Podkey 0.0.8: general-signer signing, refreshed docs, popup fit, key icons (#23)

* fix(signing): trusted origins sign without a prompt (general NIP-07 signer)

handleSignEvent gated auto-signing on `trusted && autoSign && isSolidAuth`,
so a trusted origin only signed kind-27235 (Solid auth) silently and
re-prompted for every other event kind. A normal Nostr client — the forum
publishes kind 0 / 10002 / 22242 on every load — therefore raised three
approval popups on each page load, making Podkey unusable as a single
general-purpose signer.

Align signing with the trust model already used by GET_PUBLIC_KEY and
nip44.{encrypt,decrypt}: a trusted origin is sufficient to skip the prompt
(decrypting DMs is strictly more sensitive than signing, and is already
silent for trusted origins). An untrusted origin still ALWAYS prompts, and
approving it establishes revocable trust — no silent first-use.

    let shouldSign = trusted && autoSign && isSolidAuth;
    ->  let shouldSign = trusted;

Tests updated to the general-signer contract (133 pass, lint clean).

Co-Authored-By: jjohare <github@thedreamlab.uk>

* docs+ui: refactor README/USAGE/CHANGELOG, fit popup to surface, add key icons

- README/USAGE/CHANGELOG: rewrite to match the current capability and security
  model (session-only key, per-origin consent, trusted-origin signing, NIP-98
  with fresh nonce + body/URL binding, honest window.nostr surface). UK English.
- popup: cap the trusted-sites list and tighten section spacing so the Export /
  GitHub footer stays within the browser popup height instead of scrolling off;
  widen to 400px.
- icons: add 16/48/128px key icons (icons/icon.svg master) and wire them into
  manifest icons + action.default_icon so the toolbar shows the Podkey key.

Co-Authored-By: jjohare <github@thedreamlab.uk>

* feat(vault): encrypted-at-rest key persistence with passphrase unlock

PR #22's hardening stored the private key only in chrome.storage.session
(in-memory), so it was wiped on every browser restart — getPublicKey() then
threw the non-intuitive "No keypair found" and the user had to re-import their
nsec each time. That is "no at-rest persistence", not "encryption at rest".

Add a real encrypted-at-rest vault:
- src/vault.js: AES-256-GCM ciphertext in chrome.storage.local, key wrapped by
  scrypt(passphrase) (N=2^16, r=8, p=1; params sealed in the blob for future
  upgrade). Pure encrypt/decrypt split from the storage I/O so the crypto is
  unit-tested off-platform. Wrong passphrase / tamper fail closed via the GCM tag.
- Session stays the hot cache: on unlock the decrypted key is held in
  chrome.storage.session for fast signing; a browser restart clears it and the
  user re-unlocks. The raw key never touches disk.
- background.js: generate/import now take a passphrase and seal the vault;
  new UNLOCK_VAULT / LOCK_VAULT; GET_KEYPAIR_STATUS reports none|locked|unlocked.
  A locked vault on getPublicKey/sign/nip44 opens the unlock popup and throws a
  clear "Podkey is locked — unlock and try again" instead of "No keypair found".
- popup: set-passphrase step on generate, passphrase fields on import, an unlock
  screen (with forget-key/start-over), and a Lock action. Pill reads "Unlocked".

Tests: 8 vault crypto tests (round-trip, wrong passphrase, tamper, validation,
salt/iv freshness). Full suite 141 pass; eslint src/ clean.

Co-Authored-By: jjohare <github@thedreamlab.uk>

* docs: privacy policy, vault-current docs, and Actions-based Pages site

- PRIVACY.md: repo-hosted privacy policy (local signer; key encrypted at rest;
  no servers/accounts/telemetry; per-permission rationale incl. <all_urls>).
  Doubles as the Chrome Web Store privacy disclosure basis.
- README/USAGE/CHANGELOG: bring the security model up to date with the encrypted
  vault (was "session-only"), document the passphrase + unlock/lock/forget flow,
  bump version 0.0.7 -> 0.0.8, test count 133 -> 141, add vault.js to the file
  map, and add a "Where Podkey fits" section positioning it against existing
  NIP-07 signers, the did:nostr ecosystem (github.com/topics/did-nostr), and
  Solid (solidproject.org) — extends + consolidates rather than reinvents.
- site/: a polished, self-contained docs landing (index.html) + hosted privacy
  page (privacy.html) for a clean Web Store privacy URL.
- gh-pages.yml: complete the migration off the legacy gh-pages branch — assemble
  the docs site + test page and deploy via actions/deploy-pages (the proper
  GitHub Actions Pages workflow), triggered on site/test-page changes.

Co-Authored-By: jjohare <github@thedreamlab.uk>

Author: jjohare

.github/workflows/gh-pages.yml

@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@ on:
     branches:
       - main
     paths:
+      - 'site/**'
       - 'test-page/**'
       - '.github/workflows/gh-pages.yml'
+  workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
   contents: read
@@ -30,10 +32,18 @@ jobs:
       - name: Setup Pages
         uses: actions/configure-pages@v4
 
+      - name: Assemble site (docs landing + privacy + test page)
+        run: |
+          mkdir -p _site
+          cp -r site/. _site/
+          mkdir -p _site/test-page
+          cp -r test-page/. _site/test-page/
+          echo "Assembled _site:" && ls -R _site | head -40
+
       - name: Upload artifact
         uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@v3
         with:
-          path: './test-page'
+          path: './_site'
 
       - name: Deploy to GitHub Pages
         id: deployment

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -9,13 +9,46 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ### Added
 
-- **NIP-44 (v2) encryption** — `window.nostr.nip44.encrypt(pubkey, plaintext)`
-  and `window.nostr.nip44.decrypt(pubkey, ciphertext)`, enabling NIP-17 / NIP-59
-  gift-wrapped direct messages. Crypto runs in the background service worker
-  (the private key never reaches the page), reusing the existing message-passing
-  path. Implemented with `@noble/ciphers` (chacha20) + `@noble/hashes`
-  (hkdf/hmac/sha256) + `@noble/secp256k1` (ECDH). Verified against the official
-  NIP-44 spec test vectors.
+- **NIP-44 (v2) encryption.** `window.nostr.nip44.encrypt(pubkey, plaintext)`
+  and `nip44.decrypt(pubkey, ciphertext)` for NIP-17 / NIP-59 gift-wrapped
+  direct messages. The crypto runs in the background worker (`@noble/ciphers`
+  chacha20, `@noble/hashes` hkdf/hmac, ECDH via `@noble/secp256k1`) and is
+  checked against the official NIP-44 test vectors. The private key stays in
+  the worker.
+- **Per-origin signing consent.** The first request from a site opens an
+  approval popup; closing it or a 60-second timeout denies. Approving grants
+  per-origin trust that you can revoke from the popup.
+- **Encrypted-at-rest key vault.** The private key is persisted only as an
+  AES-256-GCM ciphertext in `chrome.storage.local`, wrapped by a scrypt-derived
+  key from the user's passphrase (`src/vault.js`). On unlock the decrypted key
+  is cached in `chrome.storage.session` for fast signing and cleared when the
+  browser closes; the raw key never touches disk. New `UNLOCK_VAULT`/`LOCK_VAULT`
+  messages, a popup unlock screen, and a clear "Podkey is locked" prompt replace
+  the previous "No keypair found" error after a restart.
+- **NIP-98 Solid authentication.** Opt-in HTTP auth to Solid pods. Each token
+  carries a fresh 16-byte nonce and binds the request body hash and the final
+  redirect-aware URL, so one token authorises one request. Trusted Solid hosts
+  are matched exactly.
+- **Schnorr self-verify.** Every signature is checked against the public key
+  before it is returned.
+- **Extension icons** at 16, 48 and 128px, and a `script-src 'self'`
+  content-security policy across the popup and test page.
+- **Continuous integration.** `.github/workflows/ci.yml` runs build, test and
+  lint on every pull request and push to `main`, and uploads a sideloadable
+  extension zip. The 141-case suite covers signing, NIP-44 vectors, NIP-98
+  token shape, the content-script message whitelist, the consent flow, and the
+  vault crypto (round-trip, wrong passphrase, tamper, salt/iv freshness).
+
+### Changed
+
+- A trusted origin signs any event kind without a prompt, so Podkey works as a
+  general NIP-07 signer. A normal client publishes kind 0, 10002 and 22242 on
+  every load; those no longer raise a prompt once you trust the site. Untrusted
+  origins still prompt, and approving one grants trust.
+- The `window.nostr` provider exposes `getPublicKey`, `signEvent` and
+  `nip44.{encrypt,decrypt}`.
+- The popup fits within the browser popup height, keeping the Export and GitHub
+  links in view.
 
 ## [0.0.7] - 2024-12-XX
 

PRIVACY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Podkey Privacy Policy
+
+_Last updated: 2026-06-16_
+
+Podkey is a browser extension that holds a Nostr/[did:nostr](https://nostrcg.github.io/did-nostr/)
+key on your device and uses it to sign Nostr events ([NIP-07](https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips/blob/master/07.md))
+and to authenticate to [Solid](https://solidproject.org) pods over
+[NIP-98](https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips/blob/master/98.md). It is a
+**local signer**: your key never leaves your device, and Podkey has no servers,
+no accounts, and no analytics.
+
+## What Podkey stores, and where
+
+All data is stored **locally** in the browser's extension storage. Nothing is
+sent to the Podkey developers or to any third party.
+
+| Data | Where | Notes |
+|------|-------|-------|
+| **Private key** | `chrome.storage.local`, **encrypted** | Stored only as an AES-256-GCM ciphertext, wrapped by a key derived from your passphrase with scrypt. The plaintext key is never written to disk. |
+| **Private key (unlocked)** | `chrome.storage.session`, in-memory | After you unlock with your passphrase, the decrypted key is held in memory for the browser session so signing is fast. It is cleared when the browser closes. |
+| **Public key** | `chrome.storage.local` | Your `did:nostr` identity. Not secret. |
+| **Trusted origins** | `chrome.storage.local` | The sites you have approved to sign without re-prompting, and an optional per-site auto-sign preference. You can revoke any of them from the popup. |
+
+There is **no telemetry, no tracking, no advertising identifiers, and no
+remote logging.** Podkey collects none of your browsing history or page content.
+
+## How your key is used
+
+- **Signing** (NIP-07 `signEvent`, `nip44.encrypt/decrypt`) and **Solid
+  authentication** (NIP-98) happen entirely inside the extension's background
+  service worker. The raw private key is never exposed to web pages — only the
+  resulting signature, ciphertext/plaintext, or `Authorization` header crosses
+  to the page.
+- A site you have not approved triggers a consent prompt on its first request.
+  Closing the prompt, or a 60-second timeout, denies it.
+- Podkey makes **no network requests of its own.** A NIP-98 `Authorization`
+  header is attached only to requests **you** initiate to a Solid/Nostr server
+  you have trusted; the data goes to that server, under your control, not to
+  Podkey.
+
+## Permissions, and why they are needed
+
+- **`storage`** — to keep the encrypted key, your public key, and your trusted
+  sites locally, as described above.
+- **Host access (`<all_urls>`)** — Podkey is a NIP-07 signer, so it injects a
+  `window.nostr` provider into pages and, for sites you have trusted, attaches
+  NIP-98 auth to your own requests. This requires script access to the pages
+  where you use a Nostr/Solid app. Podkey **does not read, collect, or transmit
+  page content or browsing history**; host access is used solely to expose the
+  signer and to intercept auth for origins you have explicitly approved.
+
+## Data sharing and retention
+
+- Podkey **does not sell or share** any data. There is no data broker, no
+  third-party processor, and no off-device transfer of your key or activity.
+- All data remains on your device until you delete it. **Removing the
+  extension, or using "Forget key" in the popup, erases the stored vault, public
+  key, and trusted sites.** Back up your private key before doing so — without a
+  backup it cannot be recovered.
+
+## Your control
+
+- Unlock / lock your key on demand from the popup.
+- Review and revoke trusted sites at any time.
+- Export your private key (after unlocking) to back it up.
+- Forget the key entirely to start over.
+
+## Contact
+
+Podkey is open source under AGPL-3.0. Questions, issues, or security reports:
+<https://github.com/JavaScriptSolidServer/podkey/issues>.
+
+This policy may be updated as the extension evolves; the "Last updated" date
+above reflects the current version. Material changes will be noted in the
+project [CHANGELOG](CHANGELOG.md).