references.bib

% references.bib — MERGED (runners: claude + codex) — 2026-06-05
% 31 sources. Union of runs/claude (29) and the 2 codex-unique sources
% (cornand2008publicity, bergemann2016bayes), each re-verified by claude against an
% authoritative index before inclusion. Published versions cited.

% ============================ C4/C5 (PRIORITY) ============================

@article{inostroza2025adversarial,
  author  = {Inostroza, Nicolas and Pavan, Alessandro},
  title   = {Adversarial Coordination and Public Information Design},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year    = {2025}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, pages = {763--813},
  doi     = {10.3982/TE5768},
  note    = {Open access at econtheory.org. Previously circulated as
             ``Persuasion in Global Games with Application to Stress Testing.''}
}

@article{morris2002social,
  author  = {Morris, Stephen and Shin, Hyun Song},
  title   = {Social Value of Public Information},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {2002}, volume = {92}, number = {5}, pages = {1521--1534},
  doi     = {10.1257/000282802762024610}
}

@article{cornand2008publicity,
  author  = {Cornand, Camille and Heinemann, Frank},
  title   = {Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  year    = {2008}, volume = {118}, number = {528}, pages = {718--742},
  doi     = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02139.x}
}

@article{edmond2013information,
  author  = {Edmond, Chris},
  title   = {Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  year    = {2013}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {1422--1458},
  doi     = {10.1093/restud/rdt020}
}

@article{goldstein2016bayesian,
  author  = {Goldstein, Itay and Huang, Chong},
  title   = {Bayesian Persuasion in Coordination Games},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {2016}, volume = {106}, number = {5}, pages = {592--596},
  doi     = {10.1257/aer.p20161047},
  note    = {AER Papers \& Proceedings.}
}

@article{kamenica2011bayesian,
  author  = {Kamenica, Emir and Gentzkow, Matthew},
  title   = {Bayesian Persuasion},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {2011}, volume = {101}, number = {6}, pages = {2590--2615},
  doi     = {10.1257/aer.101.6.2590}
}

@article{bergemann2016bayes,
  author  = {Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen},
  title   = {Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year    = {2016}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {487--522},
  doi     = {10.3982/TE1808}
}

@article{bergemann2019information,
  author  = {Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen},
  title   = {Information Design: A Unified Perspective},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
  year    = {2019}, volume = {57}, number = {1}, pages = {44--95},
  doi     = {10.1257/jel.20181489}
}

@article{carlsson1993global,
  author  = {Carlsson, Hans and van Damme, Eric},
  title   = {Global Games and Equilibrium Selection},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  year    = {1993}, volume = {61}, number = {5}, pages = {989--1018},
  doi     = {10.2307/2951491}
}

% ============================ C1 — Provision-point / assurance ============================

@article{bagnoli1989provision,
  author  = {Bagnoli, Mark and Lipman, Barton L.},
  title   = {Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  year    = {1989}, volume = {56}, number = {4}, pages = {583--601},
  doi     = {10.2307/2297502}
}

@article{admati1991joint,
  author  = {Admati, Anat R. and Perry, Motty},
  title   = {Joint Projects without Commitment},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  year    = {1991}, volume = {58}, number = {2}, pages = {259--276},
  doi     = {10.2307/2297967}
}

@article{tabarrok1998private,
  author  = {Tabarrok, Alexander},
  title   = {The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts},
  journal = {Public Choice},
  year    = {1998}, volume = {96}, number = {3--4}, pages = {345--362},
  doi     = {10.1023/A:1004957109535}
}

% ============================ C2 — Crowdfunding mechanism design ============================

@article{strausz2017crowdfunding,
  author  = {Strausz, Roland},
  title   = {A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {2017}, volume = {107}, number = {6}, pages = {1430--1476},
  doi     = {10.1257/aer.20151700}
}

@article{ellman2019optimal,
  author  = {Ellman, Matthew and Hurkens, Sjaak},
  title   = {Optimal Crowdfunding Design},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  year    = {2019}, volume = {184}, pages = {104939},
  doi     = {10.1016/j.jet.2019.104939},
  note    = {Article 104939.}
}

@article{belleflamme2014crowdfunding,
  author  = {Belleflamme, Paul and Lambert, Thomas and Schwienbacher, Armin},
  title   = {Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd},
  journal = {Journal of Business Venturing},
  year    = {2014}, volume = {29}, number = {5}, pages = {585--609},
  doi     = {10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.07.003}
}

@article{cumming2020crowdfunding,
  author  = {Cumming, Douglas J. and Leboeuf, Ga\"{e}l and Schwienbacher, Armin},
  title   = {Crowdfunding Models: Keep-It-All vs. All-Or-Nothing},
  journal = {Financial Management},
  year    = {2020}, volume = {49}, number = {2}, pages = {331--360},
  doi     = {10.1111/fima.12262}
}

% ============================ C3 — Coalition / hedonic / matching ============================

@article{bogomolnaia2002stability,
  author  = {Bogomolnaia, Anna and Jackson, Matthew O.},
  title   = {The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  year    = {2002}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, pages = {201--230},
  doi     = {10.1006/game.2001.0877}
}

@article{banerjee2001core,
  author  = {Banerjee, Suryapratim and Konishi, Hideo and S\"{o}nmez, Tayfun},
  title   = {Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  year    = {2001}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {135--153},
  doi     = {10.1007/s003550000067}
}

@article{hatfield2005matching,
  author  = {Hatfield, John William and Milgrom, Paul R.},
  title   = {Matching with Contracts},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {2005}, volume = {95}, number = {4}, pages = {913--935},
  doi     = {10.1257/0002828054825466}
}

@article{pycia2012stability,
  author  = {Pycia, Marek},
  title   = {Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  year    = {2012}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {323--362},
  doi     = {10.3982/ECTA7143}
}

% ============================ C6 — Common knowledge & coordination ============================

@book{chwe2001rational,
  author    = {Chwe, Michael Suk-Young},
  title     = {Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge},
  publisher = {Princeton University Press}, address = {Princeton, NJ}, year = {2001},
  note      = {Paperback reissue 2013, ISBN 9780691158280.}
}

@article{rubinstein1989electronic,
  author  = {Rubinstein, Ariel},
  title   = {The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under ``Almost Common Knowledge''},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {1989}, volume = {79}, number = {3}, pages = {385--391},
  note    = {Pre-DOI; no DOI assigned.}
}

@article{monderer1989approximating,
  author  = {Monderer, Dov and Samet, Dov},
  title   = {Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  year    = {1989}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {170--190},
  doi     = {10.1016/0899-8256(89)90017-1}
}

@article{aumann1976agreeing,
  author  = {Aumann, Robert J.},
  title   = {Agreeing to Disagree},
  journal = {The Annals of Statistics},
  year    = {1976}, volume = {4}, number = {6}, pages = {1236--1239},
  doi     = {10.1214/aos/1176343654}
}

% ============================ C7 — Collective action + market design ============================

@book{olson1965logic,
  author    = {Olson, Mancur},
  title     = {The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups},
  publisher = {Harvard University Press}, address = {Cambridge, MA}, year = {1965},
  series    = {Harvard Economic Studies}, volume = {124}, isbn = {978-0674537507},
  note      = {Revised printing 1971, ISBN 978-0674537514.}
}

@article{roth2002engineer,
  author  = {Roth, Alvin E.},
  title   = {The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  year    = {2002}, volume = {70}, number = {4}, pages = {1341--1378},
  doi     = {10.1111/1468-0262.00335}
}

@book{weyl2018radical,
  author    = {Posner, Eric A. and Weyl, E. Glen},
  title     = {Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society},
  publisher = {Princeton University Press}, address = {Princeton, NJ}, year = {2018},
  isbn      = {978-0691177502}
}

@article{roth1999redesign,
  author  = {Roth, Alvin E. and Peranson, Elliott},
  title   = {The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {1999}, volume = {89}, number = {4}, pages = {748--780},
  doi     = {10.1257/aer.89.4.748}
}

% ============================ C8 — Payment intermediation / escrow / custody ============================

@misc{sec2015regcf,
  author       = {{U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission}},
  title        = {Crowdfunding (Final Rule)},
  year         = {2015},
  howpublished = {Release Nos. 33-9974; 34-76324, File No. S7-09-13,
                  80 Fed. Reg. 71388 (Nov. 16, 2015), codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227},
  note         = {Escrow / qualified-third-party requirement at 17 C.F.R. \S 227.303(e).}
}

@article{diamond1984delegated,
  author  = {Diamond, Douglas W.},
  title   = {Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  year    = {1984}, volume = {51}, number = {3}, pages = {393--414},
  doi     = {10.2307/2297430}
}

@article{rochettirole2006twosided,
  author  = {Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean},
  title   = {Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  year    = {2006}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, pages = {645--667},
  doi     = {10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x}
}

% ===================== C-axis deep-dive additions (2026-06-05) =====================

@article{rostek2020matching,
  author  = {Rostek, Marzena J. and Yoder, Nathan},
  title   = {Matching with Complementary Contracts},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  year    = {2020}, volume = {88}, number = {5}, pages = {1793--1827},
  doi     = {10.3982/ECTA16686}
}

@article{morris2024implementation,
  author  = {Morris, Stephen and Oyama, Daisuke and Takahashi, Satoru},
  title   = {Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  year    = {2024}, volume = {92}, number = {3}, pages = {775--813},
  doi     = {10.3982/ECTA19149}
}

@techreport{vosooghi2017information,
  author      = {Vosooghi, Sareh},
  title       = {Information Design in Coalition Formation Games},
  institution = {Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)},
  type        = {Nota di Lavoro},
  number      = {28.2017},
  year        = {2017},
  doi         = {10.22004/ag.econ.258010},
  note        = {Working paper; SSRN 2987779. Related published extension:
                 Vosooghi \& Caparr\'os (2022), European Economic Review 143:104042.}
}

@article{halac2020raising,
  author  = {Halac, Marina and Kremer, Ilan and Winter, Eyal},
  title   = {Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year    = {2020}, volume = {110}, number = {3}, pages = {889--921},
  doi     = {10.1257/aer.20190234}
}

@article{chen2023stability,
  author  = {Chen, Yi-Chun and Hu, Gaoji},
  title   = {A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year    = {2023}, volume = {15}, number = {1}, pages = {288--322},
  doi     = {10.1257/mic.20200411}
}

@article{frankelmorrispauzner2003equilibrium,
  author  = {Frankel, David M. and Morris, Stephen and Pauzner, Ady},
  title   = {Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  year    = {2003}, volume = {108}, number = {1}, pages = {1--44},
  doi     = {10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00018-2}
}

@article{marxmatthews2000dynamic,
  author  = {Marx, Leslie M. and Matthews, Steven A.},
  title   = {Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  year    = {2000}, volume = {67}, number = {2}, pages = {327--358},
  doi     = {10.1111/1467-937X.00134}
}

@article{li2023global,
  author = {Li, Fei and Song, Yangbo and Zhao, Mofei},
  title = {Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {207},
  pages = {105575},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2022.105575}
}

@article{halac2021rank,
  author = {Halac, Marina and Lipnowski, Elliot and Rappoport, Daniel},
  title = {Rank Uncertainty in Organizations},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {111},
  number = {3},
  pages = {757--786},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20200555}
}

@article{vosooghi2022information,
  author = {Vosooghi, Sareh and Caparr{\'o}s, Alejandro},
  title = {Information Disclosure and Dynamic Climate Agreements: Shall the {IPCC} Reveal It All?},
  journal = {European Economic Review},
  volume = {143},
  pages = {104042},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104042}
}