diff --git a/.deployment-state.json b/.deployment-state.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d7d72c..0000000
--- a/.deployment-state.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "activeColor": "green",
-  "lastSwitch": 1779951788037,
-  "previousColor": "blue"
-}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/data/webhook-dlq.db b/data/webhook-dlq.db
index 543411b..ec60a53 100644
Binary files a/data/webhook-dlq.db and b/data/webhook-dlq.db differ
diff --git a/docs/request-limits-implementation.md b/docs/request-limits-implementation.md
index cba4261..4aa695e 100644
--- a/docs/request-limits-implementation.md
+++ b/docs/request-limits-implementation.md
@@ -50,6 +50,67 @@ ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPES=application/json
 REQUEST_LIMITS_EXCLUDE_PATHS=/health,/metrics
 ```
 
+### Rate Limiting (RFC 6585)
+
+Rate limiting is enforced by the `src/middleware/rateLimiter.ts` middleware, which returns RFC 6585 compliant 429 Too Many Requests responses.
+
+#### 429 Response Format
+
+All 429 responses include:
+- **HTTP Status**: 429 Too Many Requests
+- **Retry-After Header**: Seconds to wait before retrying (required by RFC 6585)
+- **X-RateLimit-* Headers**: Current rate limit state
+  - `X-RateLimit-Limit`: Maximum requests allowed in the window
+  - `X-RateLimit-Remaining`: Requests remaining in current window
+  - `X-RateLimit-Reset`: Seconds until window resets
+  - `X-RateLimit-Blocked`: `true` if client is hard-blocked (abuse detected)
+
+#### Response Body (Safe Error Contract)
+
+```json
+{
+  "error": {
+    "code": "rate_limited",
+    "message": "Too many requests — please try again later",
+    "requestId": "unique-correlation-id"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Security Notes:**
+- Error messages follow the safe-error policy (`src/errors/safeErrors.ts`)
+- No internal state or implementation details are leaked
+- Messages are consistent regardless of block reason (rate limit vs. abuse)
+- `requestId` allows clients to correlate with server logs
+
+#### Client Backoff Guidance
+
+Clients encountering 429 responses should:
+1. **Check the `Retry-After` header** for the recommended wait time (in seconds)
+2. **Respect exponential backoff**: Each successive violation doubles the block duration
+3. **Monitor `X-RateLimit-Remaining`** on successful requests to pace load
+4. **Read `X-RateLimit-Reset`** to understand when the window resets
+
+Example client retry logic:
+```javascript
+async function makeRequestWithBackoff(url, options = {}) {
+  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++) {
+    const response = await fetch(url, options);
+    
+    if (response.status === 429) {
+      const retryAfter = response.headers.get('Retry-After');
+      const waitMs = (parseInt(retryAfter, 10) || 60) * 1000;
+      console.log(`Rate limited. Waiting ${waitMs}ms before retry...`);
+      await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, waitMs));
+      continue;
+    }
+    
+    return response;
+  }
+  throw new Error('Rate limited after 3 attempts');
+}
+```
+
 ### Error Responses
 
 All errors use the standard application error format:
@@ -71,6 +132,8 @@ All errors use the standard application error format:
 - Integration tests: Full application testing
 - Environment configuration tests
 - Error handling validation
+- Rate limit header verification
+- Safe-error contract assertion
 
 ### Running Tests
 ```bash
@@ -81,13 +144,15 @@ npm run test:watch
 ### Specific Test Files
 - `src/middleware/__tests__/requestLimits.test.ts` - Unit tests
 - `src/requestLimits.integration.test.ts` - Integration tests
+- `src/rateLimit.integration.test.ts` - Rate limiting integration tests
 
 ## Security Benefits
 
 1. **DoS Prevention**: Limits request size to prevent memory exhaustion
 2. **Content-Type Security**: Prevents parsing vulnerabilities
-3. **Standardized Errors**: Consistent error handling prevents information leakage
-4. **Configurable**: Environment-driven settings for different deployment needs
+3. **Rate Limiting**: Protects against abuse and brute-force attacks
+4. **Standardized Errors**: Consistent error handling prevents information leakage (RFC 6585)
+5. **Configurable**: Environment-driven settings for different deployment needs
 
 ## Performance Impact
 
@@ -95,13 +160,15 @@ npm run test:watch
 - Early rejection of invalid requests
 - No request body buffering
 - Efficient string comparisons
+- In-process rate limit store (no Redis dependency required)
 
 ## Migration Guide
 
 ### For Existing Applications
 1. No breaking changes for valid requests
 2. Invalid requests will now be rejected with proper error codes
-3. Configure environment variables as needed
+3. Rate-limited requests return RFC 6585 compliant 429 responses
+4. Configure environment variables as needed
 
 ### Recommended Settings
 - **Development**: Default settings (1MB, JSON-only)
@@ -113,13 +180,16 @@ npm run test:watch
 ### Key Metrics to Monitor
 - Rate of 413 errors (payload too large)
 - Rate of 415 errors (unsupported media type)
+- Rate of 429 errors (rate limited)
 - Average request size
 - Request size distribution
+- Number of hard-blocked clients
 
 ### Alerting
 - High error rates may indicate attacks
 - Monitor for abuse patterns
 - Track geographic distribution of violations
+- Alert on sustained 429 response rates
 
 ## Troubleshooting
 
@@ -130,15 +200,22 @@ npm run test:watch
    - Verify content-type configuration
    - Consider path exclusions if needed
 
-2. **Integration issues**
+2. **Clients receiving 429 responses**
+   - Verify client is respecting `Retry-After` header
+   - Check `X-RateLimit-Remaining` to understand budget
+   - Review abuse patterns in logs
+
+3. **Integration issues**
    - Ensure clients send proper Content-Type headers
    - Verify request sizes are within limits
    - Check environment variable configuration
+   - Verify `requestId` correlation in logs
 
 ### Debugging
 - Enable debug logging
-- Monitor error responses
+- Monitor error responses and headers
 - Test with different request sizes and content-types
+- Simulate rate limit scenarios with load testing
 
 ## Future Considerations
 
@@ -146,3 +223,4 @@ npm run test:watch
 2. **Rate Limiting Integration**: Combined validation
 3. **Advanced Content-Type**: Schema validation
 4. **Machine Learning**: Adaptive limit adjustment
+5. **Distributed Rate Limiting**: Redis-backed store for multi-replica deployments
diff --git a/src/middleware/rateLimiter.ts b/src/middleware/rateLimiter.ts
index f917215..06cf4a5 100644
--- a/src/middleware/rateLimiter.ts
+++ b/src/middleware/rateLimiter.ts
@@ -6,10 +6,18 @@
  * ## Algorithm
  * Uses a **sliding-window counter** per key (default: client IP).
  * When a key exceeds `maxRequests` within `windowMs`:
- *   1. A 429 response is returned immediately.
+ *   1. A 429 Too Many Requests response is returned immediately.
  *   2. The abuse guard checks whether the violation count itself exceeds
  *      `abuseThreshold`. If so, the key is **hard-blocked** for `blockDurationMs`.
  *
+ * ## RFC 6585 Compliance
+ * All 429 responses include:
+ * - **HTTP Status**: 429 Too Many Requests
+ * - **Retry-After Header**: Seconds until the rate limit resets or block expires
+ * - **X-RateLimit-* Headers**: Current state (Limit, Remaining, Reset)
+ * - **Safe Error Body**: Conforms to the error contract in src/errors/safeErrors.ts
+ *   to prevent information disclosure via error messages.
+ *
  * ## Adaptive throttling
  * The abuse guard doubles the block duration on every successive violation
  * (exponential back-off), up to `maxBlockDurationMs`.
@@ -23,6 +31,7 @@
  * - Keys are hashed in the store — raw IPs are never persisted.
  * - All timing operations use `Date.now()` (monotonic in V8 ≥ Node 16).
  * - Blocked responses include `Retry-After` to aid legitimate clients.
+ * - Error messages are sanitized per the safe-error policy (CWE-209).
  * - Headers expose only aggregate counts, never raw keys.
  *
  * @example
@@ -36,6 +45,7 @@
 
 import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
 import { RateLimitStore } from '../lib/rateLimitStore';
+import { sanitizeErrorMessage } from '../errors/safeErrors';
 
 
 export interface RateLimiterConfig {
@@ -147,12 +157,16 @@ export function createRateLimiter(config: RateLimiterConfig = {}) {
           res.setHeader('X-RateLimit-Blocked', 'true');
         }
         const requestId = typeof res.locals.requestId === 'string' ? res.locals.requestId : 'unknown';
+        const code = 'rate_limited';
+        const safeMessage = sanitizeErrorMessage(
+          'Too many requests — please try again later',
+          code,
+        );
         res.status(429).json({
           error: {
-            code: 'rate_limited',
-            message: 'Your access has been temporarily blocked due to excessive requests.',
+            code,
+            message: safeMessage,
             requestId,
-            retryAfter: retryAfterSec,
           },
         });
         return;
@@ -222,12 +236,16 @@ export function createRateLimiter(config: RateLimiterConfig = {}) {
           res.setHeader('X-RateLimit-Blocked', 'true');
         }
         const requestId = typeof res.locals.requestId === 'string' ? res.locals.requestId : 'unknown';
+        const code = 'rate_limited';
+        const safeMessage = sanitizeErrorMessage(
+          'Too many requests — please try again later',
+          code,
+        );
         res.status(429).json({
           error: {
-            code: 'rate_limited',
-            message: 'Abuse detected. Your access has been temporarily blocked.',
+            code,
+            message: safeMessage,
             requestId,
-            retryAfter: retryAfterSec,
           },
         });
         return;
@@ -237,12 +255,16 @@ export function createRateLimiter(config: RateLimiterConfig = {}) {
 
       if (sendHeaders) res.setHeader('Retry-After', resetSec);
       const requestId = typeof res.locals.requestId === 'string' ? res.locals.requestId : 'unknown';
+      const code = 'rate_limited';
+      const safeMessage = sanitizeErrorMessage(
+        'Too many requests — please try again later',
+        code,
+      );
       res.status(429).json({
         error: {
-          code: 'rate_limited',
-          message: `Rate limit exceeded. Try again in ${resetSec} second(s).`,
+          code,
+          message: safeMessage,
           requestId,
-          retryAfter: resetSec,
         },
       });
       return;
diff --git a/talenttrust.db b/talenttrust.db
index 5f1bc78..206530c 100644
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