From a324339e421e6a9aa86df95ba701f9d07a89b8c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sparky Fen <sparky1010@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 22:55:46 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] web: enforce the strict CSP (was report-only), allowlist
 CF analytics

Promotes the strict policy from Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only to the
enforced Content-Security-Policy: postbuild now REPLACES the safe-tier CSP
line with the full policy (script-src pinned to inline-script hashes + scoped
resource directives) instead of adding a report-only header.

Validated in report-only against real traffic first: a headless public-route
sweep and an authenticated Bluesky login both came back clean; the only
report-only violation was Cloudflare's own Web Analytics beacon, now
allowlisted via https://static.cloudflareinsights.com in script-src (its data
POST is covered by connect-src https:).

Follow-up to security review 2026-07-14 finding #3.
---
 public/_headers        | 17 ++++++++---------
 scripts/inject-csp.mjs | 29 +++++++++++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/public/_headers b/public/_headers
index 6ef5728..457810c 100644
--- a/public/_headers
+++ b/public/_headers
@@ -1,17 +1,16 @@
 # Cloudflare Pages security headers. https://developers.cloudflare.com/pages/configuration/headers/
 #
-# The Content-Security-Policy below is the safe, behaviour-neutral tier: it does
+# The Content-Security-Policy below is a safe, behaviour-neutral tier: it does
 # not govern how scripts/styles/images/connections load, so it cannot break the
 # app, and it delivers clickjacking + base-uri/object hardening on its own.
 #
-# At build time scripts/inject-csp.mjs (run via the `postbuild` npm hook) ADDS a
-# second header to the built build/client/_headers:
-# Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only carrying the full policy — a script-src
-# pinned to the sha256 of each inline bootstrap script (the XSS backstop) plus
-# scoped resource directives. Report-only only reports violations, so it cannot
-# break the app; once it runs clean against real traffic (incl. the OAuth login),
-# promote it to the enforced header below. If the build step is skipped, only
-# this enforced safe tier ships — still valid, never a broken CSP.
+# At build time scripts/inject-csp.mjs (run via the `postbuild` npm hook)
+# REPLACES the Content-Security-Policy line in the built build/client/_headers
+# with the full enforced policy — a script-src pinned to the sha256 of each
+# inline bootstrap script (the XSS backstop) plus scoped resource directives.
+# It was validated report-only against real traffic (public sweep + an authed
+# login) before enforcing. If the build step is ever skipped, only this safe
+# tier ships — still valid, never a broken CSP.
 
 /*
   X-Frame-Options: DENY
diff --git a/scripts/inject-csp.mjs b/scripts/inject-csp.mjs
index 1ca343b..eb7302d 100644
--- a/scripts/inject-csp.mjs
+++ b/scripts/inject-csp.mjs
@@ -7,14 +7,13 @@
 // URL matches neither 'self' nor any hash, so it stays blocked — the XSS
 // backstop for the anchor sinks safeExternalUrl already guards.
 //
-// ROLLOUT: the full strict policy ships as Content-Security-Policy-REPORT-ONLY,
-// so it only reports violations and cannot break the app. The committed
-// public/_headers keeps a small ENFORCED Content-Security-Policy (frame-ancestors
-// etc.) so clickjacking protection is live now. Once report-only has run clean
-// against real traffic (incl. the OAuth login + authed actions), promote the
-// strict policy to the enforced header. This rewrites only the built artifact
-// (build/client/_headers); if the step is skipped the deploy still serves the
-// valid enforced safe tier from public/_headers.
+// This rewrites the enforced Content-Security-Policy in the built artifact
+// (build/client/_headers) with the full strict policy. The committed
+// public/_headers keeps a small safe tier (frame-ancestors etc.), so if this
+// step is ever skipped the deploy still serves a valid CSP, never a broken one.
+// Validated report-only against real traffic (a public-route sweep + an authed
+// Bluesky login) before enforcing; the only external script was Cloudflare's
+// Web Analytics beacon, allowlisted in script-src below.
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
 import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 
@@ -39,7 +38,10 @@ const csp = [
   "object-src 'none'",
   "frame-ancestors 'none'",
   "frame-src 'none'",
-  `script-src 'self' ${hashes.join(" ")}`,
+  // static.cloudflareinsights.com = the Cloudflare Web Analytics beacon that
+  // Pages auto-injects (Cloudflare's documented CSP value). Its data POST to
+  // cloudflareinsights.com is covered by connect-src https: below.
+  `script-src 'self' https://static.cloudflareinsights.com ${hashes.join(" ")}`,
   // Mantine/emotion apply inline style attributes; vanilla-extract emits static CSS.
   "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
   // bsky avatars, flag data URIs, maplibre tiles (canvas/blob).
@@ -58,13 +60,12 @@ const cspLine = /^(\s*)Content-Security-Policy:.*$/m;
 if (!cspLine.test(headers)) {
   throw new Error("inject-csp: no Content-Security-Policy line found in _headers");
 }
-// Leave the committed enforced safe-tier CSP in place; add the full strict
-// policy as report-only right below it (same indentation). Report-only can't
-// block anything, so this is safe to ship to production untested routes.
+// Replace the committed safe-tier Content-Security-Policy with the full strict
+// enforced policy (indentation preserved via $1).
 writeFileSync(
   headersPath,
-  headers.replace(cspLine, `$&\n$1Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: ${csp}`),
+  headers.replace(cspLine, `$1Content-Security-Policy: ${csp}`),
 );
 console.log(
-  `inject-csp: added report-only strict CSP (script-src pinned to ${hashes.length} inline-script hashes)`,
+  `inject-csp: enforced strict CSP (script-src pinned to ${hashes.length} inline-script hashes)`,
 );

From 145068a3cab8981619c6f441edb3b293f2577a53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sparky Fen <sparky1010@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 23:44:28 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] web: harden inject-csp (regex + $-safe replace) and add
 unit tests
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Addresses the PR#7 review:
- The inline-script lookahead now requires whitespace before src= (\ssrc=
  not \bsrc=), so a data-src / *-src attribute isn't mistaken for a real src
  and skipped — a skipped inline script has no hash and would be blocked once
  the CSP is enforced.
- The _headers rewrite uses a function replacement so a $ in the policy can't
  be read as a String.replace token.
- New scripts/inject-csp.test.ts runs the real postbuild against throwaway
  build/client fixtures: inline scripts hashed, external src excluded, data-src
  not misclassified, enforced (no report-only) with indentation preserved, and
  aborts when no inline script is found. vitest include broadened to scripts/.
---
 scripts/inject-csp.mjs     | 14 ++++---
 scripts/inject-csp.test.ts | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 vitest.config.ts           |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 scripts/inject-csp.test.ts

diff --git a/scripts/inject-csp.mjs b/scripts/inject-csp.mjs
index eb7302d..be81038 100644
--- a/scripts/inject-csp.mjs
+++ b/scripts/inject-csp.mjs
@@ -20,10 +20,13 @@ import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 const OUT = "build/client";
 const html = readFileSync(`${OUT}/index.html`, "utf8");
 
-// Every inline <script> (no src= attribute). External /assets bundles carry a
-// src and are covered by 'self'.
+// Every inline <script> (no src attribute). External /assets bundles carry a
+// src and are covered by 'self'. The lookahead requires whitespace before
+// `src=`, so a data-src (or any other *-src) attribute isn't mistaken for a
+// real src and wrongly skipped — under the enforced CSP a skipped inline
+// script has no hash and would be blocked.
 const hashes = [];
-const re = /<script(?![^>]*\bsrc=)[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/script>/gi;
+const re = /<script(?![^>]*\ssrc=)[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/script>/gi;
 for (let m; (m = re.exec(html)); ) {
   const digest = createHash("sha256").update(m[1], "utf8").digest("base64");
   hashes.push(`'sha256-${digest}'`);
@@ -61,10 +64,11 @@ if (!cspLine.test(headers)) {
   throw new Error("inject-csp: no Content-Security-Policy line found in _headers");
 }
 // Replace the committed safe-tier Content-Security-Policy with the full strict
-// enforced policy (indentation preserved via $1).
+// enforced policy. A function replacement inserts the policy literally, so any
+// `$` in it can't be read as a String.replace token ($&, $1, $`, …).
 writeFileSync(
   headersPath,
-  headers.replace(cspLine, `$1Content-Security-Policy: ${csp}`),
+  headers.replace(cspLine, (_line, indent) => `${indent}Content-Security-Policy: ${csp}`),
 );
 console.log(
   `inject-csp: enforced strict CSP (script-src pinned to ${hashes.length} inline-script hashes)`,
diff --git a/scripts/inject-csp.test.ts b/scripts/inject-csp.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d5714c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/inject-csp.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
+import {
+  mkdirSync,
+  mkdtempSync,
+  readFileSync,
+  rmSync,
+  writeFileSync,
+} from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+const SCRIPT = resolve(process.cwd(), "scripts/inject-csp.mjs");
+const HEADERS =
+  "/*\n  X-Frame-Options: DENY\n" +
+  "  Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'\n";
+
+// Run the real postbuild script against a throwaway build/client fixture and
+// return the rewritten _headers.
+function runInjectCsp(indexHtml: string, headers = HEADERS): string {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "inject-csp-"));
+  try {
+    const out = join(dir, "build", "client");
+    mkdirSync(out, { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(join(out, "index.html"), indexHtml);
+    writeFileSync(join(out, "_headers"), headers);
+    execFileSync(process.execPath, [SCRIPT], { cwd: dir, stdio: "pipe" });
+    return readFileSync(join(out, "_headers"), "utf8");
+  } finally {
+    rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+function enforcedCspLine(headers: string): string {
+  const line = headers
+    .split("\n")
+    .find((l) => l.trimStart().startsWith("Content-Security-Policy:"));
+  if (!line) throw new Error("no enforced CSP line in output");
+  return line;
+}
+
+describe("inject-csp postbuild", () => {
+  it("enforces the strict policy: replaces the safe tier, no report-only, keeps indent", () => {
+    const out = runInjectCsp("<script>console.log(1)</script>");
+    expect(out).not.toContain("Report-Only");
+    // the safe-tier line is gone, replaced by the full policy at the same indent
+    expect(out).not.toContain(
+      "Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none';",
+    );
+    expect(out).toContain("  Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';");
+  });
+
+  it("hashes each inline script and skips external (src) scripts", () => {
+    const html = `<html><head>
+      <script src="/assets/app.js"></script>
+      <script data-mantine-script="true">console.log(1)</script>
+      <script type="module">import "/entry";</script>
+    </head></html>`;
+    const src = enforcedCspLine(runInjectCsp(html));
+    expect(src).toContain(
+      "script-src 'self' https://static.cloudflareinsights.com ",
+    );
+    // two inline scripts hashed; the src= one excluded
+    expect(src.match(/'sha256-[^']+'/g) ?? []).toHaveLength(2);
+  });
+
+  it("does not mistake a data-src attribute for a real src", () => {
+    // With a `\bsrc=` lookahead this inline script would be skipped, left
+    // unhashed, and blocked once the CSP is enforced.
+    const src = enforcedCspLine(
+      runInjectCsp('<script data-src="ignored">console.log(2)</script>'),
+    );
+    expect(src.match(/'sha256-[^']+'/g) ?? []).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it("aborts when the built index.html has no inline scripts", () => {
+    expect(() =>
+      runInjectCsp('<script src="/assets/only-external.js"></script>'),
+    ).toThrow();
+  });
+});
diff --git a/vitest.config.ts b/vitest.config.ts
index c50d35e..d588b86 100644
--- a/vitest.config.ts
+++ b/vitest.config.ts
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { defineConfig } from "vitest/config";
 // vanilla-extract build plugins from vite.config.ts.
 export default defineConfig({
   test: {
-    include: ["app/**/*.test.ts"],
+    include: ["app/**/*.test.ts", "scripts/**/*.test.ts"],
     environment: "node",
   },
 });