| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.4.x | ✓ |
| 0.3.5 | ✗ |
| < 0.3 | ✗ |
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories.
Include:
- A description of the vulnerability and its potential impact
- Steps to reproduce or a minimal proof of concept
- Affected versions
You will receive an acknowledgement within 72 hours. We aim to release a fix within 14 days for critical issues.
Tachyon is a same-machine IPC library. The threat model assumes that both the producer and consumer processes are trusted and run under the same user or a cooperating user on the same host. Cross-machine transport and multi-tenant isolation are explicitly out of scope.
Known limitations:
- No encryption. The shared memory region is readable by any process with access to the
memfdfile descriptor. Do not use Tachyon to communicate sensitive data between mutually untrusting processes. - No authentication. The UDS handshake does not authenticate the connecting process beyond filesystem permissions on the socket path.
All release artifacts are signed with cosign and carry a SLSA Build Level 2 provenance attestation.
Tachyon's post-handshake hot path emits a single syscall type (futex on Linux, __ulock on macOS). The full syscall
footprint per phase is documented in SYSCALLS.md.
For C++ and Rust deployments that require seccomp-BPF containment, pre-built allowlist generators are available in
contrib/seccomp/. Do not apply them from within a polyglot runtime (Go, Python, Java, Node.js).