diff --git a/test/unit/B20Security/redeem/redeemWithMemo_revertOrder.t.sol b/test/unit/B20Security/redeem/redeemWithMemo_revertOrder.t.sol
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3005f696
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/unit/B20Security/redeem/redeemWithMemo_revertOrder.t.sol
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
+
+import {IB20} from "src/interfaces/IB20.sol";
+import {IB20Security} from "src/interfaces/IB20Security.sol";
+
+import {B20Constants} from "src/lib/B20Constants.sol";
+
+import {B20SecurityTest} from "test/lib/B20SecurityTest.sol";
+import {PolicyRegistryConstants} from "test/lib/mocks/MockPolicyRegistry.sol";
+
+/// @title Sequential revert-order test for `redeemWithMemo` (security variant).
+///
+/// @notice **Canonical order (Solidity reference `_redeemBurn`, shared with `redeem`):**
+///         1. PAUSE (`_isPaused(REDEEM)`) → `ContractPaused`
+///         2. POLICY (`isAuthorized(REDEEMSenderPolicyId, msg.sender)`) → `PolicyForbids`
+///         3. BELOW-MIN (`shares == 0 || shares < minimum`) → `BelowMinimumRedeemable`
+///         4. BALANCE (`fromBalance < amount` in `_burnRaw`) → `InsufficientBalance`
+///
+///         A single test activates all four conditions at once and fixes them from
+///         highest to lowest priority, asserting each revert in turn then completing
+///         a successful call once all conditions are resolved.
+contract B20SecurityRedeemWithMemoRevertOrderTest is B20SecurityTest {
+    /// @dev Unpauses a single feature via the `unpauser` actor, lazily granting
+    ///      `UNPAUSE_ROLE` on first call. Mirrors the inherited `_pause` helper.
+    function _unpause(IB20.PausableFeature feature) private {
+        if (!token.hasRole(B20Constants.UNPAUSE_ROLE, unpauser)) _grantRole(B20Constants.UNPAUSE_ROLE, unpauser);
+        vm.prank(unpauser);
+        token.unpause(_singleFeature(feature));
+    }
+
+    function test_redeemWithMemo_revertOrder(uint256 amount, uint256 minimum, bytes32 memo) public {
+        amount = bound(amount, 1, type(uint64).max);
+        minimum = bound(minimum, amount + 1, type(uint256).max);
+
+        // Setup: activate ALL revert conditions simultaneously.
+        //   REDEEM is paused, the sender policy blocks all callers,
+        //   minimumRedeemable > amount (so shares == amount < minimum with the
+        //   default 1:1 WAD ratio), and alice has zero balance.
+        _pause(IB20.PausableFeature.REDEEM);
+        _setRedeemPolicy(PolicyRegistryConstants.ALWAYS_BLOCK_ID);
+        _updateMinimumRedeemable(minimum);
+        // alice balance is zero by default.
+
+        // 1. PAUSE fires first.
+        vm.prank(alice);
+        vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IB20.ContractPaused.selector, IB20.PausableFeature.REDEEM));
+        security().redeemWithMemo(amount, memo);
+
+        // Fix: unpause REDEEM.
+        _unpause(IB20.PausableFeature.REDEEM);
+
+        // 2. POLICY fires next (pause fixed).
+        vm.prank(alice);
+        vm.expectRevert(
+            abi.encodeWithSelector(
+                IB20.PolicyForbids.selector, security().REDEEM_SENDER_POLICY(), PolicyRegistryConstants.ALWAYS_BLOCK_ID
+            )
+        );
+        security().redeemWithMemo(amount, memo);
+
+        // Fix: allow alice through the redeem-sender policy.
+        _setRedeemPolicy(PolicyRegistryConstants.ALWAYS_ALLOW_ID);
+
+        // 3. BELOW-MIN fires next (pause and policy fixed).
+        //    With the default 1:1 WAD ratio shares == amount, and amount < minimum.
+        vm.prank(alice);
+        vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IB20Security.BelowMinimumRedeemable.selector, amount, minimum));
+        security().redeemWithMemo(amount, memo);
+
+        // Fix: clear the minimum floor so shares == amount satisfies the check.
+        _updateMinimumRedeemable(0);
+
+        // 4. BALANCE fires next (pause, policy, and minimum fixed).
+        vm.prank(alice);
+        vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IB20.InsufficientBalance.selector, alice, 0, amount));
+        security().redeemWithMemo(amount, memo);
+
+        // Fix: give alice exactly enough balance to cover the redemption.
+        _mint(alice, amount);
+
+        // Success: all conditions resolved.
+        vm.prank(alice);
+        security().redeemWithMemo(amount, memo);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/test/unit/B20Security/redeem/updateMinimumRedeemable_revertOrder.t.sol b/test/unit/B20Security/redeem/updateMinimumRedeemable_revertOrder.t.sol
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6142b2d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/unit/B20Security/redeem/updateMinimumRedeemable_revertOrder.t.sol
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
+
+import {IB20} from "src/interfaces/IB20.sol";
+
+import {B20Constants} from "src/lib/B20Constants.sol";
+
+import {B20SecurityTest} from "test/lib/B20SecurityTest.sol";
+
+/// @title Sequential revert-order test for `updateMinimumRedeemable`.
+///
+/// @notice **Canonical order (Solidity reference):**
+///         1. ROLE (`onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)` modifier) → `AccessControlUnauthorizedAccount`
+///
+///         A single test verifies the guard fires for an unauthorized caller and then
+///         confirms the call succeeds once the role is granted.
+contract B20SecurityUpdateMinimumRedeemableRevertOrderTest is B20SecurityTest {
+    function test_updateMinimumRedeemable_revertOrder(address caller, uint256 newMinimum) public {
+        // Exclude precompiles (which can distort msg.sender) and admin (who already
+        // holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, which would make the initial call succeed).
+        _assumeValidCaller(caller);
+        vm.assume(caller != admin);
+
+        // 1. ROLE fires.
+        vm.prank(caller);
+        vm.expectRevert(
+            abi.encodeWithSelector(
+                IB20.AccessControlUnauthorizedAccount.selector, caller, B20Constants.DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
+            )
+        );
+        security().updateMinimumRedeemable(newMinimum);
+
+        // Fix: grant DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to caller.
+        _grantRole(B20Constants.DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, caller);
+
+        // Success: all conditions resolved.
+        vm.prank(caller);
+        security().updateMinimumRedeemable(newMinimum);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/test/unit/B20Security/shareRatio/updateShareRatio_revertOrder.t.sol b/test/unit/B20Security/shareRatio/updateShareRatio_revertOrder.t.sol
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..080ab0f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/unit/B20Security/shareRatio/updateShareRatio_revertOrder.t.sol
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
+
+import {IB20} from "src/interfaces/IB20.sol";
+
+import {B20SecurityTest} from "test/lib/B20SecurityTest.sol";
+
+/// @title Sequential revert-order test for `updateShareRatio`.
+///
+/// @notice **Canonical order (Solidity reference):**
+///         1. ROLE (`onlyRole(SECURITY_OPERATOR_ROLE)` modifier) → `AccessControlUnauthorizedAccount`
+///
+///         A single test verifies the guard fires for an unauthorized caller and then
+///         confirms the call succeeds once the role is granted.
+contract B20SecurityUpdateShareRatioRevertOrderTest is B20SecurityTest {
+    function test_updateShareRatio_revertOrder(address caller, uint256 newRatio) public {
+        // Exclude precompiles (which can distort msg.sender) and admin (needed
+        // internally by _grantRole to approve the role grant).
+        _assumeValidCaller(caller);
+        vm.assume(caller != admin);
+
+        // Resolve the role identifier before setting the prank; an external view
+        // call inside abi.encodeWithSelector would otherwise consume vm.prank
+        // before the state-changing call, sending it as address(this) instead.
+        bytes32 operatorRole = security().SECURITY_OPERATOR_ROLE();
+
+        // 1. ROLE fires.
+        vm.prank(caller);
+        vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IB20.AccessControlUnauthorizedAccount.selector, caller, operatorRole));
+        security().updateShareRatio(newRatio);
+
+        // Fix: grant SECURITY_OPERATOR_ROLE to caller.
+        _grantRole(operatorRole, caller);
+
+        // Success: all conditions resolved.
+        vm.prank(caller);
+        security().updateShareRatio(newRatio);
+    }
+}