diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index c79494864e..a6f1cd636a 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ Versions follow the merge of a `*_release-v*` branch; CI publishes to npm on tag ### Fixed +- **win32 统一存储降级提示:READONLY 签名点名 + OS 级拒绝不再建议删 index.db(#4614)**。现场报告(v0.1.205,win32-x64):index.db 已存在且早期可写,某次重启后打开报 `attempt to write a readonly database`——与 #3823 同一类 OS 级拒写(完整性标签/AV/并发写者)在文件已存在时的另一种表面(打开成功、第一次写入被拒 → READONLY 而非 CANTOPEN);但既有提示只认 CANTOPEN 字符串,诊断 reason 零可操作信息,warn 行结尾还跟着「delete the file to reset the index」——full 模式下该建议有害(index.db 可能是被冻结会话近期状态的唯一副本)。修法:`sqliteOpenFailureHint` 扩展覆盖 READONLY 签名(点名完整性标签嫌疑、icacls 查标签命令、递归 Low 重打标、AV、并发写者,明确 do NOT delete);degrade 尾部改为「hint 触发时不附删除建议」(CANTOPEN/READONLY 同享;真损坏文件与非 win32 平台维持原样)。测试:`tests/storage-cantopen-hint.test.ts` 新增 5 例(READONLY 正负双向 + 0444 文件确定性复现 READONLY 降级 wiring + stub-win32 删除建议抑制钉 + 原生平台双向),全绿。 - **master CI 全红修复:#4390 historian 的媒体引用释放 + #3250 WAL cap 断言预算(#4506)。** bisect 定位 f161c518..02f544da 窗口 first bad = #4390(row-identity-historian),两个破口:① 权威集清扫改墓碑后,retired 行的 message_media 映射与媒体 CAS 引用永远不释放(默认要等 archive 365 天)——图片重度会话里即 #3762/#3901 的字节泄漏,`media-cas` 家族在 windows 分片稳定红。现在 retire 时释放媒体映射+引用(文本字节照旧史官保留;图片体积大、历史价值低),rewind-redo 复活时由重摄取路径幂等重建映射与引用(sqlite+mysql 双后端同款)。② `#3250: configured cap` 断言的 CAP_SLACK=4KiB(一页余量)预算不住 #4390 新增的每行 WAL 体积(identity 列 64hex + idx_messages_identity 索引项,~192 行超 12 页/47,376B)——截断不变量本身完好,坏的是页级余量的算术;custom-cap 用例改用 64KiB 的 inter-reset 累积预算(注释引用 #4390 行体积),close-converges 等其余断言维持一页余量不变。 - **External summary: stop injecting the summary-writing rules into the conversation prompt (#4460).** With `compress.externalSummary.enabled`, the conversation model only selects ranges and the independent service writes the committed summary — yet every conversation request still carried `HOW TO COMPRESS`/`KEEP VERBATIM`/`DROP`/`PRIORITY` (~5.8K chars) plus the per-summary length budget, which the model's non-authoritative hint is never checked against. The conversation-side prompt now drops both while the chain is enabled (all five prompt assembly sites, function and hybrid builders, pack overrides included); philosophy, ACP tags, tools, summaries-in-context and marker integrity stay. The summary requests keep the full rules (`session.meta.summaryInstructions`), and classic mode is byte-identical. New tests/issue4460-external-summary-conversation-prompt.test.ts (7 cases, positive + negative). - **增量车道:拉取回执修复 ack 传输盲区 + 漂移回退取富侧(#4352/#4323)**。2026-10-22 事故双根因修复:① pi 的 after_provider_response 只在部分 provider 传输下暴露响应头,x-bili-applied-seq 丢失时 noteIncrementalAck 永不执行,后续每轮都整包 re-seed(sinceSeq=0 重发 21K 条历史)。现在 GET /__bili/plugin/turn?conversation= 返回热 canonical 的 {appliedSeq, boundary}(boundary=末条 wire 消息哈希,冷重建诚实返回 null),pi 扩展在规划下一轮前拉取回执,仅在 boundary 证明 canonical 吸收了我方末条消息时采纳——绝不按 seq 前进盲目采纳(外来的全量重发也会推进 canonical);② #4323 多实例写同一目录时,漂移回退无条件吃旧信封,把索引里更新的折叠世代(26,971 refs/16 active)换成旧世代(11,849/12),覆盖与 canonical 失配→0 可压区间→preflight 8.29M 假性死局 502。现在漂移两侧按 mapped ref 数取富侧(平局信封赢,平局语义=原子整文件)。新增 tests/incremental-ack-pull.test.ts 3 例(响应头 ack 回归钉/拉取采纳/冷 boundary null 拒采纳)+ storage-full-flip 4b(陈旧信封让位新索引世代)。 diff --git a/src/storage/shadow.ts b/src/storage/shadow.ts index f7d66cc8d5..45dc3f5821 100644 --- a/src/storage/shadow.ts +++ b/src/storage/shadow.ts @@ -53,20 +53,32 @@ export const VERIFY_EVERY_INGESTS = 20; * every save, and the first clean sample re-admits the session. */ export const DRIFT_ESCALATE_STREAK = 3; -/** #3823: on win32 "unable to open database file" (SQLITE_CANTOPEN) is almost - * always an OS-level refusal — antivirus/Defender holding the dir, OneDrive - * placeholder files under the profile dir, a path past MAX_PATH, or a - * restricted/sandboxed process whose writes Windows integrity control refuses - * (#3823 field report: a DSH-launched child at low integrity hit exactly this - * class on its CA bundle) — NOT a corrupt index.db, so the generic "delete - * the file" recovery advice misleads for that class; name the real suspects - * instead. Empty elsewhere: every field instance of this failure domain is - * win32-x64 (#3338/#3385/#3788/#3823), and Linux/macOS CANTOPEN causes - * (permissions, disk full) are too varied to hint at usefully. */ +/** #3823 + #4614: on win32 two open-time error strings are OS-level refusals, + * not a corrupt index.db, so the generic "delete the file" recovery advice + * misleads for that class — name the real suspects instead: + * - "unable to open database file" (SQLITE_CANTOPEN): antivirus/Defender + * holding the dir, OneDrive placeholder files, a path past MAX_PATH, or a + * restricted/sandboxed process (#3823 field report: a DSH-launched child at + * low integrity hit exactly this class on its CA bundle); + * - "attempt to write a readonly database" (SQLITE_READONLY family): the + * EXISTING index.db opened fine but the first write was refused — the + * #3823 mechanism surfacing differently once the file already exists + * (Windows integrity control / MIC No-Write-Up: a process launched at lower + * integrity than the file's label cannot write it; AV lock; exclusive + * concurrent writer). Deleting the file here is worse than useless: in + * unified-full mode it may hold the only copy of recent session state. + * Empty elsewhere: every field instance of this failure domain is win32-x64 + * (#3338/#3385/#3788/#3823/#4614), and Linux/macOS causes (permissions, disk + * full) are too varied to hint at usefully. */ export function sqliteOpenFailureHint(err: string): string { if (process.platform !== "win32") return ""; - if (!/unable to open database file/i.test(err)) return ""; - return " (win32: the OS refused to open the file — usually antivirus/Defender locking the sessions dir, OneDrive placeholder files under the profile dir, a path over 260 chars, or a restricted/sandboxed process (low-integrity label, app container) whose writes Windows integrity control refuses; exclude %USERPROFILE%\\.local\\share\\billion-context\\ from antivirus real-time scanning first; deleting the file will not clear a lock)"; + if (/unable to open database file/i.test(err)) { + return " (win32: the OS refused to open the file — usually antivirus/Defender locking the sessions dir, OneDrive placeholder files under the profile dir, a path over 260 chars, or a restricted/sandboxed process (low-integrity label, app container) whose writes Windows integrity control refuses; exclude %USERPROFILE%\\.local\\share\\billion-context\\ from antivirus real-time scanning first; deleting the file will not clear a lock)"; + } + if (/attempt to write a readonly database/i.test(err)) { + return " (win32: 'attempt to write a readonly database' on an EXISTING index.db = the file opened read-only and the first write was refused by the OS — most often Windows integrity control (a process running at Low integrity cannot write Medium-labeled files, and a DSH-spawned node.exe can itself carry a Low label, e.g. after a stray 'icacls /setintegritylevel Low' — #5154), less often antivirus/Defender or another bili/dsh process holding the files; check the PROCESS side first — run icacls on your node.exe and if it reports a Low label restore it with 'icacls /setintegritylevel Medium' — do NOT relabel the sessions dir Low to match (that cements the mislabel and drags every file down with it); do NOT delete the file — in unified-full mode it may hold the only copy of recent session state)"; + } + return ""; } // Canonical home for StorageMode/resolveStorageMode is src/knobs.ts (env-var @@ -241,11 +253,16 @@ export class UnifiedShadow { // blobs (#2671 Phase 2) — destructive recovery is operator policy. const errStr = String(err); // Deleting the index cannot fix a no-engine failure (this Node.js has neither builtin - // node:sqlite nor a loadable better-sqlite3) — that advice only fits a genuine open - // failure; the Node.js upgrade lever is surfaced via /__bili/status + the bootstrap warn. + // node:sqlite nor a loadable better-sqlite3), and it cannot clear an OS-level refusal + // either (#3823 lock; #4614 readonly — where it would DESTROY the only copy of recent + // session state in unified-full mode). The delete advice fits only a genuine corrupt + // file; the Node.js upgrade lever is surfaced via /__bili/status + the bootstrap warn. + const hint = sqliteOpenFailureHint(errStr); const tail = /no SQLite engine available/i.test(errStr) ? "" - : `${sqliteOpenFailureHint(errStr)}; delete the file to reset the index`; + : hint !== "" + ? hint + : "; delete the file to reset the index"; loggerLog( "warn", `[storage] unified sidecar failed to open ${dir}/index.db (${errStr}) — staying legacy-only${tail}`, diff --git a/tests/issue4323-drift-escalation.test.ts b/tests/issue4323-drift-escalation.test.ts index bd55190b6a..ce162b343e 100644 --- a/tests/issue4323-drift-escalation.test.ts +++ b/tests/issue4323-drift-escalation.test.ts @@ -188,6 +188,9 @@ test("#4323 A: three consecutive sampled drifts escalate once and freeze envelop assert.equal(escalated.length, 1, "exactly ONE escalation alarm for the whole streak"); assert.ok(escalated[0].msg.includes("active block(s) vs index"), `alarm names both sides' fold counts: ${escalated[0].msg}`); assert.ok(escalated[0].msg.includes("#394"), "alarm names the multi-writer anti-pattern"); + // #4614: the alarm must name BOTH known producers — a single host re-writing + // slots below the watermark on every save produces the identical signature. + assert.ok(escalated[0].msg.includes("#4614"), "alarm also names the single-writer repeating-rewrite producer"); const resolved = captured.filter((e) => e.level === "info" && e.msg.includes(`drift resolved for ${ids}`)); assert.equal(resolved.length, 1, "re-admission is logged"); const driftErrors = captured.filter((e) => e.level === "error" && e.msg.startsWith(`[storage] unified shadow DIGEST DRIFT for ${ids}:`)); diff --git a/tests/storage-cantopen-hint.test.ts b/tests/storage-cantopen-hint.test.ts index 6cd103656b..96d9e726c5 100644 --- a/tests/storage-cantopen-hint.test.ts +++ b/tests/storage-cantopen-hint.test.ts @@ -1,23 +1,33 @@ import { test } from "node:test"; import assert from "node:assert/strict"; -import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs"; +import { chmodSync, mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import * as path from "node:path"; import { sqliteOpenFailureHint } from "../src/storage/shadow.ts"; import { _resetStorageRuntimeStatusForTest, storageStatusWire } from "../src/storage/runtime-status.ts"; import { SessionStore } from "../src/persist.ts"; +import { setLogCapture } from "../src/logger.ts"; import { rmrf } from "./tmp-rm.ts"; /** - * #3823: on win32, CANTOPEN ("unable to open database file") at index.db open - * time is almost always an OS-level environment refusal (AV/Defender lock, - * OneDrive placeholder files, MAX_PATH) — NOT a corrupt file, so the generic - * "delete the file to reset the index" advice misleads for that class. The - * hint fires exactly when win32 && CANTOPEN and stays silent otherwise — - * both directions pinned (#3617 gate discipline). + * #3823 + #4614: on win32, two open-time error strings are OS-level + * environment refusals, not a corrupt file, so the generic "delete the file + * to reset the index" advice misleads for that class (for READONLY it is + * worse than useless — deleting may destroy the only copy of recent session + * state in unified-full mode): + * - CANTOPEN ("unable to open database file"): AV/Defender lock, OneDrive + * placeholders, MAX_PATH, low-integrity process; + * - READONLY ("attempt to write a readonly database"): an EXISTING index.db + * opened but the first write was refused — the same integrity-control + * mechanism once the file already exists (#4614 field report). + * Each hint fires exactly when win32 && its signature and stays silent + * otherwise; when a hint fires the degrade line drops the delete advice, + * and a genuine corrupt-file failure keeps it — all directions pinned + * (#3617 gate discipline). */ const CANT_OPEN = "Error: [storage:node:sqlite] Error: unable to open database file"; +const READONLY = "Error: [storage:node:sqlite] Error: attempt to write a readonly database"; function stubPlatform(platform: string): () => void { const original = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(process, "platform"); @@ -62,6 +72,31 @@ test("hint: non-win32 platforms stay silent even on CANTOPEN", () => { } }); +test("hint: win32 + READONLY names integrity-control suspects and forbids deletion (#4614)", () => { + const restore = stubPlatform("win32"); + try { + const hint = sqliteOpenFailureHint(READONLY); + assert.ok(hint.includes("win32"), "names the platform"); + assert.ok(hint.includes("readonly"), "echoes the failure class"); + assert.ok(hint.includes("integrity"), "points at Windows integrity control"); + assert.ok(hint.includes("icacls"), "gives the label-check command"); + assert.ok(hint.includes("do NOT delete"), "forbids deleting the live index"); + } finally { + restore(); + } +}); + +test("hint: non-win32 platforms stay silent even on READONLY", () => { + for (const p of ["linux", "darwin"]) { + const restore = stubPlatform(p); + try { + assert.equal(sqliteOpenFailureHint(READONLY), "", `expected no hint on ${p}`); + } finally { + restore(); + } + } +}); + const ENV_KEYS = ["BILI_SESSIONS_DIR", "BILI_CONFIG_FILE", "XDG_CACHE_HOME", "XDG_STATE_HOME", "BILI_STORAGE_UNIFIED", "BILI_ENCRYPTION_KEY"] as const; function isolateEnv(base: string, sessions: string): Record { @@ -92,6 +127,8 @@ test("#3823 wiring: an unopenable index.db degrades with the platform-appropriat // reports carry, minus the environment-specific cause. mkdirSync(path.join(sessions, "index.db")); const snap = isolateEnv(base, sessions); + const logs: string[] = []; + setLogCapture((level, msg) => logs.push(`${level} ${msg}`)); try { _resetStorageRuntimeStatusForTest(); new SessionStore({ dir: sessions, enabled: true }); @@ -102,12 +139,94 @@ test("#3823 wiring: an unopenable index.db degrades with the platform-appropriat wire.reason?.startsWith("index database failed to open"), `reason names the open failure (got: ${wire.reason})`, ); + const degradeLine = logs.find((l) => l.includes("unified sidecar failed to open")); + assert.ok(degradeLine, "the degrade warn was logged"); if (process.platform === "win32") { assert.ok(wire.reason?.includes("(win32:"), "win32 runner carries the OS-level hint"); + assert.ok( + !degradeLine.includes("delete the file to reset the index"), + "an OS-level refusal must not carry the delete advice", + ); } else { assert.ok(!wire.reason?.includes("(win32:"), "non-win32 runner stays un-hinted"); + assert.ok( + degradeLine.includes("; delete the file to reset the index"), + "a genuine open failure keeps the delete advice off-hint platforms", + ); } } finally { + setLogCapture(null); + _resetStorageRuntimeStatusForTest(); + restoreEnv(snap); + rmrf(base); + } +}); + +// #4614: the field-reported READONLY signature — an EXISTING index.db that +// opens but refuses the first write. Deterministic cross-platform repro: a +// 0444 regular file (root bypasses permission bits, so skip under root; +// chmod is inert on win32, so skip there — the win32 branch of the hint is +// unit-pinned above with a platform stub instead). +test("#4614 wiring: an unwritable existing index.db degrades carrying the readonly signature", () => { + if (process.platform === "win32") return; + if (typeof process.getuid === "function" && process.getuid() === 0) return; + const base = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), "readonly-hint-")); + const sessions = path.join(base, "sessions"); + mkdirSync(sessions, { recursive: true }); + writeFileSync(path.join(sessions, "index.db"), ""); + chmodSync(path.join(sessions, "index.db"), 0o444); + const snap = isolateEnv(base, sessions); + const logs: string[] = []; + setLogCapture((level, msg) => logs.push(`${level} ${msg}`)); + try { + _resetStorageRuntimeStatusForTest(); + new SessionStore({ dir: sessions, enabled: true }); + const wire = storageStatusWire(); + assert.equal(wire.degraded, true, "the sidecar must be degraded"); + assert.equal(wire.effective, "legacy", "legacy JSON keeps serving"); + assert.ok( + wire.reason?.includes("attempt to write a readonly database"), + `reason carries the readonly signature (got: ${wire.reason})`, + ); + const degradeLine = logs.find((l) => l.includes("unified sidecar failed to open")); + assert.ok(degradeLine, "the degrade warn was logged"); + assert.ok(!degradeLine.includes("(win32:"), "non-win32 stays un-hinted"); + } finally { + setLogCapture(null); + _resetStorageRuntimeStatusForTest(); + restoreEnv(snap); + rmrf(base); + } +}); + +// #3617 negative direction on ALL runners: when the OS-level hint fires +// (stubbed win32 + CANTOPEN), the degrade line must drop the delete advice — +// including for READONLY-class refusals where deleting destroys the only copy +// of recent session state in unified-full mode. +test("wiring: an OS-level refusal drops the delete advice from the degrade line", () => { + const base = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), "readonly-hint-")); + const sessions = path.join(base, "sessions"); + mkdirSync(sessions, { recursive: true }); + mkdirSync(path.join(sessions, "index.db")); + const snap = isolateEnv(base, sessions); + const logs: string[] = []; + setLogCapture((level, msg) => logs.push(`${level} ${msg}`)); + const restore = stubPlatform("win32"); + try { + _resetStorageRuntimeStatusForTest(); + new SessionStore({ dir: sessions, enabled: true }); + const wire = storageStatusWire(); + assert.ok(wire.reason?.includes("(win32:"), "stubbed win32 carries the OS-level hint in the diagnostic"); + const degradeLine = logs.find((l) => l.includes("unified sidecar failed to open")); + assert.ok(degradeLine, "the degrade warn was logged"); + assert.ok(degradeLine.includes("(win32:"), "the warn line carries the hint"); + assert.ok( + !degradeLine.includes("delete the file to reset the index"), + "an OS-level refusal must not carry the delete advice", + ); + } finally { + restore(); + setLogCapture(null); _resetStorageRuntimeStatusForTest(); restoreEnv(snap); rmrf(base);