diff --git a/crates/khive-mcp/src/server.rs b/crates/khive-mcp/src/server.rs
index 0140f0c2b..2e7822986 100644
--- a/crates/khive-mcp/src/server.rs
+++ b/crates/khive-mcp/src/server.rs
@@ -2339,6 +2339,60 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    // ── request-boundary regression: raw controls survive wire decoding ─────
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn request_boundary_raw_control_bytes_reach_handler() {
+        // Simulates the actual MCP wire: a JSON-RPC client sends the tool's
+        // `ops` argument as a JSON string using the standard JSON `\n`
+        // escape. Deserializing `RequestParams` decodes that escape into an
+        // actual raw LF byte inside the DSL source — the exact shape
+        // `escape_literal_control_chars` (crates/khive-request/src/parser/scan.rs)
+        // exists to accept. This confirms the decoded raw newline survives
+        // parsing and dispatch all the way to the pack handler's result.
+        let wire = "{\"ops\":\"create(kind=\\\"entity\\\", entity_kind=\\\"concept\\\", name=\\\"line1\\nline2\\\")\"}";
+        let params: RequestParams = serde_json::from_str(wire).expect("wire JSON deserializes");
+        assert!(
+            params.ops.contains('\n'),
+            "deserialized ops must carry a raw LF, not the two-char escape: {:?}",
+            params.ops
+        );
+
+        let config = RuntimeConfig {
+            db_path: None,
+            default_namespace: Namespace::local(),
+            embedding_model: None,
+            additional_embedding_models: vec![],
+            packs: vec!["kg".to_string()],
+            ..RuntimeConfig::default()
+        };
+        let runtime = KhiveRuntime::new(config).expect("in-memory runtime");
+        let server = KhiveMcpServer::new(runtime).expect("server builds with kg");
+
+        let parsed = parse_request(&params.ops).expect("literal newline inside quotes must parse");
+        let response = server
+            .run_parsed(
+                parsed.ops,
+                parsed.mode,
+                PresentationMode::Verbose,
+                None,
+                false,
+                None,
+            )
+            .await;
+
+        let results = response["results"]
+            .as_array()
+            .expect("results must be an array");
+        assert_eq!(results.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(
+            results[0]["ok"],
+            json!(true),
+            "unexpected result: {response:?}"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(results[0]["result"]["name"], json!("line1\nline2"));
+    }
+
     // ── MCP-AUD-002 regression: save_to must bypass daemon forwarding ────────
 
     fn make_daemon_save_to_test_server() -> KhiveMcpServer {
diff --git a/crates/khive-request/src/parser/parser_impl.rs b/crates/khive-request/src/parser/parser_impl.rs
index cee826864..c3a724f94 100644
--- a/crates/khive-request/src/parser/parser_impl.rs
+++ b/crates/khive-request/src/parser/parser_impl.rs
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 
 use crate::types::{ArgValue, DslError, ParsedOp, NESTING_DEPTH_LIMIT};
 
-use super::scan::{char_label, scan_string_end};
+use super::scan::{char_label, escape_literal_control_chars, scan_string_end};
 
 /// Byte-slice cursor for the DSL input.
 pub(crate) struct Parser<'a> {
@@ -386,11 +386,23 @@ impl<'a> Parser<'a> {
         let end = self.scan_value_end()?;
         let slice = std::str::from_utf8(&self.src[start..end])
             .expect("ascii-or-utf8 maintained by scanner");
-        let value: Value =
-            serde_json::from_str(slice.trim()).map_err(|e| DslError::InvalidValue {
-                pos: start,
-                error: e.to_string(),
-            })?;
+        let trimmed = slice.trim();
+        // A quoted string literal may contain raw control bytes (newline, CR,
+        // tab) verbatim in the DSL source; JSON proper forbids that, so
+        // rewrite them to JSON escapes before handing the slice to
+        // `serde_json`. Non-string values (numbers, bool, null) never
+        // legitimately contain such bytes, so this only touches strings.
+        let normalized;
+        let json_src: &str = if trimmed.starts_with('"') {
+            normalized = escape_literal_control_chars(trimmed);
+            &normalized
+        } else {
+            trimmed
+        };
+        let value: Value = serde_json::from_str(json_src).map_err(|e| DslError::InvalidValue {
+            pos: start,
+            error: e.to_string(),
+        })?;
         self.pos = end;
         Ok(value)
     }
diff --git a/crates/khive-request/src/parser/scan.rs b/crates/khive-request/src/parser/scan.rs
index a58692c1b..7415ad3f8 100644
--- a/crates/khive-request/src/parser/scan.rs
+++ b/crates/khive-request/src/parser/scan.rs
@@ -20,6 +20,42 @@ pub(crate) fn scan_string_end(src: &[u8], start: usize) -> Result<usize, DslErro
     Err(DslError::UnclosedString)
 }
 
+/// Rewrite raw literal newline, carriage return, and tab bytes inside a
+/// double-quoted string literal into their JSON escape form, so a value
+/// containing one of those three bytes verbatim (as opposed to a
+/// `\n`/`\r`/`\t` escape sequence) still parses as valid JSON. Existing
+/// backslash-escape pairs are copied through untouched: this walks the same
+/// `\` + next-byte pairing [`scan_string_end`] uses, so an already-escaped
+/// sequence is never reinterpreted.
+///
+/// Per ADR-016, this exception is limited to exactly those three
+/// characters. Every other raw U+0000-U+001F control byte is left as-is and
+/// falls through to `serde_json`, which rejects it as invalid JSON — the
+/// same behavior as before this exception existed.
+pub(crate) fn escape_literal_control_chars(s: &str) -> String {
+    if !s.contains(['\n', '\r', '\t']) {
+        return s.to_owned();
+    }
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len() + 8);
+    let mut chars = s.chars();
+    while let Some(c) = chars.next() {
+        if c == '\\' {
+            out.push(c);
+            if let Some(next) = chars.next() {
+                out.push(next);
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        match c {
+            '\n' => out.push_str("\\n"),
+            '\r' => out.push_str("\\r"),
+            '\t' => out.push_str("\\t"),
+            c => out.push(c),
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
 /// Returns a stable delimiter label for diagnostics.
 pub(crate) fn char_label(c: char) -> &'static str {
     match c {
diff --git a/crates/khive-request/tests/parser.rs b/crates/khive-request/tests/parser.rs
index 7c26a43a0..0c3971af5 100644
--- a/crates/khive-request/tests/parser.rs
+++ b/crates/khive-request/tests/parser.rs
@@ -109,6 +109,151 @@ fn string_with_escaped_quote() {
     assert_eq!(val(&v[0].args["title"]), &json!("he said \"hi\""));
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn multiline_string_value_round_trips() {
+    // A literal raw newline (0x0A) inside a double-quoted value, as an agent
+    // client would send it directly rather than escaping it to `\n` text.
+    let src = "gtd.assign(title=\"line one\nline two\")";
+    let v = ops(src);
+    assert_eq!(val(&v[0].args["title"]), &json!("line one\nline two"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn tab_and_carriage_return_literal_in_string() {
+    let src = "gtd.assign(title=\"a\tb\rc\")";
+    let v = ops(src);
+    assert_eq!(val(&v[0].args["title"]), &json!("a\tb\rc"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn mixed_literal_newline_and_escaped_sequences() {
+    // A literal raw newline sits next to escaped-quote and escaped-backslash
+    // pairs in the same value, proving the control-char rewrite does not
+    // disturb adjacent backslash-escape pairs.
+    let src = "comm.reply(content=\"line one \\\"quoted\\\"\nline two a\\\\b\")";
+    let v = ops(src);
+    assert_eq!(
+        val(&v[0].args["content"]),
+        &json!("line one \"quoted\"\nline two a\\b")
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn unterminated_multiline_string_rejected() {
+    // A raw newline mid-string does not make an unclosed string legal; the
+    // closing quote is still required somewhere in the input.
+    let src = "gtd.assign(title=\"line one\nline two)";
+    let err = parse_request(src).unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, DslError::UnclosedString));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn json_form_rejects_literal_newline_in_string() {
+    // JSON form stays strict JSON: a raw control character inside a quoted
+    // string is a parse error there, unlike the function-call form above.
+    let src = "[{\"tool\":\"gtd.next\",\"args\":{\"note\":\"line one\nline two\"}}]";
+    let err = parse_request(src).unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, DslError::InvalidJson { .. }));
+}
+
+// ── ADR-016 grammar-boundary matrix (round-1 review, PR #957) ────────────────
+
+#[test]
+fn crlf_preserved_exact_in_quoted_value() {
+    // A literal CRLF pair (not just LF or CR alone) inside a quoted value
+    // round-trips byte-for-byte, proving both bytes are rewritten
+    // independently rather than the pair being collapsed or reordered.
+    let src = "gtd.assign(title=\"line one\r\nline two\")";
+    let v = ops(src);
+    assert_eq!(val(&v[0].args["title"]), &json!("line one\r\nline two"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn literal_newline_immediately_before_closing_quote() {
+    // The raw newline is the very last byte before the closing `"`, with no
+    // trailing content — the scanner must not mistake it for trailing
+    // whitespace to trim, nor the rewrite skip the final byte.
+    let src = "gtd.assign(title=\"abc\n\")";
+    let v = ops(src);
+    assert_eq!(val(&v[0].args["title"]), &json!("abc\n"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn raw_newline_immediately_after_escaped_quote_boundary() {
+    // A `\"` escape pair is immediately followed by a raw literal newline.
+    // `scan_string_end` must consume the escape pair as a unit (not treat
+    // its second byte as the closing quote), and the rewrite must copy the
+    // escape pair through untouched before rewriting the adjacent raw LF.
+    let src = "gtd.assign(title=\"a\\\"\nb\")";
+    let v = ops(src);
+    assert_eq!(val(&v[0].args["title"]), &json!("a\"\nb"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn raw_control_char_in_bareword_position_rejected() {
+    // The literal-control-char exception only applies inside a
+    // double-quoted string value (`parse_value` only calls
+    // `escape_literal_control_chars` when the trimmed slice starts with
+    // `"`). A raw NUL embedded in an unquoted (bareword) numeric value must
+    // still fail to parse as JSON, exactly as before this PR.
+    let src = format!("gtd.assign(weight=1{}0)", '\u{0}');
+    let err = parse_request(&src).unwrap_err();
+    assert!(
+        matches!(err, DslError::InvalidValue { .. }),
+        "expected InvalidValue for a raw control byte in bareword position, got {err:?}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn other_raw_control_chars_in_quoted_string_still_rejected() {
+    // Only `\n`, `\r`, and `\t` are exempted (ADR-016). Every other raw
+    // U+0000-U+001F byte inside a quoted value must remain a parse error,
+    // matching pre-PR behavior — NUL, form feed, and ESC here.
+    for raw in ['\u{0}', '\u{c}', '\u{1b}'] {
+        let src = format!("gtd.assign(title=\"a{raw}b\")");
+        let err = parse_request(&src).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, DslError::InvalidValue { .. }),
+            "expected InvalidValue for raw control byte {:#04x}, got {err:?}",
+            raw as u32
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn invalid_backslash_escape_in_quoted_string_rejected() {
+    // A negative invalid-escape case: `\q` is not a JSON escape sequence.
+    // This must fail regardless of the literal-newline carve-out.
+    let src = r#"gtd.assign(title="bad \q escape")"#;
+    let err = parse_request(src).unwrap_err();
+    assert!(matches!(err, DslError::InvalidValue { .. }));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn batch_ops_separated_by_raw_newlines() {
+    // The top-level batch `,` separator may be split across literal
+    // newlines between ops, since `skip_ws` treats `\n` as ordinary
+    // whitespace around the separator.
+    let src = "[create(kind=\"entity\", name=\"A\"),\ncreate(kind=\"entity\", name=\"B\")]";
+    let r = req(src);
+    assert_eq!(r.mode, ExecutionMode::Parallel);
+    assert_eq!(r.ops.len(), 2);
+    assert_eq!(val(&r.ops[0].args["name"]), &json!("A"));
+    assert_eq!(val(&r.ops[1].args["name"]), &json!("B"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn chain_ops_separated_by_raw_newlines() {
+    // The chain `|` separator may likewise be split across literal
+    // newlines between ops.
+    let src = "create(kind=\"entity\", name=\"A\")\n|\ncreate(kind=\"entity\", name=\"B\")";
+    let r = req(src);
+    assert_eq!(r.mode, ExecutionMode::Chain);
+    assert_eq!(r.ops.len(), 2);
+    assert_eq!(val(&r.ops[0].args["name"]), &json!("A"));
+    assert_eq!(val(&r.ops[1].args["name"]), &json!("B"));
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn null_and_negative_number() {
     let v = ops(r#"update(id="x", description=null, weight=-0.5)"#);
diff --git a/docs/adr/ADR-016-request-dsl.md b/docs/adr/ADR-016-request-dsl.md
index 4811c583e..4be32cc06 100644
--- a/docs/adr/ADR-016-request-dsl.md
+++ b/docs/adr/ADR-016-request-dsl.md
@@ -105,7 +105,16 @@ Argument values use JSON literal syntax inside the function-call form:
 | Reference (chain only) | `$prev`, `$prev.field.path`, `$prev[N].field` |
 
 String escapes follow JSON: `\\`, `\"`, `\n`, `\t`, `\r`. Other backslash
-sequences are literal.
+sequences are literal. Unlike strict JSON, a double-quoted value in the
+function-call form may also contain a literal newline, carriage return, or
+tab byte verbatim (not just the backslash-escaped form); the parser rewrites
+those bytes to their JSON escape before decoding, so multi-paragraph content
+round-trips without requiring callers to pre-escape line breaks. This
+exception is limited to exactly those three bytes: every other raw
+U+0000-U+001F control character inside a function-call quoted value remains
+a parse error, same as strict JSON. The JSON form (`ops="[{\"tool\":...}]"`)
+keeps strict JSON string rules: raw control characters there remain a parse
+error, per the JSON spec.
 
 #### `$prev` reference grammar