Status: RUNNING — container php2shell-lab serving on http://127.0.0.1:8090.
Test target for the PHP2Shell PHP vulnerabilities (both CVSS 9.2, unauthenticated, triggered during request startup before any app code runs):
| CVE | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| CVE-2026-109618 | RCE via OOM corruption: hitting memory_limit makes an emalloc failure call zend_bailout() → longjmp to the request boundary → cleanup is skipped → half-initialized structs are later freed/read |
| CVE-2026-109619 | RCE via stale global state: bailout skips the per-request session-global reset; dangling zval* pointers (e.g. PS(http_session_vars), PS(rfc1867_progress)) survive into the next request on the same persistent mod_php worker → heap UAF, memory disclosure, RCE |
Entry point: the default-on session.upload_progress feature. A multipart POST containing a
PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS field makes the PHP core write an upload-progress record into the
session file during request startup (in the rfc1867 multipart parser callback, pre-RINIT).
With session.use_strict_mode = 0 the attacker chooses the session ID via the PHPSESSID POST field.
- Affected: PHP 5.4 → 8.5.11
- Patched: 8.4.27 (this lab runs 8.4.26 — vulnerable); also 8.2.35 / 8.3.36 / 8.5.12 (Oct 21, 2026)
- Highest-risk SAPI: Apache mod_php — this lab runs exactly that config
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Image | docker.io/library/php:8.4.26-apache-bookworm (ID df868eae5dac, cached locally) |
| PHP version | 8.4.26 (podman exec php2shell-lab php -v) — vulnerable, 8.4.26 < 8.4.27 (patch release of Oct 21, 2026) |
| SAPI | apache2handler (Apache 2.4.68 mod_php, mpm_prefork) — the highest-risk configuration per the advisory |
| Patched image (for comparison) | docker.io/library/php:8.4.27-apache-bookworm (ID e4da5b539e5c) — cached locally |
Reconstructed from podman inspect php2shell-lab (no volumes, no env overrides, no cap changes,
default pasta network, image default command apache2-foreground):
# START (image is cached locally; --name must be free)
podman run -d --name php2shell-lab -p 8090:80 docker.io/library/php:8.4.26-apache-bookworm
# web root is the stock /var/www/html of the image; lab files are copied in (sources in this dir):
podman cp upload.php php2shell-lab:/var/www/html/upload.php
podman cp version.php php2shell-lab:/var/www/html/version.php
podman cp index.html php2shell-lab:/var/www/html/index.html
podman cp probe2.php php2shell-lab:/var/www/html/probe2.php # diagnostic, optional
# (probe2.php was added by the takeover session; the other three are the original lab files)
# STOP
podman stop php2shell-lab
# REMOVE (use -f if running)
podman rm php2shell-lab
# OBSERVE
podman logs php2shell-lab 2>&1 | tail # apache logs go to container stdout (log files are symlinks to /dev/stdout)
podman exec php2shell-lab php -v
podman exec php2shell-lab sh -c 'ls -la /tmp/sess_* 2>/dev/null'From GET /version.php (live output, Oct 26 2026):
{
"php_version": "8.4.26",
"session.upload_progress.enabled": "1",
"session.use_strict_mode": "0",
"memory_limit": "128M",
"post_max_size": "8M",
"max_file_uploads": "20",
"session.serialize_handler": "php",
"sapi": "apache2handler",
"session_id": ""
}Additional defaults (verified via php -r 'ini_get(...)' inside the container; the image ships
no active main php.ini — only conf.d/{opcache,sodium}.ini — so these are the PHP 8.4
compile-time defaults):
| INI | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
session.upload_progress.enabled |
1 |
entry point is on |
session.upload_progress.cleanup |
1 |
default ON: the progress record is deleted and the session file re-flushed (empty) at end of upload — see transcript |
session.upload_progress.freq |
1% |
byte threshold between record updates |
session.upload_progress.min_freq |
1 |
default 1 second minimum time between updates |
session.upload_progress.name |
PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS |
POST field that arms the feature |
session.upload_progress.prefix |
upload_progress_ |
session-key prefix |
session.use_strict_mode |
0 |
attacker-chosen ID accepted |
session.use_only_cookies |
1 |
session_start() will NOT adopt a POST/GET PHPSESSID — it generates a random ID. The upload-progress path is unaffected: it sets PS(id) directly from the POST field (see "Mechanism") |
session.save_path |
'' (unset) |
files handler falls back to the temp dir → session files land in /tmp inside the container, not /var/lib/php/sessions |
session.save_handler |
files |
|
session.serialize_handler |
php |
|
session.auto_start |
0 |
|
memory_limit |
128M |
OOM-bailout target (CVE-2026-109618) |
post_max_size |
8M |
keep uploads ≤ ~8M so parsing reaches the OOM path instead of a POST-size abort |
max_file_uploads |
20 |
Base URL: http://127.0.0.1:8090
| Endpoint | Purpose | Expected response |
|---|---|---|
GET /version.php |
JSON of the served config (php version, session/memory/post settings, SAPI) | the JSON block above |
POST /upload.php |
multipart sink; echoes a JSON summary of $_FILES/$_POST — the vulnerable progress path runs before this code |
200 + JSON: files_uploaded, files[].name/.size, post_fields, raw_post_size, content_type, session_id (empty — handler never starts a session), php_version |
POST /probe2.php |
diagnostic: reports session_status() before/after session_start() and $_SESSION contents |
200 + JSON incl. session_status_before, session_id, session_keys, session |
GET /index.html |
manual test form | HTML form |
$ podman ps --format '{{.Names}} {{.Ports}} {{.Status}}'
php2shell-lab 0.0.0.0:8090->80/tcp Up
$ podman exec php2shell-lab php -v
PHP 8.4.26 (cli) (built: Oct 21 2026 00:31:48) (NTS)
Zend Engine v4.4.26, Copyright (c), by the Zend Technologies
with Zend OPcache v8.4.26, Copyright (c), by the Zend Technologies$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8090/version.php
{
"php_version": "8.4.26",
"session.upload_progress.enabled": "1",
"session.use_strict_mode": "0",
"memory_limit": "128M",
"post_max_size": "8M",
"max_file_uploads": "20",
"session.serialize_handler": "php",
"sapi": "apache2handler",
"session_id": ""
}$ head -c 200000 /dev/zero > /tmp/opencode/probe-200k.bin
$ curl -s -i --max-time 10 \
-F "PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS=1" -F "PHPSESSID=labcheck-0001" \
-F "file=@/tmp/opencode/probe-200k.bin" \
http://127.0.0.1:8090/upload.php
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 21:19:24 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.68 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.4.26
Content-Length: 402
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{
"files_uploaded": 1,
"files": [ { "name": "probe-200k.bin", "size": 200000 } ],
"post_fields": [ "PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS", "PHPSESSID" ],
"raw_post_size": 200458,
"content_type": "multipart/form-data; boundary=...",
"session_id": "",
"php_version": "8.4.26"
}Observations
- HTTP 200, correct JSON summary.
- No
Set-Cookieheader — expected: the upload-progress code setsPS(send_cookie) = 0when the ID comes from a non-cookie source (verified inext/session/session.c). - Session file evidence (note: files land in
/tmpin this image, not/var/lib/php/sessions):
$ podman exec php2shell-lab sh -c 'ls -la /tmp/sess_labcheck-0001; cat /tmp/sess_labcheck-0001'
-rw------- 1 www-data www-data 0 Oct 26 21:19 /tmp/sess_labcheck-0001
(empty — 0 bytes)The file is created during request startup under the attacker-chosen ID (timestamp matches
the probe exactly; the handler never calls session_start()), then re-flushed empty because
session.upload_progress.cleanup=1 deletes the record at end-of-upload (see Mechanism below).
$ curl -s --max-time 10 -F "PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS=1" -F "PHPSESSID=labcheck-0002" \
-F "file=@/tmp/opencode/probe-200k.bin" http://127.0.0.1:8090/probe2.php
{
"session_status_before": 1, # PHP_SESSION_NONE — the progress session is already gone
"session_id": "b6ab3bce5b4798f8e38a47bd23927032", # NEW random ID (use_only_cookies=1: POST ID not adopted by session_start())
"session_keys": [],
"session": [],
"php_version": "8.4.26"
}
$ podman exec php2shell-lab ls -la /tmp/sess_labcheck-0002
-rw------- 1 www-data www-data 0 Oct 26 21:24 /tmp/sess_labcheck-0002
$ curl -s --max-time 10 -F "PHPSESSID=labcheck-ctrl1" \
-F "file=@/tmp/opencode/probe-200k.bin" http://127.0.0.1:8090/probe2.php
{
"session_status_before": 1,
"session_id": "3b666df3ed05e5b579ee4fe0603d56b6", # random ID again
"session_keys": [],
"session": [],
"php_version": "8.4.26"
}
$ podman exec php2shell-lab ls -la /tmp/sess_labcheck-ctrl1
ls: cannot access '/tmp/sess_labcheck-ctrl1': No such file or directory # control: no progress record path takenObservations
- With
PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESSpresent → a session file is created under the POST ID at request startup (treatment). Without it → no file (control). This isolates the upload-progress code path as the creator. - The progress session does not stay active for the handler:
session_status_beforeisPHP_SESSION_NONEin both cases, andsession_start()in the handler generates a random ID because PHP 8.4's defaultsession.use_only_cookies=1blocks POST/GET ID adoption inphp_session_start()(the progress path itself setsPS(id)directly and is unaffected). $_SESSIONin the handler is empty (record already cleaned up percleanup=1).
To prove the record content, session.upload_progress.cleanup=0 was temporarily set
(echo session.upload_progress.cleanup=0 > /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/zz-cleanup-test.ini,
apachectl restart), probed, then the INI removed and Apache restarted (state restored —
cleanup=1 re-verified).
$ curl -s --max-time 10 -F "PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS=1" -F "PHPSESSID=labcheck-0004" \
-F "file=@/tmp/opencode/probe-200k.bin" http://127.0.0.1:8090/upload.php
{ ... "files_uploaded": 1, ... "session_id": "", "php_version": "8.4.26" }
$ podman exec php2shell-lab sh -c 'ls -la /tmp/sess_labcheck-0004; cat /tmp/sess_labcheck-0004'
-rw------- 1 www-data www-data 367 Oct 26 21:29 /tmp/sess_labcheck-0004
upload_progress_1|a:5:{s:10:"start_time";i:1793050145;s:14:"content_length";i:200458;
s:15:"bytes_processed";i:200458;s:4:"done";b:1;s:5:"files";a:1:{i:0;a:7:{s:10:"field_name";
s:4:"file";s:4:"name";s:14:"probe-200k.bin";s:8:"tmp_name";s:27:"/tmp/phpq3b6uvlriagi6IxbJA0";
s:5:"error";i:0;s:4:"done";b:1;s:10:"start_time";i:1793050145;s:15:"bytes_processed";i:200000;}}}This is the exact record format the progress path writes — key
upload_progress_<POST value of PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS> (here upload_progress_1), with
start_time, content_length, bytes_processed, done, and a per-file array
(field_name, name, tmp_name, error, done, start_time, bytes_processed).
The session extension wraps the rfc1867 multipart-parser callback
(php_session_rfc1867_callback, registered at module init). Relevant flow for one probe request:
MULTIPART_EVENT_START(request startup, body parse, pre-RINIT):php_rinit_session_globals()— the per-request reset of session globals (PS(id)=NULL,PS(http_session_vars)UNDEF,PS(session_status)=none, …). Aphp_session_rfc1867_progressstruct is allocated and stored inPS(rfc1867_progress).MULTIPART_EVENT_FORMDATA: capturesPHPSESSIDPOST value intoprogress->sidandPHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESSvalue into the session key.MULTIPART_EVENT_FILE_START:PS(id) = progress->sid(attacker ID, directly) — this is why the POST field works even withuse_only_cookies=1; setsPS(send_cookie)=0(hence noSet-Cookie); initializes the progress record array.FILE_START/FILE_DATA/FILE_END:php_session_rfc1867_update()— rate-limited byfreq(1%) andmin_freq(1 s) — callsphp_session_initialize()(starts the session under the attacker ID, loads/creates/tmp/sess_<id>), inserts the record intoPS(http_session_vars), andphp_session_flush(1)writes it to disk.MULTIPART_EVENT_END: with defaultcleanup=1→php_session_rfc1867_cleanup()deletes the record and re-flushes (→ 0-byte file, as observed), thenphp_rshutdown_session_globals()releases the session state. Progress struct freed.
The CVE surface: if zend_bailout() longjmps out of the mid-parse state (e.g. OOM under
128M memory_limit during step 4), steps 4–5 cleanup never run: PS(rfc1867_progress),
PS(http_session_vars) (a live zval), PS(id), etc. are left dangling. The normal
request-boundary resets (php_rinit_session_globals/php_rshutdown_session_globals) that would
clear them are exactly what bailout skips → the stale globals (dangling zval*/zend_string*
pointers) survive into the next request on the same prefork worker → heap UAF / memory
disclosure / RCE (CVE-2026-109619), and half-initialized structs are freed/read on teardown
(CVE-2026-109618).
- Vulnerable: 8.4.26 (
apache2handler). Patched for comparison: 8.4.27 image is cached locally (e4da5b539e5c) —podman run -d -p 8091:80 php:8.4.27-apache-bookworm+ same web files. - Trigger shape:
multipart/form-dataPOST with fieldsPHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS=<any>+PHPSESSID=<attacker-chosen-id>and ≥1 file part. File part name is arbitrary (fileused here). - Sizing knobs:
memory_limit=128M,post_max_size=8M(stay under it so the request reaches the OOM path instead of a 2M/POST-abort),max_file_uploads=20,min_freq=1s,freq=1%. - Session files: inside the container at
/tmp/sess_<id>(save_pathunset → temp dir), mode600, ownerwww-data. With defaults they end 0 bytes (cleanup=1); setsession.upload_progress.cleanup=0in/usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/+apachectl restartto keep the record (format shown in §5). - No
Set-Cookiecomes back for POST-chosen IDs — don't use cookie presence as a success signal; use the created/tmp/sess_<id>file (timestamped at request startup) or the record content. session.use_only_cookies=1(PHP 8.4 default) only affectssession_start()in handler code (random ID generated); it does not affect the upload-progress path, which setsPS(id)directly.- Worker stickiness: mod_php +
mpm_prefork— a given client connection is handled by one prefork worker; to hit the same worker as the baiting request, reuse the same connection pattern / target the same child (workers are PIDs under the apache parent; seepodman exec php2shell-lab ps aux). - Logs: Apache log files are symlinks to
/dev/stdout//dev/stderr— usepodman logs php2shell-lab, nottail /var/log/apache2/*(tail on the symlink will block). - Reset between experiments:
apachectl restartinside the container gives fresh workers (clears any stale per-request state) — verified working during this session. - Cleanup of this takeover session: stray self-test containers removed:
scanner-selftest-vuln-1664448(8092),scanner-selftest-patched-1664448(8093),exploit-selftest-1666661_7646(8093),exploit-selftest-8094(8094).podman ps -anow shows onlyphp2shell-lab(+ pre-existingvrf-lab-redos-b3dc3b81, untouched); ports 8092/8093/8094 confirmed free (connection refused). - Diagnostic session files left in the container (harmless, evidence of probes):
/tmp/sess_labcheck-0001(0 B),sess_labcheck-0002(0 B),sess_labcheck-sidtest(0 B),sess_labcheck-0004(367 B, full record), plus two random-ID 0-byte files from/probe2.php. Remove withpodman exec php2shell-lab rm -f /tmp/sess_*if you want a pristine start.
| File | In container | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
version.php |
/var/www/html/version.php |
served-config JSON |
upload.php |
/var/www/html/upload.php |
multipart sink / probe target |
index.html |
/var/www/html/index.html |
manual test form |
probe2.php |
/var/www/html/probe2.php |
diagnostic (session status/contents) — added by takeover session |