One JSON object per triage run.
{
"id": "9b1f0c2e7a44", // stable fingerprint: check + identity key (no PIDs)
"sev": "critical", // critical | high | medium | low | info
"cat": "process", // process network kernel persistence accounts logs integrity filesystem
"check": "memfd-exe", // see docs/TRIAGE_CHECKS.md
"title": "Fileless process 3 (254762) runs from memory (/memfd:x)",
"mitre": ["T1620"],
"why": "The executable lives only in an anonymous memfd …",
"fix": "Dump /proc/<pid>/exe and memory before killing it.",
"evidence": {"pid": 254762, "user": "root", "exe": "/memfd:x", "cmdline": "…",
"parent": "bash (254700)", "started": "2026-11-03 06:09:41", "sha256": "…"}
}id does not include PIDs or timestamps. The same problem found on two runs gets the
same id, which is what triage-diff and --compare use to report new and resolved
findings.
"systemd": {
"title": "systemd units", "cat": "persistence",
"cols": ["unit", "scope", "path", "package", "exec", "changed", "flags"],
"rows": [["dbus-org.service", "system", "/etc/systemd/system/dbus-org.service", "",
"/dev/shm/dbus-org --daemon", "2026-11-03 06:16:37", ["ww-exec", "unpackaged"]]],
"key": [0, 1, 2, 4], // columns that identify a row when diffing two runs
"note": ""
}A column named flags holds a list of short tags. The report highlights rows whose
flags include anything other than the context tags external, recent, unpackaged,
dkms and analyst-session.
Inventory names: processes, listeners, connections, raw_sockets, interfaces,
modules, bpf_pins, users, ssh_keys, sshd_config, sudoers, pam,
ld_so_conf, services, services_nondefault, cron, cron_nondefault, at_jobs,
systemd (raw unit files), persistence_more, containers, immutable, autostart, shell_init, history,
sessions, session_history, logins, failed_logins, account_events, logfiles, dpkg_verify, conffiles,
bin_unpackaged, suid, caps, dropped, webshells, recent_changes.
triage.enriched.json is a triage.json with these additions:
intel:{generated, geo_provider, virustotal, public_ips, hashes, countries: [{cc, country, ips}], vt_files: {looked_up, malicious, unknown}, vt_ips: {looked_up, malicious}, notes, case_meta}- findings with
cat: "intel":vt-file,vt-ip,vt-unknown - inventories
intel_vt(file, sha256, detections, malicious, label, first seen, seen as, virustotal, flags) andintel_geo(ip, country, city, asn, organisation, VT, seen as, virustotal, flags) locationandip VTcolumns appended toconnections,loginsandfailed_logins;exe VTappended toconnectionsandlisteners(N/M [label],not in VT,dpkg-verifiedornot looked up);virustotalappended toprocessescounts,verdictandmitrerecomputed
intel.json holds the raw provider answers. The API key is never written anywhere.
{"kind": "procsnap-baseline", "version": 1, "created": 1793690000,
"hosts": [{"hostname": "web1", "os": "Debian GNU/Linux 12", "triaged": 1793680000, "verdict": "clean"}],
"services": {"system:nginx.service": {"exec_paths": ["/usr/sbin/nginx"],
"exec_sha256": ["…"], "default": ["yes"]}},
"cron": {"/etc/cron.d/certbot|root test -x /usr/bin/certbot … certbot -q renew":
{"exec_paths": ["/usr/bin/certbot"], "exec_sha256": ["…"]}}}User crontabs are keyed as crontab:<user>|<command>, so the same job matches across
hosts. When a triage is checked against a DB, res["baseline"]["db"] records which
DB was used and how many differences it produced.
procsnap collect writes one file per day, procsnap-YYYYMMDD.jsonl[.gz], with one
JSON object per line. Every line has ts (epoch seconds) and ev:
ev |
When | Key fields |
|---|---|---|
collector_start |
collector starts | host, kernel, boot, interval, root, version |
proc_start |
a process is seen for the first time | pid, ppid, user, comm, cmdline, exe, exe_deleted, cwd, sid, tty, rss_kb, cpu_s, cgroup, start, pcomm, pcmdline, baseline, sha256 |
exe_deleted |
a running process's binary disappears from disk | pid, comm, cmdline, exe, start |
exe_hash |
an executable's SHA-256, computed in the idle time after its proc_start (new binaries only; known ones carry sha256 on proc_start itself) |
pid, start, comm, exe, sha256 |
proc_exit |
a process is gone | pid, comm, cmdline, lifetime_s, cpu_s, rss_kb_peak |
listen_open / listen_close |
listening socket appears / disappears | proto, laddr, lport, pid, comm, user, duration_s |
conn_open / conn_close |
connection appears / disappears | proto, laddr, lport, raddr, rport, state, pid, comm, dir (outbound/inbound, on open), duration_s |
inventory |
every --full-every snapshots |
full procs / listen / conns lists (resync point) |
heartbeat |
every snapshot | n, nproc, nlisten, nconn, scan_ms |
collector_stop |
SIGINT / SIGTERM / --count reached |
snapshots |
baseline: true marks entities that already existed in the first snapshot of a
collector session. A new collector_start resets the delta chain, so logs from cron'd
once runs and from reboots reconstruct correctly.
{ "tool": "procsnap", "kind": "triage", "version": "2.0.0", "started": 1793686995.12, // epoch seconds (UTC) "duration_s": 46.1, "host": { // facts collected by the "host" check "hostname": "web01", "os": "Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)", "kernel": "6.1.0-26-amd64", "arch": "x86_64", "mode": "live", // or "offline image at /mnt/web01" "boot": 1793452265, "uptime_s": 233080, "tainted": 0, "timezone": "UTC +0000", "root_privileges": true, "dpkg_packages": 1493, "dpkg_files_verified": 1684, "dpkg_scope": "binaries, PAM, sshd helpers, core libraries", "pid_scan": "1..384737", "files_swept": 336789, "wtmp_records": 1142 }, "verdict": {"level": "compromised", "text": "Indicators of compromise found"}, // level: compromised | suspicious | review | clean "counts": {"critical": 4, "high": 16, "medium": 3, "low": 3, "info": 1}, "options": {"root": "/", "days": 7, "deep": false, "collect": true, "walk_budget": 240}, "findings": [ /* see below, sorted most severe first */ ], "inventory": { /* name -> table, see below */ }, "evidence": [ {"path": "/proc/254762/exe", "size": 35336, "why": "fileless process", "sha256": "…", "saved": "evidence/3f1c…_memfd-254762.sample"} ], "errors": [ {"check": "logins", "error": "no /var/log/auth.log* - journald-only host? …"} ], "timings": {"processes": 5.6, "package integrity": 25.4, "filesystem sweep": 9.1, …}, "mitre": {"T1620": {"name": "Reflective Code Loading", "tactic": "Defense Evasion"}, …}, "tactics": ["Execution", "Persistence", …], "self": {"sha256": "<sha256 of procsnap.py>", "pid": 254790, "argv": ["procsnap.py", "triage"]} }