Parent map: #1
Decision to resolve
What safety promise can TinyHarness honestly make when it denies detected mutations outside the active project using its native tools and hooks?
Product requirement
Detected external mutations are denied by default and cannot be approved around. Native approval behavior remains for other actions. Initial operation uses hooks/policy rather than an OS sandbox.
Questions
- Which native tools expose exact target paths and can enforce the rule reliably?
- Which shell constructs and indirect side effects cannot be determined statically?
- How should ambiguous commands behave?
- How do symlinks, traversal, subprocesses, environment variables, and git commands affect the promise?
- Which hook failures must fail closed?
- What adversarial regression corpus is needed?
- Which operations must remain unavailable for unattended use until OS confinement exists?
Output
A threat model, explicit guarantee/non-guarantee statement, and recommended user-visible policy behavior.
Resolves when
The map can state a testable safety contract without claiming sandbox guarantees hooks cannot provide.
Parent map: #1
Decision to resolve
What safety promise can TinyHarness honestly make when it denies detected mutations outside the active project using its native tools and hooks?
Product requirement
Detected external mutations are denied by default and cannot be approved around. Native approval behavior remains for other actions. Initial operation uses hooks/policy rather than an OS sandbox.
Questions
Output
A threat model, explicit guarantee/non-guarantee statement, and recommended user-visible policy behavior.
Resolves when
The map can state a testable safety contract without claiming sandbox guarantees hooks cannot provide.