This scan is incomplete. The GPOs below couldn't be read, and any of them could set any setting in this report. So a setting not found in the GPOs that were read is reported as unknown, not as a pass. Those verdicts are unknown, not clean. Fix the read failures and scan again.
This scan is incomplete. The GPOs below couldn't be read, and any of them could set any setting in this report. So a setting not found in the GPOs that were read is reported as unknown, not as a pass. Those verdicts are unknown, not clean. Fix the read failures and scan again.
Rollout: 2 enforced · 0 at step 1 · 10 not started, of 12 settings with a value to check.
Of the 5 unknown, 1 couldn't be read and 4 can't be seen in Group Policy at all.
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Start here
This scan is incomplete: 1 GPO(s) couldn't be read (see above). Fix that and scan again before relying on the rest.
Lockout risk right now: Domain controllers are set to refuse NTLMv1 by 'Sample Override GPO' (5), while 'Sample Workstation Baseline GPO' (1) lets other machines send it. Those machines can fail to sign in to the domain controllers, and repeated failures lock accounts out. Raise them to 3 first.
Safest first: the changes at the top can't break anything and give you the evidence the riskier ones need.
This scan is incomplete: 1 GPO(s) couldn't be read (see above). Fix that and scan again before relying on the rest.
Lockout risk right now: Domain controllers are set to refuse NTLMv1 by 'Sample Override GPO' (5), while 'Sample Workstation Baseline GPO' (1) lets other machines send it. Those machines can fail to sign in to the domain controllers, and repeated failures lock accounts out. Raise them to 3 first.
Safest first: the changes at the top can't break anything and give you the evidence the riskier ones need.
Settings to change: they are weaker than the baseline, or only hold because of a Windows default.
Failures (10)
These settings are weaker than the baseline recommends. Fix them in the order each card shows: several need an audit step first, and skipping it can lock users out.
HIGHFailstage: not startedCONFLICTCan lock people out
NTLMv1 and LM responses can be cracked or relayed quickly, so anyone who captures one can sign in as that user.
Microsoft changes this default: October 2026. Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 switch BlockNtlmv1SSO to enforce by default, blocking NTLMv1 credentials for signed-in users (unless Credential Guard is on). Microsoft
Found:1 in Sample Workstation Baseline GPO; 5 in Sample Override GPOTarget: at least 5 (step 1: at least 3)Applies to: 50 of 50 computers
Conflict — enforced-override
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Precedence is unresolved. Confirm the effective value with gpresult /h or the Group Policy Results (RSoP) wizard on a representative machine before changing or trusting any of these settings.
Before enforcing, check: Look for event 4624 with LmPackageName = 'NTLM V1' on member servers and endpoints, ignoring ANONYMOUS LOGON. Event 4776 on DCs doesn't record the NTLM version, so it can't be used for this.
IN STAGES: don't set domain controllers to 5 until every device is at 3 or higher. At 5, a DC treats NTLMv1 attempts as bad passwords, which locks accounts out (Devore saw 46 failed logons from one NTLMv1 SMB connection).
TATTOOING: the value lives outside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies, so if you later set the policy back to 'Not Defined', the old value stays on each device and has to be cleared there.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: LAN Manager authentication level'. Set every client and member server to 'Send NTLMv2 response only' (3) first. Only then raise domain controllers to 'Refuse LM & NTLM' (5).
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 3 first. Machines send only NTLMv2. This already changes behaviour: a device or server that only accepts LM or NTLMv1, such as an old NAS or copier, stops working with them. Domain controllers still accept anything until step 2.
Step 2: only then set it to 5. Don't skip step 1: enforcing before every device and service account is ready can cause sign-in failures and account lockouts.
More notes (2)
Levels 0-3 control what a client sends; levels 4-5 control what a server or DC accepts.
Credential Guard stops a machine using NTLMv1 with signed-in users' credentials, whatever this setting says. What servers and domain controllers accept is still decided by this setting. Changing it needs no reboot.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Network security: LAN Manager authentication level
Devore Part 1 lists levels 0-5 and what each means (3 = Send NTLMv2 response only; 5 = Refuse LM & NTLM).
Found (this scan)
Value found
Type
Rollout step
Set by GPO
Delivered by
Enforced link / link path
1
REG_DWORD
not started
Sample Workstation Baseline GPO CN={11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]
security template (policy)
no
DC=test,DC=local
5
REG_DWORD
enforced
Sample Override GPO CN={22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]
security template (policy)
yes
OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local(enforced)
Scan notes
Precedence is not resolved (v1): every GPO that sets this key is listed. Check the conflict field before treating a single GPO's value as effective.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Before enforcing, check: Events 3074 and 3075 in the Directory Service log (Server 2019 and 2022 with the 2023–24 updates, diagnostic logging at 2 or higher). Event 3039 means a bind already failed.
AUDIT FIRST: with diagnostic logging ('16 LDAP Interface Events') at 2 or higher, event 3074 records a client whose token would fail validation and 3075 a client that sent no token. Both are logged on Windows Server 2022 from the November 2023 update and Server 2019 from the January 2024 update. Event 3039 records a bind that actually failed. Source: Microsoft KB4520412, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/2020-2023-and-2024-ldap-channel-binding-and-ldap-signing-requirements-for-windows-kb4520412-ef185fb8-00f7-167d-744c-f299a66fc00a
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements' = 'When supported' (1) while you audit, then 'Always' (2).
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 1 first. Domain controllers check the channel binding token from every client that sends one, and still accept clients that send none. That already rejects clients whose token doesn't match, which is common behind load balancers that terminate TLS, so test first.
Step 2: only then set it to 2. Don't skip step 1: enforcing before every device and service account is ready can cause sign-in failures and account lockouts.
More notes (2)
Devore gives the setting names (Never / When supported / Always) but not the numbers. The 0/1/2 mapping is the widely used one from KB4034879; confirm it against a baseline source.
Unset means off. It only affects SASL binds over TLS. Load balancers that terminate or bridge TLS break channel binding, and a load-balanced name (VIP FQDN) must be in the DC certificate's SAN.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements
Devore Part 5 gives the registry path and the setting names, but not the numbers. The mapping 0/1/2 = Never / When supported / Always is Microsoft's, from KB4034879.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
The value isn't set, so channel binding is off (it has no default) and SASL binds over TLS aren't tied to the TLS channel.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
HIGHFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisPilot first
Without SMB signing, an attacker can relay a captured sign-in to a file server and act as that user.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: exactly 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)' = Enabled, on endpoints and member servers as well as domain controllers.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This can break some devices or apps. Link it to a small pilot OU first, and widen it once nothing breaks.
More notes (3)
NOT THE LEGACY SETTING: this isn't 'Digitally sign communications (if server agrees)' (EnableSecuritySignature). That's a different, weaker setting that only affects SMBv1: Microsoft says SMB2 and later ignore it, and recommends against it. A GPO setting EnableSecuritySignature = 1 doesn't satisfy this check, which doesn't read that value.
'(always)' applies to every SMB version and drops the session when the other side can't sign.
Windows 11 24H2 and Server 2025 require SMB signing by default, so on those an unset value doesn't necessarily mean unsigned traffic. It's still not enforced by policy, which is what this check looks for.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)
Microsoft, 'Overview of Server Message Block signing in Windows', for 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)': registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManWorkstation\Parameters, value RequireSecuritySignature, REG_DWORD, 0 (disable) or 1 (enable): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview. That 'always' means signing is required is from Microsoft, 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-digitally-sign-communications-always. The key is written as Microsoft writes it ('LanMan', capital M). Real GPOs spell the service name several ways, and ADitor matches it regardless of case.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
No GPO requires SMB signing on the client side, so outbound SMB is signed only when the server requires it. ADitor doesn't assume a Windows default here: the policy's documented default is Disabled, but Windows 11 24H2 and Server 2025 require signing by default, so what an unset value means depends on the Windows version, which a GPO scan can't see.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-06-SMB-SERVER-SIGNING-ALWAYS SMB server always requires signing
HIGHFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisPilot first
Without SMB signing, an attacker can relay a captured sign-in to this server and act as that user.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: exactly 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)' = Enabled, on member servers and endpoints too, not only domain controllers.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This can break some devices or apps. Link it to a small pilot OU first, and widen it once nothing breaks.
More notes (3)
NOT THE LEGACY SETTING: this isn't 'Digitally sign communications (if client agrees)' (EnableSecuritySignature). That's a different, weaker setting that only affects SMBv1: Microsoft says SMB2 and later ignore it, and recommends against it. A GPO setting EnableSecuritySignature = 1 doesn't satisfy this check, which doesn't read that value.
Devore is explicit that this belongs on endpoints and member servers too. Third-party appliances and multifunction printers are the usual devices that can't sign.
Domain controllers already require SMB signing for SYSVOL and NETLOGON; this check is about the policy that requires it everywhere else.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)
Microsoft, 'Overview of Server Message Block signing in Windows', for 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)': registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManServer\Parameters, value RequireSecuritySignature, REG_DWORD, 0 (disable) or 1 (enable): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview. That 'always' means signing is required is from Microsoft, 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always. The key is written as Microsoft writes it ('LanMan', capital M). Real GPOs spell the service name several ways, and ADitor matches it regardless of case.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
No GPO requires SMB signing on the server side, so inbound SMB is signed only when the client requires it. ADitor doesn't assume a Windows default here: Microsoft's defaults table gives Enabled for domain controllers but Disabled for member servers and clients, so the default depends on the machine's role.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-07-UNCONSTRAINED-DELEGATION No accounts other than domain controllers have unconstrained delegation
HIGHFailstage: not startedread from the directoryPilot first
A computer with unconstrained delegation keeps the tickets of everyone who connects to it, admins included, so taking it over can mean taking over the domain.
Found: 1 listed: APPSRV01$Target: none
Next: fix the 1 listed on the card.
IN STAGES: changing delegation can break the services that depend on it. Find out what each listed account delegates to before changing it, and change one at a time.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
For each listed account, switch to constrained delegation or resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD) for only the services it needs, then turn off 'Trust this computer/user for delegation to any service'.
How to roll it out safely
More notes (2)
Only writable domain controllers are excluded. Read-only domain controllers don't carry this flag by design, so one that has it is listed, as is any user account, whatever its primary group.
Disabled accounts are listed and marked: re-enabling one brings the exposure back.
Evidence and technical detail
Directory check
unconstrained-delegation
Scope
domain-root
Check type
directory-state
Expected (baseline)
Expected
nothing found by the directory query
Where the rule comes from
Devore Part 7: accounts trusted for delegation to any service (userAccountControl TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, 0x80000) should be moved to constrained or resource-based constrained delegation. Writable domain controllers carry this flag by design and are excluded, recognised by their account type (a computer account with SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT, 0x2000), not by primary group.
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows which clients still use NTLM against this system, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit Incoming NTLM Traffic' = 'Enable auditing for domain accounts' (or 'for all accounts').
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (5)
MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means some auditing is on, and 0 fails as auditing turned off. Microsoft lists the options but not their numbers, so whether it audits domain accounts or all accounts is shown in the evidence, not judged. Read the value found if you need to know.
INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Disable' is stored as 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Disable'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
WATCH OUT: some third-party write-ups mix up the Audit* and Restrict* values and say 2 here means 'deny all'. It doesn't. Microsoft says this audit policy doesn't block any traffic. Blocking is DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INCOMING, which isn't checked yet because no source gives its value.
Rollout state 'enforced' here means the audit policy is fully set up, not that NTLM is blocked. Blocking is covered by the DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-* checks.
Logs events 8002 and 8003 in Microsoft/Windows/NTLM/Operational.
Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit incoming NTLM traffic' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-audit-incoming-ntlm-traffic), lists the options (Disable / Enable auditing for domain accounts / Enable auditing for all accounts), says 'Not defined' is the same as Disable and audits nothing, and says the policy doesn't block any traffic. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Disable is stored as the numeric 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft says unset and Disable are the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact level is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the level would be mislabelled, but Disable still couldn't pass.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
Incoming NTLM auditing isn't set up, so there's no record of which clients still use NTLM against this system. Microsoft says 'Not defined' is the same as Disable, which audits no NTLM traffic.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-INDOMAIN Audit NTLM authentication in this domain (domain controllers)
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows NTLM use across the domain from the domain controllers, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain' = 'Enable all', in a GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (5)
MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means some in-domain auditing is on, and 0 fails as auditing turned off. The policy has five options (Disable and four Enable scopes) and Microsoft doesn't publish their numbers, so which one is set is shown in the evidence, not judged. 'Enable all' is the one that records everything.
INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Disable' is stored as 0 and the four Enable options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Disable'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
WATCH OUT: this is an audit policy. Microsoft says it doesn't block any traffic; the deny options belong to DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INDOMAIN, which isn't checked yet. No value of this setting blocks NTLM.
Rollout state 'enforced' here means this audit policy's target is met, not that in-domain NTLM is blocked. Blocking is covered by DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INDOMAIN.
Logs events 8004, 8005 and 8006.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain
Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-audit-ntlm-authentication-in-this-domain), lists five options (Disable / Enable for domain accounts to domain servers / Enable for domain accounts / Enable for domain servers / Enable all), says Disable logs no events for incoming NTLM traffic, gives 'Not defined' as the default for every server type, and says the policy doesn't block traffic. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Disable is stored as the numeric 0 and the four Enable options as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft treats unset and Disable as the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact option is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the option would be mislabelled, but Disable still couldn't pass. With five options the level matters more here than for the other audit checks: only 'Enable all' records everything.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
In-domain NTLM auditing isn't set up on the domain controllers, so there's no record of NTLM use across the domain. Microsoft gives 'Not defined' as the default for every server type, and Disable logs no events.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-OUTGOING Audit outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows which systems still send NTLM to other servers, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers' = 'Audit all' during the audit phase.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (4)
MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means outgoing NTLM is at least logged, and Allow all (0) fails. Which level is set (Audit all or Deny all) is shown in the evidence, not judged, because Microsoft doesn't publish the numbers.
INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Allow all' is stored as 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Allow all'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
One value controls both auditing and blocking of outgoing NTLM; see DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-OUTGOING, which isn't checked yet because no source gives the number for Deny all. A pass here means at least audited. It doesn't mean outgoing NTLM is blocked.
Rollout state 'enforced' here means this audit check's target is met, not that outgoing NTLM is denied.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers
Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-outgoing-ntlm-traffic-to-remote-servers), lists the options (Allow all / Audit all / Deny all) and says 'Not defined' is the same as Allow all. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Allow all is stored as the numeric 0 and the other two as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft says unset and Allow all are the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact level is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the level would be mislabelled, but Allow all still couldn't pass. A minimum can't tell Audit all from Deny all, so a pass here means 'at least audited', never 'blocked'. Blocking uses the same value and is DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-OUTGOING, which isn't checked yet because it needs the exact number for Deny all.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
Outgoing NTLM is neither audited nor restricted, so there's no record of outbound NTLM use, which you need before you can block it. Microsoft says 'Not defined' is the same as Allow all: the device allows all NTLM authentication requests.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
The scan couldn't settle these. They are not passes.
Unknown (5)
The scan couldn't confirm these settings. Treat them as unconfirmed, not as passes. A GPO couldn't be read, a directory query failed, or the setting is normally made directly in the registry, where Group Policy can't show it. Each card says which, and how to check.
DEVORE-03-LDAP-SERVER-SIGNING Domain controller LDAP server signing
HIGHUnknownstage: enforcedCan lock people out
Unsigned LDAP binds can be intercepted and relayed to a domain controller, letting an attacker act as the user who signed in.
Found:2 in Sample Override GPOTarget: exactly 2 (step 1: exactly 1)Applies to: 2 of 2 domain controllers
Why this is unknown — this is not a pass
The GPOs that were read meet the target, but a GPO that applies here couldn't be read and could set a weaker value. Fix the read failure and scan again.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
The GPOs that were read pass, but 1 GPO(s) that apply here couldn't be read, and any of them could set a weaker value that wins. Reported as unknown until they can be read.
Next: fix the read failure above, then scan again.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Domain controller: LDAP signing requirements' = 'Require signing', in a GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU. Before you do, check that event 2889 shows no unsigned binds.
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 1 first. Signing is negotiated, not required. This is the Windows default, so on its own it changes nothing; the audit comes from LDAP diagnostic logging and event 2889 (DEVORE-03-LDAP-DIAG-LOGGING).
Step 2: only then set it to 2. Don't skip step 1: enforcing before every device and service account is ready can cause sign-in failures and account lockouts.
More notes (1)
A load balancer that terminates or bridges TLS forwards unsigned traffic, and shows up in event 2889 as the client IP.
DEVORE-04-KDC-DEFAULTDOMAINSUPPORTEDENCTYPES Disable RC4 at the domain level on domain controllers
HIGHUnknownnot confirmed by this scanCan lock people out
While domain controllers still issue RC4 tickets, any account with an SPN is easier to crack offline (Kerberoasting).
Microsoft already changed this default: 14 April 2026. Domain controllers with the Kerberos updates treat accounts with no encryption-type setting as AES only (0x18). From July 2026 the rollback setting is gone. Microsoft
Found: not confirmed by this scanTarget: AES only, no RC4 or DES, for example 56
Why this is unknown — this is not a pass
Group Policy doesn't show this setting's value, so the scan can't confirm it either way. Use the check below to settle it.
No GPO sets the KDC default. Devore creates this value directly on the domain controllers, which leaves nothing in Group Policy, so its absence here doesn't mean RC4 is still allowed domain-wide. This scan reads Group Policy only and can't tell either way.
Reported as 'unknown', not as a failure. This control's documented remediation is a direct registry write on the domain controllers, which leaves no trace in Group Policy at all, so the key appearing in no GPO is NOT evidence that the value is unset. This scan reads Group Policy and not the machines, so it cannot see the live value either way and issues no verdict. Check it on each domain controller with: reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\KDC" /v "DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes"
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Next: check it by hand; the card gives the command.
Before enforcing, check: 4768 Ticket Encryption Type = RC4 identifies the accounts and devices that still depend on RC4.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
On domain controllers, set DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes to 0x38. Do it last, after each service account has AES. Devore creates the value directly on the DCs; a GPO registry preference with the same value works the same way, and it's the only form this scan can see.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 56. This can lock people out. Apply it to a pilot group first and read the warnings below.
More notes (2)
Devore warns that switching everything at once is 'too aggressive for most'. Make this the last step, after fixing individual accounts, not the first.
NOT SET THROUGH GROUP POLICY: the documented fix creates the value on the domain controllers, so its absence from Group Policy proves nothing. Where no GPO sets it, the result is 'unknown', not 'fail', and the finding includes the reg query command to check it on the DCs. Where a GPO does set it, for example as a registry preference, it's checked normally.
Devore Part 4 gives 0x38 (56 decimal), citing KB5021131. ADitor accepts any AES-only value, not just 0x38: an AES bit (0x8 or 0x10) set and no DES or RC4 bit (0x1, 0x2, 0x4). So 0x18 (AES128 and AES256 without the AES session-key bit) passes too, while anything that includes RC4, such as 0x3C, fails.
Makes Windows clients sign their LDAP traffic, so it can't be altered or relayed in transit.
Found: not confirmed by this scanTarget: at least 2 (step 1: at least 1)
Why this is unknown
1 of 3 GPO(s) could not be read, so it is unproven that no GPO sets this key; the documented Windows default was not applied
Next: fix the read failure above, then scan again.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: LDAP client signing requirements' = 'Require signing'. Windows already negotiates signing without a GPO, so setting 'Negotiate signing' explicitly only documents the default; it doesn't harden anything.
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 1 first. Clients ask for signing wherever the server supports it. This is the Windows default, so nothing breaks.
Step 2: only then set it to 2. Low risk, but check a few machines after step 1 first.
The catalog doesn't say what to check before enforcing. Treat that as a catalog gap, and pilot it first.
More notes (2)
Because Windows defaults to Negotiate (1), Windows SASL binds keep working when DCs start requiring signing, unless a GPO has lowered this to 0.
OS DEFAULT, NOT ENFORCED: where no GPO sets this, the result rests on the documented Windows default and is marked 'source: os-default'. That's a pass at the Negotiate step, not proof that nothing will set it to 0 later.
Devore Part 3 gives the values 0/1/2 (None / Negotiate signing / Require signing). Microsoft documents the default as 'Negotiate signing' for domain controllers, member servers and client computers, in the Default values table of 'Network security: LDAP client signing requirements': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-ldap-client-signing-requirements
Found (this scan)
No GPO that could be read sets this key, and the scan could not read every GPO, so the documented default 1 was not applied: one or more GPOs could not be read, so 'no GPO sets this key' is unproven and the default cannot be assumed effective
Scan notes
No GPO that could be read sets this key, but 1 of 3 GPO(s) could not be read at all, so 'nothing sets this key' is unproven. The documented Windows default (1) is therefore NOT applied: an unreadable GPO could set this value to anything, including a value below the default. Reported as unknown rather than a pass: fix the read failures and scan again.
Could not evaluate: 1 of 3 GPO(s) could not be read, so it is unproven that no GPO sets this key; the documented Windows default was not applied. Reported as unknown rather than a pass or a fail.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-08-PRINT-RPCNAMEDPIPE Print Spooler: no NTLM fallback on named pipes
LOWUnknownnot confirmed by this scanPilot first
Stops the print spooler's named-pipe listener falling back to weaker NTLM authentication.
Found: not confirmed by this scanTarget: exactly 2
Why this is unknown — this is not a pass
Group Policy doesn't show this setting's value, so the scan can't confirm it either way. Use the check below to settle it.
No GPO sets this value. That's correct if the print spooler uses RPC over TCP, which this scan can't see, so it's reported as unknown. Check how the spooler's RPC listener is configured; if named pipes are in use, set this value to 2.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Next: check it by hand; the card gives the command.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Prefer RPC over TCP. Where named pipes have to stay, set 'Configure RPC connection settings' / RpcNamedPipeAuthentication = 2 so the named-pipe listener doesn't fall back to unauthenticated NTLM.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 2. This can break some devices or apps. Link it to a small pilot OU first, and widen it once nothing breaks.
More notes (1)
Devore gives the value explicitly. Other NTLM fallback sources (RPC EPM, TryIPSPN, Kerberos LogLevel, MS-CHAPv2, DFS referrals) are named in the post without values.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Printers\Configure RPC connection/listener settings (prefer RPC over TCP)
INFORMATIONALUnknownnot confirmed by this scanSafe: logging only
Records which clients still make unsigned LDAP binds, so you know what would break before you require signing.
Found: not confirmed by this scanTarget: at least 2
Why this is unknown — this is not a pass
Group Policy doesn't show this setting's value, so the scan can't confirm it either way. Use the check below to settle it.
No GPO sets the diagnostic level. Devore sets it with a registry write on each domain controller, which leaves nothing in Group Policy, so its absence here doesn't mean the level is 0 or that 2889 events aren't being logged. This scan reads Group Policy only and can't tell either way.
Reported as 'unknown', not as a failure. This control's documented remediation is a direct registry write on the domain controllers, which leaves no trace in Group Policy at all, so the key appearing in no GPO is NOT evidence that the value is unset. This scan reads Group Policy and not the machines, so it cannot see the live value either way and issues no verdict. Check it on each domain controller with: reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Diagnostics" /v "16 LDAP Interface Events"
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Next: check it by hand; the card gives the command.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
On domain controllers, set the '16 LDAP Interface Events' diagnostic level to 2 or higher while you collect unsigned-bind evidence. Devore does this with a registry write on each DC: reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Diagnostics" /v "16 LDAP Interface Events" /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f. A GPO registry preference with the same value works the same way, and it's the only form this scan can see.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 2. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (4)
NOT SET THROUGH GROUP POLICY: the documented fix writes the registry directly on each domain controller, so this scan can't confirm the level. Where no GPO sets it, the result is 'unknown', not 'fail', and the finding includes the reg query command to check it on the DCs.
This turns on logging; it doesn't harden anything by itself. It produces events 2889 (client IP, account, bind type), 2887 (daily unsigned count) and 2888 (binds rejected once signing is required).
Left on permanently it's noisy, so it's usually raised only for the audit period.
Levels run 0-5, more verbose as they rise (Microsoft, 'AD and LDS diagnostic event logging'; default 0). A level above 2 logs more, including the 2889 events, so it passes. The minimum is 2; it doesn't have to be exactly 2.
Devore Part 3 gives 2. ADitor accepts 2 or higher, not exactly 2: Microsoft documents the NTDS diagnostic levels as 0-5, more verbose as they rise (default 0), in 'How to configure Active Directory and LDS diagnostic event logging': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/active-directory/configure-ad-and-lds-event-logging. A DC at 3 logs everything a DC at 2 does, including the 2889 events this check is for, so it isn't a failure.
Two or more GPOs set the same setting to different values, and this scan doesn't work out which one wins. Check the value a machine actually gets with gpresult /h report.html before changing any of them. These findings also appear in their own section.
HIGHFailstage: not startedCONFLICTCan lock people out
NTLMv1 and LM responses can be cracked or relayed quickly, so anyone who captures one can sign in as that user.
Microsoft changes this default: October 2026. Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 switch BlockNtlmv1SSO to enforce by default, blocking NTLMv1 credentials for signed-in users (unless Credential Guard is on). Microsoft
Found:1 in Sample Workstation Baseline GPO; 5 in Sample Override GPOTarget: at least 5 (step 1: at least 3)Applies to: 50 of 50 computers
Conflict — enforced-override
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Precedence is unresolved. Confirm the effective value with gpresult /h or the Group Policy Results (RSoP) wizard on a representative machine before changing or trusting any of these settings.
Devore Part 1 lists levels 0-5 and what each means (3 = Send NTLMv2 response only; 5 = Refuse LM & NTLM).
Found (this scan)
Value found
Type
Rollout step
Set by GPO
Delivered by
Enforced link / link path
1
REG_DWORD
not started
Sample Workstation Baseline GPO CN={11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]
security template (policy)
no
DC=test,DC=local
5
REG_DWORD
enforced
Sample Override GPO CN={22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]
security template (policy)
yes
OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local(enforced)
Scan notes
Precedence is not resolved (v1): every GPO that sets this key is listed. Check the conflict field before treating a single GPO's value as effective.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Settings this scan doesn't check yet. They are not passes, and there is nothing to change from this report.
Not checked yet — no target value (4)
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value to check these against, and this tool doesn't guess, so they were not checked and are not passes. Each row expands to its guidance.
DEVORE-04-KERB-CONFIGURE-ENCTYPESConfigure encryption types allowed for Kerberos (disable RC4 on devices)
HIGHNOT CHECKED — NOT A PASS
Not checked — this is not a pass
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value for this setting, and this tool doesn't guess one, so its state is unknown. It can be checked once a target value is sourced, for example from a Microsoft Security Baseline. Reason code: needs_baseline_value.
Devore Part 4 names only the policy and the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute; it gives neither the registry path nor the bitmask. Both need to come from the Microsoft Security Baseline (Security Compliance Toolkit) or the CIS Benchmark before this can be checked.
Excluded from scoring: no verdict is issued rather than a guessed one. Source the exact value from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark to activate this control.
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos'. Enable the AES types. Clear RC4 only after 4768 auditing shows every device advertises AES. Fix service accounts before devices.
How to roll it out safely
Before enforcing, check: Event 4768, Ticket Encryption Type. From the January 2025 cumulative update, 4768 and 4769 also show Advertised Etypes and Available Keys.
More notes (2)
The source doesn't give the registry path, so this isn't checked yet.
Fix service accounts before disabling RC4 on devices.
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value for this setting, and this tool doesn't guess one, so its state is unknown. It can be checked once a target value is sourced, for example from a Microsoft Security Baseline. Reason code: needs_baseline_value.
Devore Part 8 gives the three audit paths but no blocking path or value. MSV1_0\RestrictReceivingNTLMTraffic is the value name usually cited, but it isn't confirmed here and isn't used. The path and the number for 'Deny all domain accounts' need to come from the Microsoft Security Baseline or the CIS Benchmark.
Excluded from scoring: no verdict is issued rather than a guessed one. Source the exact value from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark to activate this control.
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Incoming NTLM traffic' = 'Deny all domain accounts'. Try it on Tier 0 systems and PAWs first.
How to roll it out safely
Before enforcing, check: Events 8002 and 8003 must be clean on the systems in scope before you block.
More notes (2)
The source gives no registry path or value, so this isn't checked yet.
Use 'Deny all domain accounts', not 'Deny all accounts', which breaks loopback and the System account. There are separate policies for server exceptions. Once blocking is on, events 4001-4006 replace 8001-8006.
DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INDOMAINBlock NTLM authentication in this domain (domain controllers, last step)
HIGHNOT CHECKED — NOT A PASS
Not checked — this is not a pass
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value for this setting, and this tool doesn't guess one, so its state is unknown. It can be checked once a target value is sourced, for example from a Microsoft Security Baseline. Reason code: needs_baseline_value.
Devore Part 8 gives neither the blocking path nor the deny values. Netlogon\Parameters\RestrictNTLMInDomain is the value name usually cited, but it isn't confirmed here and isn't used. The deny options differ by scope, so both the path and the values need to come from a baseline source.
Excluded from scoring: no verdict is issued rather than a guessed one. Source the exact value from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark to activate this control.
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain' = the deny option that fits, on domain controllers, as the very last step of the project.
How to roll it out safely
Before enforcing, check: Events 8004, 8005 and 8006 must be clean across the domain before you block.
More notes (2)
The source gives no path or values, so this isn't checked yet.
The deny options differ by scope. Apply one at the very end, on DCs only.
DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-OUTGOINGBlock outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers
HIGHNOT CHECKED — NOT A PASS
Not checked — this is not a pass
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value for this setting, and this tool doesn't guess one, so its state is unknown. It can be checked once a target value is sourced, for example from a Microsoft Security Baseline. Reason code: needs_baseline_value.
The value name is known: MSV1_0\RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic, the same one the outgoing audit check (DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-OUTGOING) reads. But no Microsoft or CIS document consulted gives the number that means 'Deny all'. The audit check can still use this value because it only needs a floor (a minimum): the permissive option is 0 and every other option is 1 or higher, which follows from Microsoft's statement that unset means Allow all. Blocking needs the exact number for Deny all, which a minimum can't express ('1 or higher' also matches Audit all), and guessing it would report a domain that only audits as blocking. So the catalog leaves this check's registry key empty, and nothing can report it as checked. It becomes active once the number is sourced from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark.
Excluded from scoring: no verdict is issued rather than a guessed one. Source the exact value from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark to activate this control.
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers' = 'Deny all', once the audit phase comes back clean.
How to roll it out safely
Before enforcing, check: Events 8001 and 8002 (outbound NTLM) must be clean on the systems in scope.
More notes (2)
Uses the same value as the outgoing audit check (DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-OUTGOING), which only checks for 1 or higher ('at least audited'). A pass there doesn't mean outgoing NTLM is blocked. This one isn't checked yet: it needs the Deny all number from a real source.
WATCH OUT: some third-party write-ups mix up the Audit* and Restrict* values and confidently give a number for 'Deny all'. This check waits for a real source so that it doesn't guess.
These meet the baseline. Each row expands to its evidence. If a pass also appears under Conflicts, check it there before relying on it.
DEVORE-04-SPN-ACCOUNTS-AESService accounts with an SPN state AES in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypesstage: enforcedfound none
Expected (baseline)
Expected
nothing found by the directory query
Where the rule comes from
Devore Part 4: service accounts with an SPN should carry the AES bits in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes. AES bits per Microsoft: 0x8 (AES128) and 0x10 (AES256). A blank value makes the account use the domain default, which depends on patch level: before the 2026 Kerberos updates the domain controllers assume 0x27 (RC4 tickets); from April 2026 (enforcement enabled) and July 2026 (automatic) they assume AES only (0x18), per Microsoft's CVE-2026-20833 guidance: https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/topic/how-to-manage-kerberos-kdc-usage-of-rc4-for-service-account-ticket-issuance-changes-related-to-cve-2026-20833-1ebcda33-720a-4da8-93c1-b0496e1910dc. An account that explicitly lists RC4 without AES keeps getting RC4 tickets after those updates.
Found (this scan)
Nothing found — the directory query returned no matching objects that the bind account can read.
DEVORE-07-EMPTY-PRIVILEGED-GROUPSBuilt-in privileged groups that should be empty have no membersstage: enforcedfound none
Expected (baseline)
Expected
nothing found by the directory query
Where the rule comes from
Devore Part 7 lists these built-in groups as ones that should normally have no members. Each group is found by its well-known SID, not its name, so a localized or renamed group is still checked.
Found (this scan)
Nothing found — the directory query returned no matching objects that the bind account can read.
Settings to change: they are weaker than the baseline, or only hold because of a Windows default.
Failures (10)
These settings are weaker than the baseline recommends. Fix them in the order each card shows: several need an audit step first, and skipping it can lock users out.
HIGHFailstage: not startedCONFLICTCan lock people out
NTLMv1 and LM responses can be cracked or relayed quickly, so anyone who captures one can sign in as that user.
Microsoft changes this default: October 2026. Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 switch BlockNtlmv1SSO to enforce by default, blocking NTLMv1 credentials for signed-in users (unless Credential Guard is on). Microsoft
Found:1 in Sample Workstation Baseline GPO; 5 in Sample Override GPOTarget: at least 5 (step 1: at least 3)Applies to: 50 of 50 computers
Conflict — enforced-override
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Precedence is unresolved. Confirm the effective value with gpresult /h or the Group Policy Results (RSoP) wizard on a representative machine before changing or trusting any of these settings.
This scan reads Group Policy, not event logs. To see which machines and accounts would break, run aditor-cli ntlm-script > export.ps1, list your domain controllers and servers in it, run it (read-only; Event Log Readers is enough), then scan again with --ntlm-evidence ntlmv1-evidence.csv.
Next: step 1: set it to 3.
Before enforcing, check: Look for event 4624 with LmPackageName = 'NTLM V1' on member servers and endpoints, ignoring ANONYMOUS LOGON. Event 4776 on DCs doesn't record the NTLM version, so it can't be used for this.
IN STAGES: don't set domain controllers to 5 until every device is at 3 or higher. At 5, a DC treats NTLMv1 attempts as bad passwords, which locks accounts out (Devore saw 46 failed logons from one NTLMv1 SMB connection).
TATTOOING: the value lives outside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies, so if you later set the policy back to 'Not Defined', the old value stays on each device and has to be cleared there.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: LAN Manager authentication level'. Set every client and member server to 'Send NTLMv2 response only' (3) first. Only then raise domain controllers to 'Refuse LM & NTLM' (5).
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 3 first. Machines send only NTLMv2. This already changes behaviour: a device or server that only accepts LM or NTLMv1, such as an old NAS or copier, stops working with them. Domain controllers still accept anything until step 2.
Step 2: only then set it to 5. Don't skip step 1: enforcing before every device and service account is ready can cause sign-in failures and account lockouts.
More notes (2)
Levels 0-3 control what a client sends; levels 4-5 control what a server or DC accepts.
Credential Guard stops a machine using NTLMv1 with signed-in users' credentials, whatever this setting says. What servers and domain controllers accept is still decided by this setting. Changing it needs no reboot.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Network security: LAN Manager authentication level
Devore Part 1 lists levels 0-5 and what each means (3 = Send NTLMv2 response only; 5 = Refuse LM & NTLM).
Found (this scan)
Value found
Type
Rollout step
Set by GPO
Delivered by
Enforced link / link path
1
REG_DWORD
not started
Sample Workstation Baseline GPO CN={11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]
security template (policy)
no
DC=test,DC=local
5
REG_DWORD
enforced
Sample Override GPO CN={22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]
security template (policy)
yes
OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local(enforced)
Scan notes
Precedence is not resolved (v1): every GPO that sets this key is listed. Check the conflict field before treating a single GPO's value as effective.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Before enforcing, check: Events 3074 and 3075 in the Directory Service log (Server 2019 and 2022 with the 2023–24 updates, diagnostic logging at 2 or higher). Event 3039 means a bind already failed.
AUDIT FIRST: with diagnostic logging ('16 LDAP Interface Events') at 2 or higher, event 3074 records a client whose token would fail validation and 3075 a client that sent no token. Both are logged on Windows Server 2022 from the November 2023 update and Server 2019 from the January 2024 update. Event 3039 records a bind that actually failed. Source: Microsoft KB4520412, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/2020-2023-and-2024-ldap-channel-binding-and-ldap-signing-requirements-for-windows-kb4520412-ef185fb8-00f7-167d-744c-f299a66fc00a
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements' = 'When supported' (1) while you audit, then 'Always' (2).
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 1 first. Domain controllers check the channel binding token from every client that sends one, and still accept clients that send none. That already rejects clients whose token doesn't match, which is common behind load balancers that terminate TLS, so test first.
Step 2: only then set it to 2. Don't skip step 1: enforcing before every device and service account is ready can cause sign-in failures and account lockouts.
More notes (2)
Devore gives the setting names (Never / When supported / Always) but not the numbers. The 0/1/2 mapping is the widely used one from KB4034879; confirm it against a baseline source.
Unset means off. It only affects SASL binds over TLS. Load balancers that terminate or bridge TLS break channel binding, and a load-balanced name (VIP FQDN) must be in the DC certificate's SAN.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements
Devore Part 5 gives the registry path and the setting names, but not the numbers. The mapping 0/1/2 = Never / When supported / Always is Microsoft's, from KB4034879.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
The value isn't set, so channel binding is off (it has no default) and SASL binds over TLS aren't tied to the TLS channel.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
HIGHFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisPilot first
Without SMB signing, an attacker can relay a captured sign-in to a file server and act as that user.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: exactly 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)' = Enabled, on endpoints and member servers as well as domain controllers.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This can break some devices or apps. Link it to a small pilot OU first, and widen it once nothing breaks.
More notes (3)
NOT THE LEGACY SETTING: this isn't 'Digitally sign communications (if server agrees)' (EnableSecuritySignature). That's a different, weaker setting that only affects SMBv1: Microsoft says SMB2 and later ignore it, and recommends against it. A GPO setting EnableSecuritySignature = 1 doesn't satisfy this check, which doesn't read that value.
'(always)' applies to every SMB version and drops the session when the other side can't sign.
Windows 11 24H2 and Server 2025 require SMB signing by default, so on those an unset value doesn't necessarily mean unsigned traffic. It's still not enforced by policy, which is what this check looks for.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)
Microsoft, 'Overview of Server Message Block signing in Windows', for 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)': registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManWorkstation\Parameters, value RequireSecuritySignature, REG_DWORD, 0 (disable) or 1 (enable): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview. That 'always' means signing is required is from Microsoft, 'Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always)': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-client-digitally-sign-communications-always. The key is written as Microsoft writes it ('LanMan', capital M). Real GPOs spell the service name several ways, and ADitor matches it regardless of case.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
No GPO requires SMB signing on the client side, so outbound SMB is signed only when the server requires it. ADitor doesn't assume a Windows default here: the policy's documented default is Disabled, but Windows 11 24H2 and Server 2025 require signing by default, so what an unset value means depends on the Windows version, which a GPO scan can't see.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-06-SMB-SERVER-SIGNING-ALWAYS SMB server always requires signing
HIGHFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisPilot first
Without SMB signing, an attacker can relay a captured sign-in to this server and act as that user.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: exactly 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)' = Enabled, on member servers and endpoints too, not only domain controllers.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This can break some devices or apps. Link it to a small pilot OU first, and widen it once nothing breaks.
More notes (3)
NOT THE LEGACY SETTING: this isn't 'Digitally sign communications (if client agrees)' (EnableSecuritySignature). That's a different, weaker setting that only affects SMBv1: Microsoft says SMB2 and later ignore it, and recommends against it. A GPO setting EnableSecuritySignature = 1 doesn't satisfy this check, which doesn't read that value.
Devore is explicit that this belongs on endpoints and member servers too. Third-party appliances and multifunction printers are the usual devices that can't sign.
Domain controllers already require SMB signing for SYSVOL and NETLOGON; this check is about the policy that requires it everywhere else.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)
Microsoft, 'Overview of Server Message Block signing in Windows', for 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)': registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanManServer\Parameters, value RequireSecuritySignature, REG_DWORD, 0 (disable) or 1 (enable): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-signing-overview. That 'always' means signing is required is from Microsoft, 'Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/microsoft-network-server-digitally-sign-communications-always. The key is written as Microsoft writes it ('LanMan', capital M). Real GPOs spell the service name several ways, and ADitor matches it regardless of case.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
No GPO requires SMB signing on the server side, so inbound SMB is signed only when the client requires it. ADitor doesn't assume a Windows default here: Microsoft's defaults table gives Enabled for domain controllers but Disabled for member servers and clients, so the default depends on the machine's role.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-07-UNCONSTRAINED-DELEGATION No accounts other than domain controllers have unconstrained delegation
HIGHFailstage: not startedread from the directoryPilot first
A computer with unconstrained delegation keeps the tickets of everyone who connects to it, admins included, so taking it over can mean taking over the domain.
Found: 1 listed: APPSRV01$Target: none
Next: fix the 1 listed on the card.
IN STAGES: changing delegation can break the services that depend on it. Find out what each listed account delegates to before changing it, and change one at a time.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
For each listed account, switch to constrained delegation or resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD) for only the services it needs, then turn off 'Trust this computer/user for delegation to any service'.
How to roll it out safely
More notes (2)
Only writable domain controllers are excluded. Read-only domain controllers don't carry this flag by design, so one that has it is listed, as is any user account, whatever its primary group.
Disabled accounts are listed and marked: re-enabling one brings the exposure back.
Evidence and technical detail
Directory check
unconstrained-delegation
Scope
domain-root
Check type
directory-state
Expected (baseline)
Expected
nothing found by the directory query
Where the rule comes from
Devore Part 7: accounts trusted for delegation to any service (userAccountControl TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, 0x80000) should be moved to constrained or resource-based constrained delegation. Writable domain controllers carry this flag by design and are excluded, recognised by their account type (a computer account with SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT, 0x2000), not by primary group.
DEVORE-06-LLMNR-DISABLE Turn off LLMNR (multicast name resolution)
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedLow risk
Found:0 in Sample Workstation LLMNR GPOTarget: exactly 0Applies to: 40 of 50 computers
✓ Done on 40 of 50 computers: OU=Workstations,DC=test,DC=local (40).
✗ Not yet on 10: OU=Servers,DC=test,DC=local (8), OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (2). What that leaves open: On the local network, an attacker can answer LLMNR name lookups (for example with Responder) and collect password hashes. Link the GPO there too, or to a container above them.
Next: apply the same setting to the 10 computers it doesn't reach yet.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client > 'Turn off multicast name resolution' = Enabled (writes EnableMulticast = 0).
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 0. Low risk: apply it through a GPO, and check a few machines afterwards.
More notes (1)
Devore gives the value explicitly. Turning LLMNR off removes one of the ways Responder-style adversary-in-the-middle attacks work.
Sample Workstation LLMNR GPO CN={44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from Registry.pol
administrative template (policy)
no
OU=Workstations,DC=test,DC=local
Scan notes
Group Policy sets this on 40 of 50 computers. The other 10 get no value from it, so they aren't configured. Not reached: OU=Servers,DC=test,DC=local (8), OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (2).
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows which clients still use NTLM against this system, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit Incoming NTLM Traffic' = 'Enable auditing for domain accounts' (or 'for all accounts').
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (5)
MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means some auditing is on, and 0 fails as auditing turned off. Microsoft lists the options but not their numbers, so whether it audits domain accounts or all accounts is shown in the evidence, not judged. Read the value found if you need to know.
INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Disable' is stored as 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Disable'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
WATCH OUT: some third-party write-ups mix up the Audit* and Restrict* values and say 2 here means 'deny all'. It doesn't. Microsoft says this audit policy doesn't block any traffic. Blocking is DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INCOMING, which isn't checked yet because no source gives its value.
Rollout state 'enforced' here means the audit policy is fully set up, not that NTLM is blocked. Blocking is covered by the DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-* checks.
Logs events 8002 and 8003 in Microsoft/Windows/NTLM/Operational.
Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit incoming NTLM traffic' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-audit-incoming-ntlm-traffic), lists the options (Disable / Enable auditing for domain accounts / Enable auditing for all accounts), says 'Not defined' is the same as Disable and audits nothing, and says the policy doesn't block any traffic. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Disable is stored as the numeric 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft says unset and Disable are the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact level is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the level would be mislabelled, but Disable still couldn't pass.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
Incoming NTLM auditing isn't set up, so there's no record of which clients still use NTLM against this system. Microsoft says 'Not defined' is the same as Disable, which audits no NTLM traffic.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-INDOMAIN Audit NTLM authentication in this domain (domain controllers)
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows NTLM use across the domain from the domain controllers, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain' = 'Enable all', in a GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (5)
MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means some in-domain auditing is on, and 0 fails as auditing turned off. The policy has five options (Disable and four Enable scopes) and Microsoft doesn't publish their numbers, so which one is set is shown in the evidence, not judged. 'Enable all' is the one that records everything.
INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Disable' is stored as 0 and the four Enable options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Disable'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
WATCH OUT: this is an audit policy. Microsoft says it doesn't block any traffic; the deny options belong to DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INDOMAIN, which isn't checked yet. No value of this setting blocks NTLM.
Rollout state 'enforced' here means this audit policy's target is met, not that in-domain NTLM is blocked. Blocking is covered by DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INDOMAIN.
Logs events 8004, 8005 and 8006.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain
Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-audit-ntlm-authentication-in-this-domain), lists five options (Disable / Enable for domain accounts to domain servers / Enable for domain accounts / Enable for domain servers / Enable all), says Disable logs no events for incoming NTLM traffic, gives 'Not defined' as the default for every server type, and says the policy doesn't block traffic. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Disable is stored as the numeric 0 and the four Enable options as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft treats unset and Disable as the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact option is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the option would be mislabelled, but Disable still couldn't pass. With five options the level matters more here than for the other audit checks: only 'Enable all' records everything.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
In-domain NTLM auditing isn't set up on the domain controllers, so there's no record of NTLM use across the domain. Microsoft gives 'Not defined' as the default for every server type, and Disable logs no events.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-OUTGOING Audit outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers
MEDIUMFailstage: not startedno GPO sets thisSafe: logging only
Shows which systems still send NTLM to other servers, which you need to know before restricting it.
Found: no GPO sets thisTarget: at least 1
Next: set it to 1.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers' = 'Audit all' during the audit phase.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 1. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (4)
MINIMUM, NOT EXACT LEVEL: 1 or higher means outgoing NTLM is at least logged, and Allow all (0) fails. Which level is set (Audit all or Deny all) is shown in the evidence, not judged, because Microsoft doesn't publish the numbers.
INFERRED, NOT CITED: Microsoft doesn't publish that 'Allow all' is stored as 0 and the other options as 1 or higher. ADitor infers it from Microsoft's statement that the unset policy behaves as 'Allow all'. 'Where the value comes from' explains why checking only a minimum is safe on that basis; the exact level is never judged.
One value controls both auditing and blocking of outgoing NTLM; see DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-OUTGOING, which isn't checked yet because no source gives the number for Deny all. A pass here means at least audited. It doesn't mean outgoing NTLM is blocked.
Rollout state 'enforced' here means this audit check's target is met, not that outgoing NTLM is denied.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers
Devore Part 8 gives the registry path. CITED: Microsoft, 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers' (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-restrict-ntlm-outgoing-ntlm-traffic-to-remote-servers), lists the options (Allow all / Audit all / Deny all) and says 'Not defined' is the same as Allow all. INFERRED, not printed by Microsoft: that Allow all is stored as the numeric 0 and the other two as 1 or higher. WHY THE INFERENCE IS SAFE: an unset REG_DWORD reads as 0, and Microsoft says unset and Allow all are the same. So the check is '1 or higher', and the exact level is shown as evidence, not judged. If the inference were wrong, the level would be mislabelled, but Allow all still couldn't pass. A minimum can't tell Audit all from Deny all, so a pass here means 'at least audited', never 'blocked'. Blocking uses the same value and is DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-OUTGOING, which isn't checked yet because it needs the exact number for Deny all.
Found (this scan)
No value found — no GPO sets this.
Scan notes
Outgoing NTLM is neither audited nor restricted, so there's no record of outbound NTLM use, which you need before you can block it. Microsoft says 'Not defined' is the same as Allow all: the device allows all NTLM authentication requests.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
The scan couldn't settle these. They are not passes.
Unknown (5)
The scan couldn't confirm these settings. Treat them as unconfirmed, not as passes. A GPO couldn't be read, a directory query failed, or the setting is normally made directly in the registry, where Group Policy can't show it. Each card says which, and how to check.
DEVORE-03-LDAP-SERVER-SIGNING Domain controller LDAP server signing
HIGHUnknownstage: enforcedCan lock people out
Unsigned LDAP binds can be intercepted and relayed to a domain controller, letting an attacker act as the user who signed in.
Found:2 in Sample Override GPOTarget: exactly 2 (step 1: exactly 1)Applies to: 2 of 2 domain controllers
Why this is unknown — this is not a pass
The GPOs that were read meet the target, but a GPO that applies here couldn't be read and could set a weaker value. Fix the read failure and scan again.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
The GPOs that were read pass, but 1 GPO(s) that apply here couldn't be read, and any of them could set a weaker value that wins. Reported as unknown until they can be read.
Next: fix the read failure above, then scan again.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Domain controller: LDAP signing requirements' = 'Require signing', in a GPO linked to the Domain Controllers OU. Before you do, check that event 2889 shows no unsigned binds.
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 1 first. Signing is negotiated, not required. This is the Windows default, so on its own it changes nothing; the audit comes from LDAP diagnostic logging and event 2889 (DEVORE-03-LDAP-DIAG-LOGGING).
Step 2: only then set it to 2. Don't skip step 1: enforcing before every device and service account is ready can cause sign-in failures and account lockouts.
More notes (1)
A load balancer that terminates or bridges TLS forwards unsigned traffic, and shows up in event 2889 as the client IP.
DEVORE-04-KDC-DEFAULTDOMAINSUPPORTEDENCTYPES Disable RC4 at the domain level on domain controllers
HIGHUnknownnot confirmed by this scanCan lock people out
While domain controllers still issue RC4 tickets, any account with an SPN is easier to crack offline (Kerberoasting).
Microsoft already changed this default: 14 April 2026. Domain controllers with the Kerberos updates treat accounts with no encryption-type setting as AES only (0x18). From July 2026 the rollback setting is gone. Microsoft
Found: not confirmed by this scanTarget: AES only, no RC4 or DES, for example 56
Why this is unknown — this is not a pass
Group Policy doesn't show this setting's value, so the scan can't confirm it either way. Use the check below to settle it.
No GPO sets the KDC default. Devore creates this value directly on the domain controllers, which leaves nothing in Group Policy, so its absence here doesn't mean RC4 is still allowed domain-wide. This scan reads Group Policy only and can't tell either way.
Reported as 'unknown', not as a failure. This control's documented remediation is a direct registry write on the domain controllers, which leaves no trace in Group Policy at all, so the key appearing in no GPO is NOT evidence that the value is unset. This scan reads Group Policy and not the machines, so it cannot see the live value either way and issues no verdict. Check it on each domain controller with: reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\KDC" /v "DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes"
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Next: check it by hand; the card gives the command.
Before enforcing, check: 4768 Ticket Encryption Type = RC4 identifies the accounts and devices that still depend on RC4.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
On domain controllers, set DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes to 0x38. Do it last, after each service account has AES. Devore creates the value directly on the DCs; a GPO registry preference with the same value works the same way, and it's the only form this scan can see.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 56. This can lock people out. Apply it to a pilot group first and read the warnings below.
More notes (2)
Devore warns that switching everything at once is 'too aggressive for most'. Make this the last step, after fixing individual accounts, not the first.
NOT SET THROUGH GROUP POLICY: the documented fix creates the value on the domain controllers, so its absence from Group Policy proves nothing. Where no GPO sets it, the result is 'unknown', not 'fail', and the finding includes the reg query command to check it on the DCs. Where a GPO does set it, for example as a registry preference, it's checked normally.
Devore Part 4 gives 0x38 (56 decimal), citing KB5021131. ADitor accepts any AES-only value, not just 0x38: an AES bit (0x8 or 0x10) set and no DES or RC4 bit (0x1, 0x2, 0x4). So 0x18 (AES128 and AES256 without the AES session-key bit) passes too, while anything that includes RC4, such as 0x3C, fails.
Makes Windows clients sign their LDAP traffic, so it can't be altered or relayed in transit.
Found: not confirmed by this scanTarget: at least 2 (step 1: at least 1)
Why this is unknown
1 of 4 GPO(s) could not be read, so it is unproven that no GPO sets this key; the documented Windows default was not applied
Next: fix the read failure above, then scan again.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: LDAP client signing requirements' = 'Require signing'. Windows already negotiates signing without a GPO, so setting 'Negotiate signing' explicitly only documents the default; it doesn't harden anything.
How to roll it out safely
Step 1: set it to 1 first. Clients ask for signing wherever the server supports it. This is the Windows default, so nothing breaks.
Step 2: only then set it to 2. Low risk, but check a few machines after step 1 first.
The catalog doesn't say what to check before enforcing. Treat that as a catalog gap, and pilot it first.
More notes (2)
Because Windows defaults to Negotiate (1), Windows SASL binds keep working when DCs start requiring signing, unless a GPO has lowered this to 0.
OS DEFAULT, NOT ENFORCED: where no GPO sets this, the result rests on the documented Windows default and is marked 'source: os-default'. That's a pass at the Negotiate step, not proof that nothing will set it to 0 later.
Devore Part 3 gives the values 0/1/2 (None / Negotiate signing / Require signing). Microsoft documents the default as 'Negotiate signing' for domain controllers, member servers and client computers, in the Default values table of 'Network security: LDAP client signing requirements': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-ldap-client-signing-requirements
Found (this scan)
No GPO that could be read sets this key, and the scan could not read every GPO, so the documented default 1 was not applied: one or more GPOs could not be read, so 'no GPO sets this key' is unproven and the default cannot be assumed effective
Scan notes
No GPO that could be read sets this key, but 1 of 4 GPO(s) could not be read at all, so 'nothing sets this key' is unproven. The documented Windows default (1) is therefore NOT applied: an unreadable GPO could set this value to anything, including a value below the default. Reported as unknown rather than a pass: fix the read failures and scan again.
Could not evaluate: 1 of 4 GPO(s) could not be read, so it is unproven that no GPO sets this key; the documented Windows default was not applied. Reported as unknown rather than a pass or a fail.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
DEVORE-08-PRINT-RPCNAMEDPIPE Print Spooler: no NTLM fallback on named pipes
LOWUnknownnot confirmed by this scanPilot first
Stops the print spooler's named-pipe listener falling back to weaker NTLM authentication.
Found: not confirmed by this scanTarget: exactly 2
Why this is unknown — this is not a pass
Group Policy doesn't show this setting's value, so the scan can't confirm it either way. Use the check below to settle it.
No GPO sets this value. That's correct if the print spooler uses RPC over TCP, which this scan can't see, so it's reported as unknown. Check how the spooler's RPC listener is configured; if named pipes are in use, set this value to 2.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Next: check it by hand; the card gives the command.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
Prefer RPC over TCP. Where named pipes have to stay, set 'Configure RPC connection settings' / RpcNamedPipeAuthentication = 2 so the named-pipe listener doesn't fall back to unauthenticated NTLM.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 2. This can break some devices or apps. Link it to a small pilot OU first, and widen it once nothing breaks.
More notes (1)
Devore gives the value explicitly. Other NTLM fallback sources (RPC EPM, TryIPSPN, Kerberos LogLevel, MS-CHAPv2, DFS referrals) are named in the post without values.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Printers\Configure RPC connection/listener settings (prefer RPC over TCP)
INFORMATIONALUnknownnot confirmed by this scanSafe: logging only
Records which clients still make unsigned LDAP binds, so you know what would break before you require signing.
Found: not confirmed by this scanTarget: at least 2
Why this is unknown — this is not a pass
Group Policy doesn't show this setting's value, so the scan can't confirm it either way. Use the check below to settle it.
No GPO sets the diagnostic level. Devore sets it with a registry write on each domain controller, which leaves nothing in Group Policy, so its absence here doesn't mean the level is 0 or that 2889 events aren't being logged. This scan reads Group Policy only and can't tell either way.
Reported as 'unknown', not as a failure. This control's documented remediation is a direct registry write on the domain controllers, which leaves no trace in Group Policy at all, so the key appearing in no GPO is NOT evidence that the value is unset. This scan reads Group Policy and not the machines, so it cannot see the live value either way and issues no verdict. Check it on each domain controller with: reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Diagnostics" /v "16 LDAP Interface Events"
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
Next: check it by hand; the card gives the command.
How to fix it, step by step
Remediation
On domain controllers, set the '16 LDAP Interface Events' diagnostic level to 2 or higher while you collect unsigned-bind evidence. Devore does this with a registry write on each DC: reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Diagnostics" /v "16 LDAP Interface Events" /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f. A GPO registry preference with the same value works the same way, and it's the only form this scan can see.
How to roll it out safely
Set it to 2. This only turns on logging, so it's safe to apply everywhere at once.
More notes (4)
NOT SET THROUGH GROUP POLICY: the documented fix writes the registry directly on each domain controller, so this scan can't confirm the level. Where no GPO sets it, the result is 'unknown', not 'fail', and the finding includes the reg query command to check it on the DCs.
This turns on logging; it doesn't harden anything by itself. It produces events 2889 (client IP, account, bind type), 2887 (daily unsigned count) and 2888 (binds rejected once signing is required).
Left on permanently it's noisy, so it's usually raised only for the audit period.
Levels run 0-5, more verbose as they rise (Microsoft, 'AD and LDS diagnostic event logging'; default 0). A level above 2 logs more, including the 2889 events, so it passes. The minimum is 2; it doesn't have to be exactly 2.
Devore Part 3 gives 2. ADitor accepts 2 or higher, not exactly 2: Microsoft documents the NTDS diagnostic levels as 0-5, more verbose as they rise (default 0), in 'How to configure Active Directory and LDS diagnostic event logging': https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/active-directory/configure-ad-and-lds-event-logging. A DC at 3 logs everything a DC at 2 does, including the 2889 events this check is for, so it isn't a failure.
Two or more GPOs set the same setting to different values, and this scan doesn't work out which one wins. Check the value a machine actually gets with gpresult /h report.html before changing any of them. These findings also appear in their own section.
HIGHFailstage: not startedCONFLICTCan lock people out
NTLMv1 and LM responses can be cracked or relayed quickly, so anyone who captures one can sign in as that user.
Microsoft changes this default: October 2026. Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 switch BlockNtlmv1SSO to enforce by default, blocking NTLMv1 credentials for signed-in users (unless Credential Guard is on). Microsoft
Found:1 in Sample Workstation Baseline GPO; 5 in Sample Override GPOTarget: at least 5 (step 1: at least 3)Applies to: 50 of 50 computers
Conflict — enforced-override
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Precedence is unresolved. Confirm the effective value with gpresult /h or the Group Policy Results (RSoP) wizard on a representative machine before changing or trusting any of these settings.
This scan reads Group Policy, not event logs. To see which machines and accounts would break, run aditor-cli ntlm-script > export.ps1, list your domain controllers and servers in it, run it (read-only; Event Log Readers is enough), then scan again with --ntlm-evidence ntlmv1-evidence.csv.
Evidence and technical detail
Policy
Network security: LAN Manager authentication level
Devore Part 1 lists levels 0-5 and what each means (3 = Send NTLMv2 response only; 5 = Refuse LM & NTLM).
Found (this scan)
Value found
Type
Rollout step
Set by GPO
Delivered by
Enforced link / link path
1
REG_DWORD
not started
Sample Workstation Baseline GPO CN={11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]
security template (policy)
no
DC=test,DC=local
5
REG_DWORD
enforced
Sample Override GPO CN={22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local read from GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]
security template (policy)
yes
OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local(enforced)
Scan notes
Precedence is not resolved (v1): every GPO that sets this key is listed. Check the conflict field before treating a single GPO's value as effective.
1 GPO(s) could not be read and were not searched for this key: CN={33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=test,DC=local
2 GPOs set this key to different values, linked to different parts of the domain: Sample Workstation Baseline GPO = 1 on DC=test,DC=local; Sample Override GPO = 5 on OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=local (enforced). The enforced value wins only under its own link; machines elsewhere get the other value. Check with gpresult on a machine from each part.
Settings this scan doesn't check yet. They are not passes, and there is nothing to change from this report.
Not checked yet — no target value (4)
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value to check these against, and this tool doesn't guess, so they were not checked and are not passes. Each row expands to its guidance.
DEVORE-04-KERB-CONFIGURE-ENCTYPESConfigure encryption types allowed for Kerberos (disable RC4 on devices)
HIGHNOT CHECKED — NOT A PASS
Not checked — this is not a pass
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value for this setting, and this tool doesn't guess one, so its state is unknown. It can be checked once a target value is sourced, for example from a Microsoft Security Baseline. Reason code: needs_baseline_value.
Devore Part 4 names only the policy and the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute; it gives neither the registry path nor the bitmask. Both need to come from the Microsoft Security Baseline (Security Compliance Toolkit) or the CIS Benchmark before this can be checked.
Excluded from scoring: no verdict is issued rather than a guessed one. Source the exact value from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark to activate this control.
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos'. Enable the AES types. Clear RC4 only after 4768 auditing shows every device advertises AES. Fix service accounts before devices.
How to roll it out safely
Before enforcing, check: Event 4768, Ticket Encryption Type. From the January 2025 cumulative update, 4768 and 4769 also show Advertised Etypes and Available Keys.
More notes (2)
The source doesn't give the registry path, so this isn't checked yet.
Fix service accounts before disabling RC4 on devices.
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value for this setting, and this tool doesn't guess one, so its state is unknown. It can be checked once a target value is sourced, for example from a Microsoft Security Baseline. Reason code: needs_baseline_value.
Devore Part 8 gives the three audit paths but no blocking path or value. MSV1_0\RestrictReceivingNTLMTraffic is the value name usually cited, but it isn't confirmed here and isn't used. The path and the number for 'Deny all domain accounts' need to come from the Microsoft Security Baseline or the CIS Benchmark.
Excluded from scoring: no verdict is issued rather than a guessed one. Source the exact value from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark to activate this control.
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Incoming NTLM traffic' = 'Deny all domain accounts'. Try it on Tier 0 systems and PAWs first.
How to roll it out safely
Before enforcing, check: Events 8002 and 8003 must be clean on the systems in scope before you block.
More notes (2)
The source gives no registry path or value, so this isn't checked yet.
Use 'Deny all domain accounts', not 'Deny all accounts', which breaks loopback and the System account. There are separate policies for server exceptions. Once blocking is on, events 4001-4006 replace 8001-8006.
DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-INDOMAINBlock NTLM authentication in this domain (domain controllers, last step)
HIGHNOT CHECKED — NOT A PASS
Not checked — this is not a pass
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value for this setting, and this tool doesn't guess one, so its state is unknown. It can be checked once a target value is sourced, for example from a Microsoft Security Baseline. Reason code: needs_baseline_value.
Devore Part 8 gives neither the blocking path nor the deny values. Netlogon\Parameters\RestrictNTLMInDomain is the value name usually cited, but it isn't confirmed here and isn't used. The deny options differ by scope, so both the path and the values need to come from a baseline source.
Excluded from scoring: no verdict is issued rather than a guessed one. Source the exact value from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark to activate this control.
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain' = the deny option that fits, on domain controllers, as the very last step of the project.
How to roll it out safely
Before enforcing, check: Events 8004, 8005 and 8006 must be clean across the domain before you block.
More notes (2)
The source gives no path or values, so this isn't checked yet.
The deny options differ by scope. Apply one at the very end, on DCs only.
DEVORE-08-NTLM-BLOCK-OUTGOINGBlock outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers
HIGHNOT CHECKED — NOT A PASS
Not checked — this is not a pass
The published guidance doesn't give an exact value for this setting, and this tool doesn't guess one, so its state is unknown. It can be checked once a target value is sourced, for example from a Microsoft Security Baseline. Reason code: needs_baseline_value.
The value name is known: MSV1_0\RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic, the same one the outgoing audit check (DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-OUTGOING) reads. But no Microsoft or CIS document consulted gives the number that means 'Deny all'. The audit check can still use this value because it only needs a floor (a minimum): the permissive option is 0 and every other option is 1 or higher, which follows from Microsoft's statement that unset means Allow all. Blocking needs the exact number for Deny all, which a minimum can't express ('1 or higher' also matches Audit all), and guessing it would report a domain that only audits as blocking. So the catalog leaves this check's registry key empty, and nothing can report it as checked. It becomes active once the number is sourced from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark.
Excluded from scoring: no verdict is issued rather than a guessed one. Source the exact value from a Microsoft Security Baseline or CIS Benchmark to activate this control.
Remediation
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > 'Network security: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers' = 'Deny all', once the audit phase comes back clean.
How to roll it out safely
Before enforcing, check: Events 8001 and 8002 (outbound NTLM) must be clean on the systems in scope.
More notes (2)
Uses the same value as the outgoing audit check (DEVORE-08-NTLM-AUDIT-OUTGOING), which only checks for 1 or higher ('at least audited'). A pass there doesn't mean outgoing NTLM is blocked. This one isn't checked yet: it needs the Deny all number from a real source.
WATCH OUT: some third-party write-ups mix up the Audit* and Restrict* values and confidently give a number for 'Deny all'. This check waits for a real source so that it doesn't guess.
These meet the baseline. Each row expands to its evidence. If a pass also appears under Conflicts, check it there before relying on it.
DEVORE-04-SPN-ACCOUNTS-AESService accounts with an SPN state AES in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypesstage: enforcedfound none
Expected (baseline)
Expected
nothing found by the directory query
Where the rule comes from
Devore Part 4: service accounts with an SPN should carry the AES bits in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes. AES bits per Microsoft: 0x8 (AES128) and 0x10 (AES256). A blank value makes the account use the domain default, which depends on patch level: before the 2026 Kerberos updates the domain controllers assume 0x27 (RC4 tickets); from April 2026 (enforcement enabled) and July 2026 (automatic) they assume AES only (0x18), per Microsoft's CVE-2026-20833 guidance: https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/topic/how-to-manage-kerberos-kdc-usage-of-rc4-for-service-account-ticket-issuance-changes-related-to-cve-2026-20833-1ebcda33-720a-4da8-93c1-b0496e1910dc. An account that explicitly lists RC4 without AES keeps getting RC4 tickets after those updates.
Found (this scan)
Nothing found — the directory query returned no matching objects that the bind account can read.
DEVORE-07-EMPTY-PRIVILEGED-GROUPSBuilt-in privileged groups that should be empty have no membersstage: enforcedfound none
Expected (baseline)
Expected
nothing found by the directory query
Where the rule comes from
Devore Part 7 lists these built-in groups as ones that should normally have no members. Each group is found by its well-known SID, not its name, so a localized or renamed group is still checked.
Found (this scan)
Nothing found — the directory query returned no matching objects that the bind account can read.
This scan doesn't work out which GPO wins when several set the same setting (policy precedence, RSoP). It reports every GPO that sets it, with its link path, and flags disagreements as conflicts. For a conflict, check the effective value with gpresult /h before acting.
Every target value comes from a cited source, shown on each card under Where the value comes from. Where no source gives a value, the setting is listed under Not covered yet rather than guessed.
These notes apply to several checks, so they are listed here once rather than on each card:
A pass means nothing the bind account can read matched. AD silently leaves out objects and attributes an account isn't allowed to read, so run the scan with an account that can read the whole domain (an ordinary domain user can by default); a domain whose permissions were tightened can hide findings from a weaker account.
-
About this scan
Tool
scan_hardening
Scan engine version
1.1.0
Report format version
1.6.0
Catalog version
2026.10.2
Catalog source
hardening/controls.json
Scan id
0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
Scan timestamp (UTC)
2026-08-19T09:30:00+00:00
Domain
test.local
Base DN
DC=test,DC=local
GPOs scanned
3
Computers scoped
50
GPOs unreadable
1
Controls evaluated
21
Controls scored
17
Read-only scan
yes
Not-applicable findings included
yes
Primary baseline source
Jerry Devore, "Active Directory Hardening Series", Microsoft Core Infrastructure and Security Blog (series verified Aug 2026).
Value policy
Expected values are only carried where the source states them. A control whose exact value the source does not state is present with status 'needs_baseline_value', no expected values, and is excluded from scoring. Values are never inferred or guessed.
Pending value sources
Microsoft Security Baselines (Security Compliance Toolkit) and/or CIS Benchmarks — needed to close the 'needs_baseline_value' controls.
This scan doesn't work out which GPO wins when several set the same setting (policy precedence, RSoP). It reports every GPO that sets it, with its link path, and flags disagreements as conflicts. For a conflict, check the effective value with gpresult /h before acting.
Catalog notes
Check types in this release: gpo-security-template (GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]), gpo-registry-pol (Registry.pol and Preferences Registry.xml) and directory-state. A directory-state control names a fixed, read-only directory query in directory_check and asserts that it finds nothing: none is a pass, any is a fail listing them, and a query that fails is an error. The spec's other directory-state controls (DEVORE-02 SMBv1, which the directory cannot show; DEVORE-08 Protected Users; the rest of DEVORE-07) are not in the catalog yet.
registry_key is the full path including the value name (its last component). For gpo-registry-pol the evaluator splits the last component off to match Registry.pol's separate key/value fields; for gpo-security-template the whole path is one [Registry Values] key.
Rollout is phased, not binary: interim_expected is the audit/negotiate step and final_expected the enforced step, so a domain correctly mid-rollout reports rollout_state 'audit' and result 'pass', not a failure.
os_default records the value Windows uses when no GPO sets the key, and only where a Microsoft document states it. Such a finding is evaluated against the default and marked 'source: os-default', so an assumed value is never mistaken for an enforced one. It is deliberately absent where there is no default to cite — LdapEnforceChannelBinding, for one, has no such key by default (channel binding is off), which is precisely why configuring it matters. Two limitations are deliberate. A finding resting on a default is capped at rollout_state 'audit', because 'enforced' means Group Policy holds the value and nothing enforces a default. And os_default is a single value, so a default that depends on the machine's role cannot be expressed: DEVORE-06-SMB-SERVER-SIGNING-ALWAYS is 'Enabled' by Microsoft's table for domain controllers but 'Disabled' for member servers and clients. Making that expressible would need the evaluator to know which machines a GPO lands on, which a SYSVOL/GPO scan cannot see at all — so those controls carry no default and say why in missing_note, rather than asserting one role's default over the whole domain.
+
About this scan
Tool
scan_hardening
Scan engine version
1.1.0
Report format version
1.6.0
Catalog version
2026.10.2
Catalog source
hardening/controls.json
Scan id
0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
Scan timestamp (UTC)
2026-08-19T09:30:00+00:00
Domain
test.local
Base DN
DC=test,DC=local
GPOs scanned
4
Computers scoped
50
GPOs unreadable
1
Controls evaluated
21
Controls scored
17
Read-only scan
yes
Not-applicable findings included
yes
Primary baseline source
Jerry Devore, "Active Directory Hardening Series", Microsoft Core Infrastructure and Security Blog (series verified Aug 2026).
Value policy
Expected values are only carried where the source states them. A control whose exact value the source does not state is present with status 'needs_baseline_value', no expected values, and is excluded from scoring. Values are never inferred or guessed.
Pending value sources
Microsoft Security Baselines (Security Compliance Toolkit) and/or CIS Benchmarks — needed to close the 'needs_baseline_value' controls.
This scan doesn't work out which GPO wins when several set the same setting (policy precedence, RSoP). It reports every GPO that sets it, with its link path, and flags disagreements as conflicts. For a conflict, check the effective value with gpresult /h before acting.
Catalog notes
Check types in this release: gpo-security-template (GptTmpl.inf [Registry Values]), gpo-registry-pol (Registry.pol and Preferences Registry.xml) and directory-state. A directory-state control names a fixed, read-only directory query in directory_check and asserts that it finds nothing: none is a pass, any is a fail listing them, and a query that fails is an error. The spec's other directory-state controls (DEVORE-02 SMBv1, which the directory cannot show; DEVORE-08 Protected Users; the rest of DEVORE-07) are not in the catalog yet.
registry_key is the full path including the value name (its last component). For gpo-registry-pol the evaluator splits the last component off to match Registry.pol's separate key/value fields; for gpo-security-template the whole path is one [Registry Values] key.
Rollout is phased, not binary: interim_expected is the audit/negotiate step and final_expected the enforced step, so a domain correctly mid-rollout reports rollout_state 'audit' and result 'pass', not a failure.
os_default records the value Windows uses when no GPO sets the key, and only where a Microsoft document states it. Such a finding is evaluated against the default and marked 'source: os-default', so an assumed value is never mistaken for an enforced one. It is deliberately absent where there is no default to cite — LdapEnforceChannelBinding, for one, has no such key by default (channel binding is off), which is precisely why configuring it matters. Two limitations are deliberate. A finding resting on a default is capped at rollout_state 'audit', because 'enforced' means Group Policy holds the value and nothing enforces a default. And os_default is a single value, so a default that depends on the machine's role cannot be expressed: DEVORE-06-SMB-SERVER-SIGNING-ALWAYS is 'Enabled' by Microsoft's table for domain controllers but 'Disabled' for member servers and clients. Making that expressible would need the evaluator to know which machines a GPO lands on, which a SYSVOL/GPO scan cannot see at all — so those controls carry no default and say why in missing_note, rather than asserting one role's default over the whole domain.