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threat-model.md

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Threat model (MVP)

Scope: local/demo WalletOps Companion — Flutter client + Go API + Postgres. No real custody or production PII.

Assets

  • User credentials (email/password hash)
  • JWT access + refresh tokens
  • Webhook shared secret
  • Event payloads (simulated wallet ops data)
  • AI prompt/response audit rows

Threats and controls

Threat Control in MVP
Forged partner webhooks HMAC-SHA256 over raw body (X-Signature: sha256=<hex>); reject bad sigs with 401
Replay / duplicate ingest Unique (user_id, idempotency_key); replay returns same event
Double-processing under two workers FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED on claim
Crash while processing claimed_at lease; stale rows are reclaimable
Stolen device tokens flutter_secure_storage; short access TTL; refresh rotation on use
Prompt injection via payload Summarize prompt uses allowlisted fields only (type, amount, status, rule name)
Cross-user event access Ownership checks on event IDs for list/detail/summarize
Secret leak in git .env gitignored; .env.example only

Out of scope (MVP)

SSO, device binding, WAF, production rate limits, multi-tenant RBAC, real on-chain keys.

Residual risk

Demo secrets in compose defaults are for local use only. Rotate before any shared deploy. Mock AI avoids network exfiltration in default config (AI_PROVIDER=mock).