From 360bf489f440a9acc203f7120ac323626476f896 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sairon Istyar Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2015 19:49:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] fix temper/tamper typos --- state_harmful.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/state_harmful.md b/state_harmful.md index 9d32a1c..e0fd8c4 100644 --- a/state_harmful.md +++ b/state_harmful.md @@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ On the other hand, if it was the Trusted Stick that performed the encryption, then there should be no way for the hypothetical ME rootkit to write anything onto the user partition bypassing the forced encryption with the user key. -## Temper-resistance considerations +## Tamper-resistance considerations The use of tamper-resistance technology is often thought as a beneficial means to improve physical security of an endpoint device. Care must be applied @@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ irrelevant whether the user would, in practice, be willing or capable to do that or not -- it's a matter of having an _opportunity_ to do that. This is very similar to guarantees of civil liberties, such as free speech.] -Thus a temper-proof mechanism might only be acceptable for the actual (small) +Thus a tamper-proof mechanism might only be acceptable for the actual (small) persistent memory which holds the bits of the user keys, and for nothing more, particularly not for the memory which holds the firmware for the device. Also, any tamper-proof protection on volatile memory (RAM) is not necessary, as such