diff --git a/device/cheetah/NOTES.md b/device/cheetah/NOTES.md index 68b1e0810..da55318f4 100644 --- a/device/cheetah/NOTES.md +++ b/device/cheetah/NOTES.md @@ -2,6 +2,71 @@ Findings from real hardware, newest first. `BRINGUP-M1.md` is the research map written before first boot. +## 2026-10-29: footers with CP2A's rollback index boot on a phone with CP3A on slot A + +- **A footer index below slot A's boots** [V]: the descriptor now carries + CP2A.260705.006's footer values as the review of #104 gives them, + rollback index 1783209600 (2026-07-05) and security patch 2026-07-05, + the oldest stock build an owner runs on slot A. Rebuilt with them, `boot` and `init_boot` + differ from the CP3A-footer images only in the footer, and the other + three images are byte for byte the same. `bin/omamobile push` wrote and + verified slot B, and the phone booted it: `androidboot.slot_suffix` + `_b`, `verifiedbootstate` orange, no failed units, slot B still marked + successful, `tools/phone-smoke` ok (cameras skipped: no data). Slot A + runs CP3A, whose footers and vbmeta carry 1791158400, so this unlocked + ABL accepts footer indexes below the CP3A one; libavb treats an index + below the stored one as a rollback error, which an unlocked boot may + continue past + [V: `result_should_continue()` in external/avb `c5066a9`]. Whether ABL + stores the indexes while unlocked is still untested. + +## 2026-10-28: a phone whose vbmeta_b chains boot and init_boot, as stock's does, needs AVB footers on them + +A second Pixel 7 Pro (cheetah MP1.0 B0), installed with +`tools/install-phone` from a build of `f5da1df`, kernel +`7.3.0-rc6-omamobile-push1-g1cb4bd36f3be`. + +- **The phone before the install** [V, `fastboot getvar`; `avbtool + info_image` on `vbmeta_a` and `vbmeta_b`, read over SSH from the guarded + root after the install]: stock `CP3A.261005.002.A1` on slot A; ABL + `cloudripper-17.0-15902555` on both slots (slot B's written from that + factory image's bootloader image, then read back with slot B current). + The rest of slot B was left from an earlier stock build: `vbmeta_b` is + `BP2A.250605.031.A2` (Android 16, rollback index 1749081600), its radio + `g5300q-250320-250425-B-13407682`. `vbmeta_a` is the factory image's + `vbmeta.img` byte for byte, zero-padded to the partition (rollback index + 1791158400). Both chain `boot` (rollback index location 2) and + `init_boot` (location 4), flags 0. +- **Without footers, slot B never started** [V]: the phone ended in + Fastboot Mode with "Enter reason: BL1 requested", `slot-retry-count:b` 1 + and `slot-successful:b` no, and no USB gadget reached the laptop in four + minutes. The symptom of issue #11. +- **With `AVB_FOOTERS`, it boots** [V]: `boot` and `init_boot` get hash + footers from `bin/omamobile images` (AOSP's test key; that day stock + CP3A's rollback index 1791158400 and security patch 2026-10-05; padded + to 64 and 8 MiB). After `bin/omamobile flash` the Omarchy splash came + up, the root grew to the whole of `userdata`, `omamobile-firstboot` + finished and `omamobile-boot-success` marked slot B successful. Nothing + else changed between the two: rebuilt from the same kernel output, + `vendor_boot`, `vendor_kernel_boot` and `dtbo` are byte for byte the + same, and `boot` and `init_boot` match up to their padding and footer. + Each was flashed once. +- **What triggers it: a vbmeta that chains them.** libavb reads a chained + partition with no footer as if vbmeta began at its first byte, finds an + invalid header and returns `ERROR_INVALID_METADATA`, which it never lets + an unlocked boot continue past. A wrong key (`ERROR_PUBLIC_KEY_REJECTED`) + or hash (`ERROR_VERIFICATION`) it does let through, and a vbmeta with + `VERIFICATION_DISABLED` set skips its descriptors [V: + `load_and_verify_vbmeta()` and `result_should_continue()` in + external/avb `c5066a9`]. The maintainer's `vbmeta_b` lists `boot` and + `init_boot` as hash descriptors rather than chaining them, which is why + that phone boots footer-less images (review of #104). This phone's `vbmeta_b` being from an older build doesn't + matter: stock's current vbmeta chains them the same way. So any Pixel 7 + Pro whose `vbmeta_b` is stock's needs the footers, and a vbmeta that + doesn't chain them, or has verification disabled, never reads them. + Issue #11's phone booted after `fastboot oem disable-verification`, + which by its name sets that flag [I]. + ## 2026-10-27: the muted speakers were the open-loop coil estimate, not sleep; the static was the boost converter; the earpiece is the top speaker - **The speaker watchdog had muted media at every boot since 10-26 22:28** diff --git a/device/cheetah/device.conf b/device/cheetah/device.conf index a1472b866..84fea2c34 100644 --- a/device/cheetah/device.conf +++ b/device/cheetah/device.conf @@ -52,6 +52,22 @@ VENDOR_CMDLINE="console=tty0 earlycon=exynos4210,0x10A00000 clk_ignore_unused pd VENDOR_PAGESIZE=0x800 OS_VERSION=17.0.0 OS_PATCH_LEVEL=2026-07 +# Stock's vbmeta chains boot and init_boot (rollback index locations 2 +# and 4). libavb takes a chained partition with no AVB footer as invalid +# metadata, which an unlocked bootloader doesn't let through, so on a +# phone whose vbmeta_b chains them, as stock's does, slot B images with +# no footer stop in fastboot ("BL1 requested", issue #11; NOTES +# 2026-10-28). A vbmeta_b that lists them as hash descriptors, or has +# verification disabled, never reads these footers. Sizes from fastboot +# getvar partition-size. +AVB_FOOTERS="boot:0x4000000 init_boot:0x800000" +# The oldest stock build an owner runs on slot A, CP2A.260705.006: its +# footers' rollback index and security patch, matching OS_PATCH_LEVEL. A +# pull request never raises them: an index the bootloader stores above an +# older stock's would lock that stock's own boot and init_boot out of +# slot A (anti-rollback). +AVB_ROLLBACK_INDEX=1783209600 +AVB_SECURITY_PATCH=2026-07-05 # --- Storage guard --- # The boot images Omarchy Mobile writes, always to slot B (the _b suffix is added diff --git a/docs/RELEASES.md b/docs/RELEASES.md index ac95d4de3..e64088e66 100644 --- a/docs/RELEASES.md +++ b/docs/RELEASES.md @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Bring-up tools (`*-stage`, `display-hz`, `usbc-deadman`) stay per plan: they pok | `VENDOR_CMDLINE` | `console=tty0 earlycon=exynos4210,0x10A00000 …` | `vendor_boot` command line (kernel arguments really go in `/chosen/bootargs`) | | `VENDOR_PAGESIZE` | `0x800` | Page size of `vendor_boot` (and `vendor_kernel_boot`, where the device has one) | | `OS_VERSION`, `OS_PATCH_LEVEL` | `17.0.0`, `2026-07` | The `init_boot` header values (the `boot` header's, on a device without `init_boot`) | -| `AVB_FOOTERS` | (zuma and the Pixel 7a: `boot:0x4000000 init_boot:0x800000`) | Optional. For a bootloader whose `vbmeta` chains these partitions and, even unlocked, refuses one with no AVB footer (zuma; the Pixel 7a too, though the Pixel 7 Pro's bootloader, the same build, takes images without one). `image:partition_size`, each a `BOOT_IMAGES` entry, once; the size is the slot's partition size in bytes (stock's footer, `avbtool info_image`, or `fastboot getvar partition-size:_b`), a multiple of 4096. `images` adds a hash footer to each, padding it to that size, signed with AOSP's test key (an unlocked bootloader accepts any key); needs `external/avb` under `SRC_DIR` (or `AVBTOOL`, `AVB_KEY`) and `openssl` | +| `AVB_FOOTERS` | (zuma, the Pixel 7a and the Pixel 7 Pro: `boot:0x4000000 init_boot:0x800000`) | Optional. For a phone whose `vbmeta_b` chains these partitions, as stock's does: libavb takes a chained partition with no AVB footer as invalid metadata, which an unlocked bootloader doesn't let through (zuma; the Pixel 7a; the Pixel 7 Pro, device/cheetah/NOTES.md 2026-10-28). A `vbmeta_b` that lists them as hash descriptors, or has verification disabled, never reads the footers. `image:partition_size`, each a `BOOT_IMAGES` entry, once; the size is the slot's partition size in bytes (stock's footer, `avbtool info_image`, or `fastboot getvar partition-size:_b`), a multiple of 4096. `images` adds a hash footer to each, padding it to that size, signed with AOSP's test key (an unlocked bootloader accepts any key); needs `external/avb` under `SRC_DIR` (or `AVBTOOL`, `AVB_KEY`) and `openssl` | | `AVB_ROLLBACK_INDEX`, `AVB_SECURITY_PATCH` | `1791158400`, `2026-10-05` | Required with `AVB_FOOTERS`, refused without it: stock's rollback index and `com.android.build..security_patch` from its footers. Never set the index above stock's: an index the bootloader stores locks stock's own images out of slot A. The `os_version` property is `OS_VERSION`'s major | | `BOOT_METHOD` | `android-v4` (default when omitted) | Generic images, flash, push and installer accept only `android-v4`; other methods are refused before phone access. `ram-only` marks a probe with no persistent install support | | `BOOT_IMAGES` | `boot init_boot vendor_boot vendor_kernel_boot dtbo` | The images written to slot B (the `_b` suffix is added by the tools and is not configurable). `boot`, `vendor_boot` and `dtbo` are always there. Without `init_boot`, `boot` carries the empty generic ramdisk and the OS version; without `vendor_kernel_boot`, `vendor_boot` carries the DTB and the initramfs (the Pixel 6: `boot vendor_boot dtbo`) |