From ed5bd79eb973e0299e881b7e5ad80a8505fcab3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lr00rl <lidongguinb@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 01:57:43 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] chore: never let publisher signing seeds into git
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cmd/pluginsign reads a raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed from a file path. Nothing is
committed today, but the only thing between a publisher seed and main was one
`git add -A` — so ignore key material outright rather than relying on care.

A leaked publisher seed signs manifests the server loads as trusted, so the
blast radius is the whole plugin trust model.
---
 .gitignore | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index ddc861f..bfa944f 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -6,3 +6,14 @@ master.key
 
 # OMC orchestration tool state (not part of the project)
 .omc/
+
+# Publisher signing material. `cmd/pluginsign` reads a raw 32-byte Ed25519 seed from a
+# file path, so a stray `seed.bin` in the working tree is one `git add -A` away from
+# being published. Never commit key material; keep seeds outside the repo.
+*.key
+*.pem
+*.seed
+seed
+seed.*
+*_seed
+*.bin