diff --git a/src/cmcp_runtime/__init__.py b/src/cmcp_runtime/__init__.py
index 2d96b9f..e9a7dc5 100644
--- a/src/cmcp_runtime/__init__.py
+++ b/src/cmcp_runtime/__init__.py
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 """cMCP Runtime: hardware-attested MCP runtime."""
 
-__version__ = "0.1.0"
+__version__ = "0.3.0"
diff --git a/src/cmcp_runtime/config.py b/src/cmcp_runtime/config.py
index 778dcd7..16c848c 100644
--- a/src/cmcp_runtime/config.py
+++ b/src/cmcp_runtime/config.py
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ class Config:
     attestation: AttestationConfig = field(default_factory=AttestationConfig)
     agent_manifest: AgentManifestConfig = field(default_factory=AgentManifestConfig)
     kill_switch: KillSwitchConfig = field(default_factory=KillSwitchConfig)
-    policy_bundle_path: str = "policy/"
+    policy_bundle_path: str = "policies/"
     catalog_path: str = "catalog.json"
     listen_addr: str = "0.0.0.0:8443"
     max_response_size_bytes: int = 2 * 1024 * 1024  # 2MB
diff --git a/src/cmcp_runtime/mcp/proxy.py b/src/cmcp_runtime/mcp/proxy.py
index 6cefbda..e5610ee 100644
--- a/src/cmcp_runtime/mcp/proxy.py
+++ b/src/cmcp_runtime/mcp/proxy.py
@@ -375,6 +375,12 @@ def _build_cedar_context(
         entry = self._catalog.lookup(tool_name)
         ctx: dict[str, Any] = {
             "tool_name": tool_name,
+            # Cedar resource entity: the backend builds Resource::"<resource>" from
+            # this, so policies can match a tool by name, e.g.
+            #   forbid(principal, action, resource == Resource::"salesforce.contacts");
+            # Without it the resource defaults to Resource::"default" and no
+            # resource-scoped policy can ever match.
+            "resource": tool_name,
             "arguments": _cedar_safe(arguments),
             "server_identity": entry.server.url if entry else "",
             "compliance_domain": entry.compliance_domain if entry else "external",
diff --git a/src/cmcp_runtime/mcp/server.py b/src/cmcp_runtime/mcp/server.py
index 3035f83..cfea7ee 100644
--- a/src/cmcp_runtime/mcp/server.py
+++ b/src/cmcp_runtime/mcp/server.py
@@ -528,7 +528,15 @@ async def _session_close(self, request: Request) -> Response:
         session_id: str = request.path_params["session_id"]
         if session_id != self._session.session_id:
             return JSONResponse(
-                {"error": f"unknown or already closed session_id={session_id}"},
+                {
+                    "error": "session_not_found",
+                    "message": (
+                        f"No open session with id '{session_id}'. It may already be "
+                        "closed, or you passed the _cmcp.session_id label instead of "
+                        "the internal session id. Look up the internal id via "
+                        "GET /audit/export?session_id=<label>."
+                    ),
+                },
                 status_code=404,
             )
 
diff --git a/src/cmcp_runtime/policy/evaluator.py b/src/cmcp_runtime/policy/evaluator.py
index 1d00267..2261229 100644
--- a/src/cmcp_runtime/policy/evaluator.py
+++ b/src/cmcp_runtime/policy/evaluator.py
@@ -219,6 +219,10 @@ def authorize_egress(
         self._maybe_reload()
         context: dict[str, Any] = {
             "tool_name": tool_name,
+            # Same resource entity as ingress (see PolicyProxy._build_cedar_context)
+            # so a resource-scoped permit matches at egress too; without it an
+            # allowed tool response would be denied on the way back.
+            "resource": tool_name,
             "egress": True,
             "sensitivity_level": SENSITIVITY_ORDER.get(session.max_sensitivity, 0),
             "injection_events": len(session.injection_events),
diff --git a/src/cmcp_runtime/tee/detect.py b/src/cmcp_runtime/tee/detect.py
index eeceac3..ad673a2 100644
--- a/src/cmcp_runtime/tee/detect.py
+++ b/src/cmcp_runtime/tee/detect.py
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ def detect_provider(config: Config) -> TEEProvider:
     Detect and return the active TEE provider.
 
     Follows the probe order from docs/spec/attestation.md §1.1:
-      tpm -> sev-snp -> tdx
+      azure-cvm -> tpm -> sev-snp -> tdx
 
     If no hardware provider is found:
     - CMCP_DEV_MODE=1: returns SoftwareOnlyProvider with a WARN log
diff --git a/tests/unit/test_resource_scoped_policy.py b/tests/unit/test_resource_scoped_policy.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7db1e20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/test_resource_scoped_policy.py
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+"""Resource-scoped Cedar policies must actually enforce.
+
+Regression guard: the Cedar backend builds the request resource from the
+`resource` key in the evaluation context. If the proxy/evaluator omit it, the
+resource defaults to Resource::"default" and a policy like
+
+    forbid(principal, action, resource == Resource::"salesforce.contacts");
+
+never matches, so every call silently default-denies (or, in advisory mode,
+forwards). These tests pin the context shape and the end-to-end decision.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from cmcp_runtime.config import AttestationConfig, Config, EnforcementMode
+from cmcp_runtime.errors import PolicyDeny
+from cmcp_runtime.policy.bundle import PolicyBundle, PolicyManifest
+from cmcp_runtime.policy.evaluator import PolicyEvaluator
+from cmcp_runtime.session.state import SessionState
+from tests.unit.test_call_log_integration import _make_catalog, _make_proxy
+
+RESOURCE_POLICY = """
+// Permit calls from the demo-agent workflow.
+permit (principal, action, resource) when { context.workflow_id == "demo-agent" };
+
+// Block one tool by resource name. forbid overrides permit.
+forbid (principal, action, resource == Resource::"salesforce.contacts");
+"""
+
+
+def _bundle(policy_content: str) -> PolicyBundle:
+    return PolicyBundle(
+        manifest=PolicyManifest(
+            version="1.0.0",
+            authored_at="2026-06-10T00:00:00Z",
+            author_identity="test",
+            commit_sha="abc",
+        ),
+        policy_files={"demo.cedar": policy_content},
+        schema_content='{"cMCP": {}}',
+        bundle_hash="sha256:" + "0" * 64,
+    )
+
+
+def _evaluator(mode: EnforcementMode = EnforcementMode.ENFORCING) -> PolicyEvaluator:
+    cfg = Config(attestation=AttestationConfig(enforcement_mode=mode))
+    return PolicyEvaluator(_bundle(RESOURCE_POLICY), cfg)
+
+
+# ── the proxy must put the tool name in the Cedar resource slot ───────────────
+
+
+def test_build_cedar_context_sets_resource_to_tool_name():
+    proxy, _, _ = _make_proxy(catalog=_make_catalog("salesforce.contacts"))
+    ctx = proxy._build_cedar_context("salesforce.contacts", {}, "demo-agent")
+    assert ctx["resource"] == "salesforce.contacts"
+
+
+# ── ingress: resource-scoped forbid actually denies ──────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_resource_forbid_denies_sensitive_tool():
+    ev = _evaluator()
+    ctx = {
+        "tool_name": "salesforce.contacts",
+        "resource": "salesforce.contacts",
+        "session_max_sensitivity": "public",
+        "workflow_id": "demo-agent",
+    }
+    with pytest.raises(PolicyDeny):
+        ev.evaluate(ctx)
+
+
+def test_permitted_tool_is_allowed():
+    ev = _evaluator()
+    decision = ev.evaluate(
+        {
+            "tool_name": "echo",
+            "resource": "echo",
+            "session_max_sensitivity": "public",
+            "workflow_id": "demo-agent",
+        }
+    )
+    assert decision.allowed is True
+    assert decision.would_have_denied is False
+
+
+def test_wrong_workflow_is_denied():
+    ev = _evaluator()
+    with pytest.raises(PolicyDeny):
+        ev.evaluate(
+            {
+                "tool_name": "echo",
+                "resource": "echo",
+                "session_max_sensitivity": "public",
+                "workflow_id": "stranger",
+            }
+        )
+
+
+# ── egress: the allowed tool's response must not be denied on the way back ────
+
+
+def test_egress_allows_permitted_tool():
+    ev = _evaluator()
+    session = SessionState(session_id="sess-egress")
+    decision = ev.authorize_egress("echo", b"{}", session, workflow_id="demo-agent")
+    assert decision.allowed is True
+    assert decision.would_have_denied is False
+
+
+def test_egress_denies_forbidden_resource():
+    ev = _evaluator()
+    session = SessionState(session_id="sess-egress")
+    with pytest.raises(PolicyDeny):
+        ev.authorize_egress(
+            "salesforce.contacts", b"{}", session, workflow_id="demo-agent"
+        )