[Security] Signed Binary Updates with Ed25519

[yashksaini-coder]

Goal

Prevent man-in-the-middle attacks during the auto-update process.

Description

The current updater in src/updater.rs downloads a binary and executes it. This is vulnerable to MITM attacks if the transport layer is compromised.

Implement signature verification:

1. Generate an Ed25519 keypair; hardcode the public key in the TRX source
2. For each release, sign the binary with the private key and upload a .sig file alongside it
3. In updater.rs, download both the binary and the .sig file
4. Verify the signature using the ed25519-dalek crate before executing the binary
5. Abort the update if verification fails and display a clear error

The private key must never be committed to the repository.

Tech

Rust, Cryptography (ed25519-dalek), Release CI pipeline

Difficulty

Level 3 – Advanced

[saurabhhhcodes]

I would like to work on this.

Plan: add Ed25519 signature verification to the updater, download the signature beside the binary, embed only the public key in source, abort updates with a clear error on verification failure, and document the release signing flow without committing private key material. Please assign this to me if this approach is acceptable.