, and the read-only fleet-wide
+# check in claude-review-audit.sh. Closes #64.
+#
+# Callers MUST NOT use `secrets: inherit`. This workflow needs no
+# secrets beyond the ambient `GITHUB_TOKEN` it mints itself — it does
+# not declare a `secrets:` block below and none should be added for
+# convenience. `secrets: inherit` on a caller hands every repo secret
+# (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, deploy keys, etc.) to a job that evaluates
+# `pull_request_target` on externally-authored PR content. The
+# no-checkout property above doesn't protect against that leak — it
+# only means the leak, if it ever happened, wouldn't arrive bundled
+# with an obvious code-execution vector. Splitting this file out of
+# each caller repo makes `secrets: inherit` look like a tempting
+# one-line fix the next time someone hits an auth error here; it is
+# not a fix, it is a new secret-leak vector this split must not
+# introduce. Caller stubs should declare no `secrets:` block at all.
+#
+# `gh pr review --approve` satisfies branch-protection rules that
+# require review. `--auto` means the merge only happens after all
+# status checks pass; failing CI leaves the PR open indefinitely.
+# Both `gh` calls degrade to a visible ::warning:: rather than a hard
+# failure — see #87 (a hard failure on either call left an
+# unactionable red check with no visible cause).
+#
+# Usage in a caller workflow:
+#
+#   permissions:
+#     contents: write
+#     pull-requests: write
+#
+#   jobs:
+#     dependabot-auto-merge:
+#       uses: smartwatermelon/github-workflows/.github/workflows/dependabot-auto-merge.yml@dependabot-auto-merge-v1
+#
+# Do NOT add a `secrets:` block to the caller (see above).
+#
+# Versioning: this file uses a prefixed tag namespace
+# (dependabot-auto-merge-v1, dependabot-auto-merge-v1.0.0, ...) rather
+# than the bare v1/v2/v3 tags used elsewhere in this repo. Those bare
+# tags are already live and consumed by claude-assistant.yml@v1; a
+# second, unrelated file cannot safely "start its own v1" in the same
+# repo-wide tag namespace.
+
+on:
+  workflow_call: {}
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  auto-merge:
+    if: github.actor == 'dependabot[bot]'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+      pull-requests: write
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Verify caller permissions
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
+          REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
+          PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
+        run: |
+          # Mirrors claude-blocking-review.yml's preflight — fail loudly and
+          # specifically if the caller didn't grant contents:write /
+          # pull-requests:write, rather than letting `gh pr merge` fail
+          # later with an unattributable error (the #87 failure mode).
+          if ! gh api "repos/${REPO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}" --silent 2>/dev/null; then
+            echo "::error::Permission check failed."
+            echo "::error::The caller workflow must declare top-level permissions:"
+            echo "::error::  contents: write, pull-requests: write"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+      - name: Fetch Dependabot metadata
+        id: metadata
+        uses: dependabot/fetch-metadata@21025c705c08248db411dc16f3619e6b5f9ea21a # v2
+
+      - name: Approve and enable auto-merge (patch/minor only)
+        if: steps.metadata.outputs.update-type == 'version-update:semver-patch' || steps.metadata.outputs.update-type == 'version-update:semver-minor'
+        env:
+          PR_URL: ${{ github.event.pull_request.html_url }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          gh pr review --approve "$PR_URL" \
+            || echo "::warning::Approval failed (check can_approve_pull_request_reviews is enabled for this repo); continuing to auto-merge."
+          gh pr merge --auto --squash --delete-branch "$PR_URL" \
+            || echo "::warning::Auto-merge enable failed — check branch protection / auto-merge repo setting."
diff --git a/.github/workflows/self-review.yml b/.github/workflows/self-review.yml
index bcc2597..0939f00 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/self-review.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/self-review.yml
@@ -11,18 +11,17 @@ name: Self-Review
 # Replaces the .github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml caller that was
 # deleted in commit 52e688b during the v1 rename.
 
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  pull-requests: write
-  issues: write
-  id-token: write
-
 on:
   pull_request:
     types: [opened, synchronize, ready_for_review, reopened]
 
 jobs:
   claude-review:
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      pull-requests: write
+      issues: write
+      id-token: write
     uses: ./.github/workflows/claude-blocking-review.yml
     with:
       pr_number: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
@@ -36,3 +35,43 @@ jobs:
         - Grep/regex changes in the escape-hatch path (see #38 history)
     secrets:
       claude_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
+
+  guard-no-checkout:
+    # Plain-shell job, no LLM call involved — deliberately NOT a step
+    # inside claude-review above (that job is `uses:
+    # ./.github/workflows/claude-blocking-review.yml`; a job is either a
+    # reusable-workflow call or a normal job with steps, not both) and
+    # deliberately not folded into the Claude review prompt (that job
+    # skips workflow-self-modification PRs, which is exactly the PR
+    # category this guardrail exists to check). Closes #64.
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 1
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Fail if dependabot-auto-merge.yml uses actions/checkout
+        run: |
+          file=".github/workflows/dependabot-auto-merge.yml"
+          if [ ! -f "$file" ]; then
+            echo "::notice::${file} not found — nothing to check."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          # Strip comment lines first — the header comment in this file
+          # legitimately names `actions/checkout` while explaining why it
+          # must never be added, which a bare substring grep would flag
+          # against itself. Match the real usage form (a `uses:` step),
+          # not just the string appearing anywhere in the file.
+          if grep -v '^\s*#' "$file" | grep -qE 'uses:\s*actions/checkout'; then
+            echo "::error::${file} must NEVER use actions/checkout."
+            echo "::error::This workflow uses pull_request_target with no-checkout as its"
+            echo "::error::core safety property. Adding actions/checkout would expose"
+            echo "::error::base-branch secrets to externally-authored PR content. See the"
+            echo "::error::header comment in ${file} and issue #64."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "No actions/checkout found in ${file} — guardrail passed."
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index b0c3be8..a221f37 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -158,6 +158,99 @@ The BLOCK criteria are in the workflow prompt. To adjust:
 
 ---
 
+## `dependabot-auto-merge`
+
+Reusable workflow: approves and auto-merges Dependabot PRs for patch and
+minor version updates once CI passes. Major-version bumps are left open
+for manual review.
+
+### Setup
+
+`.github/workflows/dependabot-auto-merge.yml` in your repo:
+
+```yaml
+name: Dependabot Auto-Merge
+
+on:
+  pull_request_target:
+    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+  pull-requests: write
+
+jobs:
+  dependabot-auto-merge:
+    uses: smartwatermelon/github-workflows/.github/workflows/dependabot-auto-merge.yml@dependabot-auto-merge-v1
+```
+
+Also add `can_approve_pull_request_reviews: true` to the repo's Actions
+workflow permissions (Settings → Actions → General → Workflow
+permissions), or run the fleet-wide fix in this repo's
+`README.md`/issue #87 history. Without it, `gh pr review --approve`
+fails; the workflow degrades to a visible `::warning::` instead of a
+silent stall, but auto-merge still won't proceed if the repo's branch
+protection requires an approval.
+
+**Do NOT add `secrets: inherit` to the caller.** This workflow needs no
+secrets beyond the `GITHUB_TOKEN` it mints internally and declares no
+`secrets:` input. Splitting this workflow out of each caller repo (so
+that fixing a bug means editing one file, not 26+) creates a real
+temptation: a future maintainer who hits an auth-shaped failure here
+has an easy one-line "fix" available in `secrets: inherit`. That line
+would hand every repo secret — `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, deploy keys,
+anything else the repo holds — to a job that runs against
+externally-authored PR content under `pull_request_target`. The
+workflow's no-checkout property (see below) does not protect against
+this: it only means a secret leak, if it happened, wouldn't arrive
+bundled with an obvious code-execution vector. If `gh pr review` or
+`gh pr merge` is failing for a reason unrelated to
+`can_approve_pull_request_reviews`, debug the actual cause — don't
+reach for `secrets: inherit`.
+
+### Security invariant: no `actions/checkout`
+
+This workflow uses `pull_request_target`, which runs with base-branch
+secrets available — the trigger implicated in several real supply-chain
+incidents (Ultralytics, nx, tj-actions) when combined with a checkout
+of PR-controlled code. This workflow is safe today because it never
+executes PR code: the only actions are API calls (`dependabot/fetch-metadata`,
+`gh pr review`, `gh pr merge`). **`actions/checkout` must never be added
+to this file.** Two guardrails enforce this (closes #64):
+
+- `self-review.yml`'s `guard-no-checkout` job greps this repo's own
+  copy of `dependabot-auto-merge.yml` and fails the PR if
+  `actions/checkout` appears.
+- `claude-review-audit.sh` performs a read-only, fleet-wide check: any
+  caller stub referencing `dependabot-auto-merge.yml` that contains
+  `actions/checkout` or `secrets: inherit` is flagged in the audit
+  report. This check does not block or gate anything — it's audit-only,
+  same as the rest of that script.
+
+### Versioning
+
+Tagged with a prefixed namespace — `dependabot-auto-merge-v1`,
+`dependabot-auto-merge-v1.0.0`, etc. — rather than the bare `v1`/`v2`/`v3`
+tags used by `claude-blocking-review` and `claude-assistant`. Git tags
+are repo-scoped, not per-file; a bare `v1` on this repo already exists
+and is live, consumed by `claude-assistant.yml@v1`. A second, unrelated
+file can't safely "start its own v1" in the same tag namespace.
+
+### Rollout discipline
+
+New tags of this workflow (and behavior-changing bumps) are pointed at
+from 2-3 low-traffic pilot repos first, pinned to the specific new tag
+(not a floating major). Let at least one real Dependabot PR flow
+through each pilot and confirm correct patch/minor-only behavior before
+repointing any floating tag fleet-wide. This workflow approves and
+merges PRs unattended with no fallback reviewer behind it (unlike
+`claude-blocking-review`, which explicitly skips Dependabot PRs) — a
+bug here ships to every repo pinned to the affected tag at once, so it
+gets the same pilot-then-fleet discipline as the org-level rollout
+work.
+
+---
+
 ## `claude-assistant`
 
 Reusable workflow that invokes Claude Code Action. The caller handles triggers
diff --git a/claude-review-audit.sh b/claude-review-audit.sh
index fb4a469..174957d 100755
--- a/claude-review-audit.sh
+++ b/claude-review-audit.sh
@@ -77,6 +77,14 @@ uses_blocking_review() {
   echo "${content}" | grep -q "claude-blocking-review\.yml"
 }
 
+# Check if a workflow file's content references the dependabot-auto-merge
+# reusable workflow (caller stub, in any repo in the fleet)
+uses_dependabot_auto_merge() {
+  local content
+  content=$(strip_comments "${1}")
+  echo "${content}" | grep -q "dependabot-auto-merge\.yml"
+}
+
 # Check if a workflow file is the Claude assistant (responds to @claude)
 is_claude_assistant() {
   local content
@@ -179,6 +187,28 @@ check_repo() {
         fi
       fi
 
+      if uses_dependabot_auto_merge "${raw}"; then
+        # READ-ONLY audit check for #64's guardrail extended to caller stubs
+        # fleet-wide (the reusable's own no-checkout invariant is enforced
+        # by self-review.yml's guard-no-checkout job, but that only ever
+        # sees this repo's copy of the file — it never sees the 26+ caller
+        # stubs living in other repos, which is exactly where
+        # `actions/checkout` or `secrets: inherit` would actually be added).
+        # This does not block or gate anything — it only surfaces in the
+        # audit report, matching the rest of this script's behavior.
+        if echo "${raw}" | grep -q "actions/checkout"; then
+          fail "Caller stub ${wf} references dependabot-auto-merge.yml AND contains actions/checkout"
+          issues+=("SECURITY: remove actions/checkout from ${wf} — dependabot-auto-merge.yml uses pull_request_target and must never check out PR code (see #64)")
+        fi
+        if echo "${raw}" | grep -q "secrets:[[:space:]]*inherit"; then
+          fail "Caller stub ${wf} references dependabot-auto-merge.yml AND uses secrets: inherit"
+          issues+=("SECURITY: remove 'secrets: inherit' from ${wf} — dependabot-auto-merge.yml needs no repo secrets; inherit hands every repo secret to a pull_request_target job evaluating external PR content")
+        fi
+        if ! echo "${raw}" | grep -q "actions/checkout" && ! echo "${raw}" | grep -q "secrets:[[:space:]]*inherit"; then
+          ok "Dependabot auto-merge caller: ${wf} (no checkout, no secrets: inherit)"
+        fi
+      fi
+
       if is_claude_assistant "${raw}"; then
         has_claude_assistant=true
         ok "Claude assistant workflow: ${wf}"
@@ -345,6 +375,7 @@ printf "  2. Caller passes claude_oauth_token secret to reusable workflow\n"
 printf "  3. Secret: CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN (repo + org level)\n"
 printf "  4. Branch protection & required status checks (for blocking review)\n"
 printf "  5. GitHub Actions enabled\n"
+printf "  6. Dependabot auto-merge caller stubs: no actions/checkout, no secrets: inherit (audit-only, #64)\n"
 printf "\nNOTE: This script is read-only — it reports issues but makes no changes.\n"
 
 for owner in "${OWNERS[@]}"; do