diff --git a/.cspell/custom-words.txt b/.cspell/custom-words.txt
index ce73c361..cdca33d9 100644
--- a/.cspell/custom-words.txt
+++ b/.cspell/custom-words.txt
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ emvco
 endlocal
 envoyproxy
 esac
+fastmcp
 felixge
 Fiuu
 fontawesome
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ jetbrains
 Jetpack
 jvmargs
 Kaia
+keccak
 keepattributes
 keepclassmembers
 Klarna
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ ktor
 Ktor
 KXMYBJWNQ
 Lazada
+levelname
 libpeerconnection
 Lightspark
 linenums
@@ -149,6 +152,8 @@ ropeproject
 RPCURL
 Rulebook
 screenreaders
+sdjwt
+sepolia
 setlocal
 sharedpref
 Shopcider
@@ -169,6 +174,7 @@ Truelayer
 Trulioo
 udpa
 unmarshal
+usdc
 viewmodel
 vulnz
 Wallex
diff --git a/.github/workflows/linter.yaml b/.github/workflows/linter.yaml
index fea1b9c1..e6d040c0 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/linter.yaml
+++ b/.github/workflows/linter.yaml
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ jobs:
           LOG_LEVEL: WARN
           SHELLCHECK_OPTS: -e SC1091 -e 2086
           VALIDATE_ALL_CODEBASE: false
-          FILTER_REGEX_EXCLUDE: "^(\\.github/|\\.vscode/|code/samples/).*|CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md|CHANGELOG.md"
+          FILTER_REGEX_EXCLUDE: "^(\\.github/|\\.vscode/|code/samples/|code/web-client/).*|CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md|CHANGELOG.md"
+          VALIDATE_BIOME_LINT: false
           VALIDATE_BIOME_FORMAT: false
           VALIDATE_PYTHON_BLACK: false
           VALIDATE_PYTHON_FLAKE8: false
diff --git a/code/samples/python/src/roles/x402_credentials_provider_mcp/server.py b/code/samples/python/src/roles/x402_credentials_provider_mcp/server.py
index c27d68ce..a42b8aad 100644
--- a/code/samples/python/src/roles/x402_credentials_provider_mcp/server.py
+++ b/code/samples/python/src/roles/x402_credentials_provider_mcp/server.py
@@ -98,6 +98,22 @@ def _load_persisted_mandate(filename: str) -> str | None:
     return None
 
 
+def _verified_amount_cents(chain: PaymentMandateChain) -> int:
+  """Return the signed amount (minor units) from the verified closed mandate.
+
+  The amount is always taken from the REQUIRED, signed payment_amount of the
+  verified mandate. There is deliberately no hardcoded fallback: authorizing a
+  fabricated amount would sign an EIP-3009 authorization the user never
+  mandated. Raises AttributeError if the verified mandate carries no usable
+  payment amount -- whether the field is absent or present but null -- which the
+  caller must treat as a verification failure (fail closed).
+  """
+  amount = chain.closed_mandate.payment_amount.amount
+  if amount is None:
+    raise AttributeError("verified mandate payment_amount.amount is null")
+  return amount
+
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def issue_payment_credential(
     payment_mandate_chain_id: str,
@@ -145,19 +161,27 @@ def issue_payment_credential(
   if violations:
     return {"error": "verification_failed", "message": "; ".join(violations)}
 
-  # Extract 'to' address and value from the verified mandate chain
+  # Amount is a REQUIRED, signed field of the verified mandate. Authorize
+  # exactly that amount and fail closed if it is somehow absent. Never fall back
+  # to a hardcoded amount: doing so would sign an EIP-3009 authorization for a
+  # value the user never mandated (previously any missing field silently
+  # defaulted the transfer to 1250 cents).
   try:
-    payee_address = chain.closed_mandate.payment_instrument.payee_address
-    amount_cents = chain.closed_mandate.payment_amount.amount
-    if not payee_address:
-      payee_address = (
-          os.environ.get("MERCHANT_WALLET_ADDRESS") or DEFAULT_MERCHANT_ADDRESS
-      )
+    amount_cents = _verified_amount_cents(chain)
   except AttributeError:
-    payee_address = (
-        os.environ.get("MERCHANT_WALLET_ADDRESS") or DEFAULT_MERCHANT_ADDRESS
-    )
-    amount_cents = 1250
+    _logger.error("verified mandate is missing a payment amount")
+    return {
+        "error": "verification_failed",
+        "message": "verified mandate is missing a payment amount",
+    }
+
+  # Destination for the transfer. The verified payment instrument does not yet
+  # carry a payee address (type-specific instrument fields are dropped before
+  # signing, see issue #299), so use the credential provider's configured payout
+  # address.
+  payee_address = (
+      os.environ.get("MERCHANT_WALLET_ADDRESS") or DEFAULT_MERCHANT_ADDRESS
+  )
 
   # x402 Binding Check: Hash mandate to create exactly 32-byte EIP-3009 Nonce
   nonce = Web3.keccak(text=mandate_chain)
diff --git a/code/samples/python/src/roles/x402_credentials_provider_mcp/server_tests.py b/code/samples/python/src/roles/x402_credentials_provider_mcp/server_tests.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..63f704af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/code/samples/python/src/roles/x402_credentials_provider_mcp/server_tests.py
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""Regression tests for x402 credential provider amount handling (issue #299).
+
+The credential provider must authorize the amount signed in the verified
+payment mandate, never a hardcoded fallback. Before the fix, an AttributeError
+on a missing instrument field caused the handler to silently authorize a fixed
+1250 cents regardless of what the user actually mandated.
+"""
+
+import sys
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+
+# Make the samples 'src' root importable (roles.*, common.*).
+_SRC = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+if str(_SRC) not in sys.path:
+  sys.path.insert(0, str(_SRC))
+
+from roles.x402_credentials_provider_mcp import server  # noqa: E402
+
+
+class _Amount:
+
+  def __init__(self, amount):
+    self.amount = amount
+
+
+class _Mandate:
+
+  def __init__(self, amount):
+    self.payment_amount = _Amount(amount)
+
+
+class _Chain:
+
+  def __init__(self, amount):
+    self.closed_mandate = _Mandate(amount)
+
+
+def test_amount_uses_signed_value():
+  assert server._verified_amount_cents(_Chain(4200)) == 4200
+
+
+def test_amount_honors_any_signed_value():
+  # The pre-fix code authorized a fixed 1250 regardless of the mandate.
+  for value in (1, 999, 1249, 1251, 500000):
+    assert server._verified_amount_cents(_Chain(value)) == value
+
+
+def test_amount_missing_fails_closed():
+  class _NoAmount:
+    pass
+
+  # A verified mandate without a payment amount must raise, so the caller can
+  # fail closed rather than fabricate a value.
+  with pytest.raises(AttributeError):
+    server._verified_amount_cents(_NoAmount())
+
+
+def test_amount_null_fails_closed():
+  # payment_amount is present but its amount is null. The null slips past
+  # attribute access, so without an explicit guard the function would return
+  # None and later crash on None * 10000 instead of failing closed. It must
+  # raise AttributeError so the caller returns verification_failed.
+  with pytest.raises(AttributeError):
+    server._verified_amount_cents(_Chain(None))
+
+
+def test_handler_does_not_fabricate_amount():
+  # Guard against reintroducing the hardcoded amount fallback in the handler.
+  source = Path(server.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+  assert "amount_cents = 1250" not in source