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SVR

SVR launched on 9 November 2026. Its only address is 0xc79298521Ae84e7a43d20E71A2B2A1BB540E889B on Arc mainnet. The bond token on Arc testnet carries the same name, but it is a faucet ERC-20 that anyone can mint.

SVR is the bond and fee token of the Sigvara protocol. Operators bond it to activate agents, and slashing an agent's bond burns most of it. Oracle operators post it as a performance bond, which a slash sends to the slash beneficiary rather than burning. Scoring epochs will be charged in it once the epoch-fee module is deployed.

This page is the canonical description. Anything about SVR that does not appear here and on sigvara.xyz first is not from this project.

Contract

Item Value
Network Arc mainnet, chain ID 5042
Address 0xc79298521Ae84e7a43d20E71A2B2A1BB540E889B
Symbol / name SVR / Sigvara
Supply 1,000,000,000, fixed at creation
Decimals 18
Owner / mint / pause none
Launch venue Tolly on Arc (pad 0xcad7ee36ac193bf2eddb7b3e2736c5bdb8269c8b), Uniswap V3 pool, 1% tier, USDC quote
Liquidity Whole supply seeded single-sided at launch; LP NFT held by Tolly's ownerless, collect-only fee locker 0xe20e4297759597da75c8998ee76ec900600ad920 (no withdraw path in code)
Pool 0xa9Be080545C6d61529c27294512bDb3Bde67A735, created in the launch transaction 0x67ac918f…d749 (block 30269650, sent by the deployer to the pad); the LP NFT is #59419, held by the fee locker
Chart DexScreener, a third-party chart of the pool above. Its token info (icon, links, description) was submitted by the team on 12 November 2026

The token contract is Tolly's TollyToken, a plain OpenZeppelin ERC-20 with public source (TollyLabs/v3-contracts). It has no owner, no mint, no pause, no blacklist and no transfer tax; its one deviation is an anti-snipe cap of 3% of supply per wallet for the first 300 seconds after launch, after which it is a vanilla ERC-20. That is exactly what the protocol contracts need from a bond asset: SigvaraStaking, SigvaraOracleBond and SigvaraEpochFees take the token by address at initialization and treat it as a plain IERC20.

Addresses

Role Address
Deployer / creator 0x8857A7C392d1Bb1A68647c64Ce18D9AA1Fd023b0
Treasury 0xBc6acE041434368dBD20a092425F6008bCFe50d4, a 48-hour timelock the admin Safe drives, deployed by the deployer on 9 November 2026 in 0x8650c34f…faaa
Admin Safe 0x6ba985D721925357DBf0Fa1E45037CFC3C245983, 2 of 3, created through Safe's factory on 9 November 2026 in 0xb5653334…f37b. The deployer is not an owner

The SVR launch transaction was sent from the deployer address above, and the Arc mainnet registry deployment will be too. A token or mainnet contract attributed to Sigvara that was not created by that address is not ours. Arc testnet is deployed from a separate address (see deploy-testnet.md) so that a testnet key never touches anything with value. The treasury address holds protocol-owned SVR and the USDC from monthly fee claims, and nothing else. The SVR pays only the costs listed under treasury policy, and the USDC is not spent until a buyback schedule is published there. The admin Safe schedules every payment from it, and a payment executes 48 hours later at the earliest, so each one is public two days before it happens (ADR 0005, decision 13). Until 8 November 2026 this table listed 0xeDC966e23318782c0241aBe1790bd221b8aCE867 as the treasury. That is a single key, it is not the treasury, and nothing should be sent to it.

Distribution

There is no team allocation, no treasury allocation, no vesting and no sale. The full supply enters the pool at launch and the only way to hold SVR is to buy it there or earn it through the protocol.

The team's position is whatever it buys on the open market, starting at the opening price. Every acquisition is published here: amount, transaction, the address that holds it, and which of the five permitted purposes below it is held against. Launch-day buys are published the same day. There are no wallets holding SVR for the protocol that are not listed on this page.

The anti-snipe cap limits any single wallet to 3% of supply for the first 300 seconds. The team does not split buys across wallets to work around it. A position larger than that cap is accumulated afterwards, on the open market, disclosed as it is bought.

Team acquisitions

Date (UTC) SVR Paid Transaction Held by Held for
9 November 2026, 01:20:37 22,283,004.212403886 115 USDC, the first buy in the launch transaction, at the opening price 0x67ac918f…d749 The deployer, 0x8857A7C392d1Bb1A68647c64Ce18D9AA1Fd023b0 5,000,000 for the two oracle operator bonds (2,500,000 each, primary and checker). The other 17,283,004.212403886 is treasury inventory, locked until 9 May 2027 (below)
12 November 2026, 13:47:54 1,021,584.286701452 5.859458 USDC, including a 0.85% swap-route fee of 0.049805, paid partly from the fee claim below 0x937c213c…e2e0 The deployer, then the treasury timelock Treasury inventory (below)
12 November 2026, 13:48:45 869,990.046016952 5 USDC, including a 0.85% swap-route fee of 0.0425 0x269ec146…f0fd The deployer, then the treasury timelock Treasury inventory: 1,890,000 of the two buys was sent to the treasury timelock 0xBc6acE04…50d4 at 14:26:13. The remaining 1,574.332718404 is with the deployer

On 12 November 2026 the creator fee share accrued since launch, 7.070578 USDC, was claimed from Tolly's fee locker to the deployer at 13:47:36 in 0x5cbf5c0d…d868. With 3.788880 USDC of the deployer's own it paid for the two buys above, 10.859458 USDC in all, and 1,890,000 of the SVR bought was sent to the treasury timelock at 14:26:13 in 0xf02e578a…1773. It was done once, as a test that the claim, the purchase and the transfer to the treasury work end to end. That departs from the treasury policy below in two ways: the claim was made on the 12th rather than the 1st, and it reached the treasury as SVR rather than as USDC held for a published buyback schedule. The remaining 1,574.332718404 SVR is held by the deployer, beside the 5,000,000 for the operator bonds.

Locked

Lock 0xE246eaF919a39d7E0ff656320f7132Ee8AfBB8FB, OpenZeppelin's VestingWallet with a duration of zero, deployed by the deployer with script/LockTreasurySvr.s.sol in 0xa62b579e…3aa5
Holds 17,283,004.212403886 SVR, the treasury share of the first buy, sent on 9 November 2026 in 0x3db63954…3230
Releases Nothing before 9 May 2027 00:00 UTC, by anyone, the deployer included. From then all of it, to the lock's owner
Owner The treasury timelock, since 9 November 2026 (0xef44f709…f7a0), so the release goes to the treasury. Ownership decides where the SVR goes, never when, and changing it now takes the admin Safe and 48 hours' notice

The other 5,000,000 SVR of the first buy is not locked. It is for the two oracle operator bonds, the primary's and the checker's, at the 2,500,000 SVR that SigvaraOracleBond requires of each operator on mainnet (see Mainnet parameters). It stays with the deployer until the mainnet registries deploy and the bonds are posted, and that transfer is published here. Anyone can read the deployer's balance, and the lock's start(), end(), owner() and releasable(SVR), on chain.

Treasury policy

The creator share of pool trading fees (64% of the 1% buy-side pool fee, paid in USDC and credited by Tolly's fee locker) is claimed once a month, on the 1st, and sent to the treasury timelock as USDC. It is held there and not spent until a buyback schedule is published on this page. The treasury is also funded by direct open-market purchases. Every claim and purchase is disclosed the same day.

Treasury SVR is spent only on:

  1. Oracle operator bonds — posting and topping up bonds under SigvaraOracleBond, including for operators that are not the team.
  2. Operator incentives — paying admitted operators for epochs served, once a distribution mechanism exists. Today distributeFees() sends the non-burned fee share to a plain address and the spend is manual.
  3. Slashing-committee costs — the operational cost of reviewing reports and filing slashes.
  4. Staking rewards, under the rules in the next section, and only those.
  5. Repaying a wrongful slash. Returning what a slash took to the operator who lost it, once the admin has published a finding that the slash was wrong (ADR 0010). Never more than the slash took, only from SVR the treasury already holds, and never to a team-operated agent or oracle operator, because the finding is a judgment and this cannot be a payment the team directs to itself. It is not owed, and it is disclosed like every other treasury movement.

No buyback runs until its schedule is published here, and then it runs on that schedule, not in response to price. No fee revenue is paid out to the team, and no treasury SVR is sold.

Staking rewards

Not live. Nothing below can pay out before the mainnet registries exist, and the rules are written here first so that inventory bought for the programme is inventory for a published programme rather than a discretionary bag.

Who can earn. Only two roles, both of which have capital at risk:

  • Agents that are Active in SigvaraIdentity, holding at least minimumStake, with no slash executed against them in the period.
  • Oracle operators admitted to SigvaraOracleBond and returning true from isActiveOperator for the whole period, with no slash executed against them.

Holding SVR earns nothing. Providing liquidity earns nothing. The reward is for bonded, slashable service to the protocol, and an address that has posted no bond is not eligible on any basis.

Where it comes from. Treasury SVR only, bought on the open market. There is no emission, no mint and no allocation, because TollyToken has no mint function and the supply is fixed at creation. A reward programme that cannot be funded from treasury does not run that quarter.

How much. At most 5% of the treasury's SVR balance per quarter, measured at the start of the quarter. The cap is on the programme, not per recipient.

How it is decided. The rate, the eligibility window and the recipient set are published before the period they apply to, not after. Rewards are not adjusted retroactively and are not discretionary within a period.

What this is not. It is not a yield on holding SVR, not a staking product for the token, and not a return the team can direct to itself. Team-operated agents and team-operated oracle operators are eligible on exactly the same published terms as anyone else, and their receipts are disclosed on this page like every other treasury movement.

Audits and development are funded separately, through ecosystem grants and CounterAudit integration revenue, not from the token.

When the utility starts

The Sigvara registries deploy to Arc mainnet after an external audit (docs/arc.md, section 6). Until that deployment, SVR has no on-chain use in the protocol. Between launch and mainnet registries it is a token with a published roadmap and nothing else. Arc testnet keeps using the faucet SVRToken for mechanics testing; testnet tokens have no value and never will.

At mainnet deploy the registries are initialized with the SVR address above, minimumStake and bondAmount denominated in 18 decimals. SigvaraEpochFees is not deployed at launch.

Mainnet parameters

The figures the registries are initialized with at mainnet deploy. Both are settable afterwards by governance, and both are deliberately different numbers doing different jobs.

Parameter Value Share of supply
SigvaraOracleBond.bondAmount 2,500,000 SVR 0.25%
SigvaraStaking.minimumStake 10,000 SVR 0.001%

The mainnet deploy scripts refuse less than either figure, and scripts/check-docs.mjs fails the build if this table, the scripts and scripts/check-mainnet.sh ever disagree.

The operator bond is what a corrupt oracle loses. slash() can take up to the whole of it, so the deterrent is the full number rather than a fraction. The agent stake is a gate on who is worth scoring, and gating onboarding is a much smaller job than deterring an oracle, which is why it sits two orders of magnitude lower. On Arc testnet both were 1,000 until the bond was raised to 25,000 on 20 September 2026, and the match was coincidence rather than design.

Neither figure is the protocol's defence against a hostile operator set. admit() takes the admin role, so nobody buys their way in: an operator joins only when the admin admits it. There is no on-chain vote. On Arc testnet the admin is one key, and the handover plan moves it to a Safe. What the bond buys is something the slashing committee can take, and capital committed across the seven-day unbonding window.

Why these are denominated in SVR, not dollars

A bond fixed in SVR scales with the payoff from attacking the protocol, because both track the same thing. When Sigvara is worth more to corrupt, the bond costs more to post and more to lose. A dollar peg would sever that link and would need governance to chase it. The trade is that a price collapse makes the bond cheap, but it also makes corrupting the protocol worth less, so the two move together in both directions.

When these get revisited

Governance reviews both figures when any of the following first becomes true, and at minimum once every two quarters regardless:

  • A single attested settlement exceeds 20% of the operator bond's market value. This is the one that matters. If one settlement is worth more than the bond, a corrupt oracle profits by lying about that settlement and walking away from its stake, and the bond has stopped deterring the case it exists for.
  • Active agents pass 250. More agents is more surface for one bad score to matter.
  • SVR's 30-day average moves more than 3x since the last review, in either direction. Secondary, since the SVR denomination already tracks this, but a large move is worth a look rather than an assumption.

Raising bondAmount takes effect immediately and without grandfathering: isActiveOperator reads bond >= bondAmount live, so any operator below the new floor stops being able to propose at its next epoch. Incumbents are topped up first and the floor raised second. The sequence is in oracle/RUNBOOK-second-operator.md, step 0.

What these numbers are not

They are a starting point, not a derivation. The payoff from corrupting a score depends on adoption that does not exist yet, so nobody can compute the correct bond today. 0.25% was chosen to be real money to a small operator while staying fundable from treasury buybacks, which pay for bonds out of 0.64% of buy volume and therefore need roughly $156 of cumulative buy volume for every $1 of bond. The review triggers above exist because the first honest thing to say about these figures is that they will be wrong later.

What the staking contract requires of a bond token

SigvaraStaking.svrToken is a plain IERC20 chosen at initialize, so this applies to any deployment, not just the ones described above.

Fee-on-transfer is handled, not merely disallowed. depositStake records the measured balance delta rather than the amount requested, so a token that takes a cut in transit credits what actually arrived. This matters even though neither deployed token does it: crediting the requested amount would book stake the contract never received, the gap would widen with every deposit, and it would surface only when the last operators to withdraw found the balance short. An agent could also cross minimumStake on tokens it never transferred, and that bond is what backs a slashable claim. A requirement written in a document does not bind whoever deploys this next; two balanceOf calls do.

Rebasing tokens are not supported. Stake is stored as a fixed amount. A balance that changes on its own drifts from the accounting in either direction, and nothing in the contract can detect it. Do not deploy with one.

Outbound transfers send the recorded amount. With a fee-on-transfer token a withdrawal or a slash payout arrives smaller than the figure in the event. That shortfall falls on the recipient and does not threaten the contract's solvency, which is why it is documented rather than compensated: paying out more than was debited would create the very shortfall the deposit path exists to prevent.

Covered by test/FeeOnTransfer.t.sol, which deploys a real fee-taking token and asserts the booked stake never exceeds the tokens held.

Impersonation

Anyone can deploy a token called SVR or Sigvara on any launchpad. Before this page carries an address, there is no genuine SVR. After it does, only that address is genuine. The team never announces a contract address on social media first; it goes here and on sigvara.xyz, then everywhere else.

These are the only accounts and domains the project speaks through:

Site sigvara.xyz
Source github.com/RunTimeAdmin/Sigvara
X @SigvaraProtocol
Security security@sigvara.xyz

Anything else claiming to be Sigvara is not, including accounts using the same name or avatar. An unnamed "official account" protects nobody, which is why this list exists and why it lives in the repository, where its history is public, rather than only in a profile bio that can be edited without trace.

countersig.network is the pre-rename domain. It now redirects here and serves nothing of its own. Anything still presenting that hostname as a live Sigvara site is not us.

Not a promise

SVR is a utility token for bonding and fees in an early protocol with no audit yet and an oracle run by one party. Nothing on this page is investment advice or a forecast of value.