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# OpenWatch — Stage-0 OpenAPI manifest.
#
# Self-contained 3-endpoint surface that oapi-codegen turns into typed
# Go server stubs. The full 14-domain manifest lives in openapi.full.yaml
# for Stage 2+ reference.
#
# Endpoints:
# GET /api/v1/health — anonymous liveness probe
# POST /api/v1/diagnostics:echo — exercises idempotency + audit
# GET /api/v1/audit/events — cursor-paginated audit list
#
# Specs:
# app/specs/api/health.spec.yaml
# app/specs/api/diagnostics-echo.spec.yaml
# app/specs/api/audit-events-query.spec.yaml
openapi: 3.0.3
info:
title: OpenWatch
version: 0.2.1
description: |
The OpenWatch REST API: authentication, hosts, scans, compliance posture,
remediation, reports, notifications, and administration. All responses carry
a correlation ID and a structured error envelope; mutating calls are
idempotency-keyed and audited.
servers:
- url: https://localhost:8443
description: Local development
# The anonymous allowlist. Spec system-rbac C-10 and AC-26.
#
# Every POST, PUT, PATCH and DELETE below has to resolve to a gate. Either its
# handler proves who is asking, with an RBAC check on a typed permission or a
# check that the caller is not anonymous, or its operationId appears here. An
# operation on neither is a defect, and AC-26 fails the build for it. The point
# is that the next author has a question to answer rather than a list to keep.
#
# This list is the small side on purpose. It holds routes that cannot require a
# credential, because they are how a caller gets one. Nothing joins it without
# a reason written next to it, and a reason has to say why the route cannot be
# gated, not why gating it would be inconvenient.
#
# A route that rejects an anonymous caller does NOT belong here, even when its
# path starts with /auth. POST /auth/mfa:enroll, POST /auth/mfa:verify and POST
# /auth/password:change all run against an already-authenticated identity and
# answer 401 without one, so they resolve to a gate on their own. Adding them
# would be worse than redundant: an entry here exempts an operation from AC-26
# permanently, so if someone later deleted the check, the test would stay green
# while the route went open.
#
# Each operationId MUST still exist in paths below. A renamed or deleted route
# fails AC-26 rather than leaving a dead entry that quietly widens the rule.
x-anonymous-mutations:
- operationId: postAuthLogin
reason: >
No identity exists yet. This route is what creates one, so it cannot
require a caller to already have it.
- operationId: postAuthLogout
reason: >
Logout is idempotent and answers 204 for an anonymous caller on purpose.
It reads the identity, but only to decide whether there is a session to
revoke, and it never rejects. A caller whose session already expired must
still be able to clear the cookies.
- operationId: postAuthRefresh
reason: >
The refresh token in the request body IS the credential being presented.
Requiring a bound identity first would make the route unusable, since a
client refreshes precisely when its access credential has expired.
- operationId: postAuthRefreshCookie
reason: >
Same as postAuthRefresh, with the refresh token arriving in a cookie
rather than the body.
x-anonymous-reads:
- operationId: getCapabilities
reason: >
A client needs to know which capabilities this deployment has before it has an identity, so it can present a locked control instead of discovering the gate from a 402. The response carries capability ids, tiers and availability, and no license, customer or deployment detail.
- operationId: getLicense
reason: >
Pre-auth by design (api-license C-06, C-09): an anonymous caller receives only tier, status and features, an allowlisted public field set; every other field is written only for a caller holding system:read, decided inside the handler.
- operationId: getAuthPermissionsRegistry
reason: >
The static permission registry: permission ids, descriptions, categories and the built-in role bundles, all of which USER_ROLES.md publishes in this public repository. It reads no table and returns no user, assignment, custom role or deployment setting (system-rbac AC-30). Retained anonymous by founder decision, 2026-09-21.
- operationId: getAuthMePermissions
reason: >
Introspection of the calling identity. An anonymous caller gets is_anonymous true and an empty permission list, which tells them only what they already are; the SPA uses it to decide whether to show the login page.
- operationId: getSSOProvidersEnabled
reason: >
The login page must list the identity providers before anyone is signed in (api-sso). The response carries provider id and name only.
- operationId: getAuthSSOLogin
reason: >
The SSO redirect that starts a sign-in; there is no identity yet (api-sso).
- operationId: getAuthSSOCallback
reason: >
The SSO redirect-back that exchanges the code and creates the session; there is no identity yet (api-sso).
paths:
/api/v1/auth/login:
post:
operationId: postAuthLogin
summary: Username/password login with optional TOTP
security: []
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthLoginRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Login succeeded; tokens issued
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthLoginResponse'}
'401':
description: Invalid credentials or MFA required
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'503':
description: >-
server.error. retryable true: sign-in did not complete and nothing was
issued, including when the per-user lock was not acquired in time.
retryable false: the outcome is unknown; sign in again rather than
assuming either result.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
/api/v1/auth/logout:
post:
operationId: postAuthLogout
summary: Revoke the calling session
responses:
'204':
description: Session revoked
'403':
description: >-
authz.csrf_invalid. A credential cookie selects what to revoke and the
double-submit token is missing or does not match. Nothing was revoked and
no cookie was changed.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
'500':
description: >-
auth.logout_incomplete, retryable. The revocation failed and rolled back,
so nothing was revoked. Both cookies are cleared; the session may stay
valid until it expires.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
'503':
description: >-
server.error, not retryable, and both cookies are cleared. Two outcomes,
told apart by the message. The account lock was not acquired in time:
this attempt revoked nothing. The commit outcome is unknown: revocation
could not be confirmed. Neither invites an automatic retry, because
with the cookies cleared a repeated request may name no family, or a
different one.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
/api/v1/auth/refresh:
post:
operationId: postAuthRefresh
summary: Rotate the refresh token; mint a new access+refresh pair
security: []
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthRefreshRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: New token pair issued
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthLoginResponse'}
'401':
description: Refresh token invalid, expired, or reused (cascade revoke triggered)
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'503':
description: >-
server.error. retryable true: nothing was rotated, including when the
per-user lock was not acquired in time. retryable false: the rotation
outcome is unknown; sign in again rather than presenting the same token.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
/api/v1/auth/refresh-cookie:
post:
operationId: postAuthRefreshCookie
summary: Rotate the refresh cookie and mint a new session (browser flow)
description: >
Reads the HttpOnly `openwatch_refresh` cookie, rotates the underlying
refresh token, mints a new session, and Set-Cookies both the rotated
refresh cookie and a fresh `openwatch_session`. Used by the browser
API client as the transparent on-401 retry hook so users with a live
refresh window don't get bounced to /login on every inactivity timeout.
security: []
responses:
'200':
description: Cookies rotated; identity returned
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthMeResponse'}
'401':
description: Refresh cookie missing, invalid, expired, or reused. Both auth cookies are cleared.
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'503':
description: >-
server.error. retryable true: nothing was rotated and no cookie was
set, including when the per-user lock was not acquired in time.
retryable false: the rotation outcome is unknown.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
/api/v1/auth/me:
get:
operationId: getAuthMe
x-requires-identity: true
summary: Return the calling identity
responses:
'200':
description: Identity
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthMeResponse'}
'401':
description: No valid session or bearer
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
patch:
operationId: patchAuthMe
x-requires-identity: true
summary: Update the calling user's own profile
description: >-
Self-service profile edit for the authenticated user. The body is a
partial: present fields are updated, omitted fields are unchanged.
Changing email (the sign-in identity) is allowed but must be unique
among active users (409 on conflict). Username, role, and password
are NOT editable here (password uses /auth/password:change).
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthMeUpdateRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Updated identity
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthMeResponse'}
'400':
description: Malformed body or invalid field
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'401':
description: No valid session or bearer
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'409':
description: Email already in use by another active user
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/users/me/preferences:
get:
operationId: getUsersMePreferences
x-requires-identity: true
summary: Return the calling user's UI preferences
description: >
Per-user UI preferences (e.g. the /hosts grid-vs-table default).
Self-scoped — any authenticated identity reads its own; no special
permission. Unset keys are simply absent (the client falls back to
its defaults). Spec system-user-preferences + api-user-preferences.
responses:
'200':
description: The caller's stored preferences
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserPreferences'}
'401':
description: No valid session or bearer
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
patch:
operationId: patchUsersMePreferences
x-requires-identity: true
summary: Merge a partial update into the calling user's UI preferences
description: >
Shallow-merges the provided keys into the caller's stored
preferences and returns the merged result. Only the keys present in
the body are changed; omitted keys are retained. Self-scoped.
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserPreferences'}
responses:
'200':
description: The merged preferences
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserPreferences'}
'400':
description: Malformed body
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'401':
description: No valid session or bearer
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/auth/mfa:enroll:
post:
operationId: postAuthMFAEnroll
x-requires-identity: true
summary: Enroll the calling user in TOTP MFA
responses:
'200':
description: Provisioning URI returned for the authenticator app
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthMFAEnrollResponse'}
/api/v1/auth/mfa:verify:
post:
operationId: postAuthMFAVerify
x-requires-identity: true
summary: Confirm an enrolled MFA secret by verifying a generated OTP
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthMFAVerifyRequest'}
responses:
'204':
description: MFA verified
'401':
description: MFA OTP invalid or replayed
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/auth/password:change:
post:
operationId: postAuthPasswordChange
x-requires-identity: true
summary: Change the calling user's password
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthPasswordChangeRequest'}
responses:
'204':
description: Password updated
'401':
description: Current password wrong
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'400':
description: New password rejected by policy
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/health:
get:
operationId: getHealth
summary: Liveness + readiness probe (anonymous)
security: []
responses:
'200':
description: Service is healthy
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/HealthResponse'}
'503':
description: Service is degraded or unavailable
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/version:
get:
operationId: getVersion
summary: Build/version metadata (anonymous)
security: []
responses:
'200':
description: Version metadata for this deployment
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/VersionResponse'}
/api/v1/diagnostics:echo:
post:
operationId: postDiagnosticsEcho
summary: Echo the request message; exercises idempotency + audit
# A successful call writes the caller's message into an audit event and
# into a stored idempotency record. The message is capped at 1024
# characters, so each write is bounded, but the call count is not.
# Attacker-supplied text in the audit log is evidence integrity, not a
# demo nit.
x-required-permission: system:read
parameters:
- name: Idempotency-Key
in: header
required: true
schema: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 255}
- name: X-Correlation-Id
in: header
required: false
schema: {type: string}
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Echo succeeded
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoResponse'}
'400':
$ref: '#/components/responses/BadRequest'
'401':
description: Caller is anonymous
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks system:read
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'405':
$ref: '#/components/responses/MethodNotAllowed'
'409':
description: Idempotency-Key reused with different body
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/capabilities:
get:
operationId: getCapabilities
summary: What this deployment is entitled to use
description: |
The paywall, made visible. Returns every registered capability with
whether THIS deployment can use it, so the interface can lock or
upsell a control instead of letting a Community user click it and
collect a 402.
Deliberately unauthenticated, like GET /license: a pre-login screen
needs to know what the deployment offers. It exposes no customer
identity and no license key material, only capability ids, their tier,
and whether each is available here.
There are no quotas. Tiering is by capability alone: OpenWatch does not
cap hosts, scans, or users.
responses:
'200':
description: Capability set for this deployment
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/CapabilitiesResponse'}
/api/v1/license:
get:
operationId: getLicense
summary: Get the current license state (tier, status, features, expiry)
responses:
'200':
description: License state
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/LicenseStateResponse'}
/api/v1/admin/license:verify:
post:
operationId: postAdminLicenseVerify
x-required-permission: system:read
summary: Dry-run validate a JWT license without installing it
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/LicenseVerifyRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Verification result (success or typed failure)
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/LicenseVerifyResponse'}
/api/v1/diagnostics:premium-echo:
post:
operationId: postDiagnosticsPremiumEcho
summary: License-gated echo; requires premium_diagnostics feature
# RBAC resolves before entitlement, so a caller who lacks system:read
# gets 401 or 403 and never learns whether this deployment is licensed
# for premium_diagnostics. Spec api-license C-05, AC-17.
x-required-permission: system:read
x-required-feature: premium_diagnostics
parameters:
- name: Idempotency-Key
in: header
required: true
schema: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 255}
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Echoed
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoResponse'}
'401':
description: Caller is anonymous
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'402':
description: License does not include premium_diagnostics feature
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks system:read
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/diagnostics:require-host-read:
post:
operationId: postDiagnosticsRequireHostRead
summary: Stage-0 RBAC demo; requires host:read permission
x-required-permission: host:read
parameters:
- name: Idempotency-Key
in: header
required: true
schema: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 255}
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Echoed (caller holds host:read)
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoResponse'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks host:read
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/diagnostics:require-host-write:
post:
operationId: postDiagnosticsRequireHostWrite
summary: Stage-0 RBAC demo; requires host:write permission
x-required-permission: host:write
parameters:
- name: Idempotency-Key
in: header
required: true
schema: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 255}
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Echoed (caller holds host:write)
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoResponse'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks host:write
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/diagnostics:evaluate-alert:
post:
operationId: postDiagnosticsEvaluateAlert
summary: Stage-0 policy demo; evaluates the alert_thresholds policy
# The response is this deployment's alert threshold policy, read back one
# score at a time. A caller who walks the score from 0 to 100 learns
# where each verdict flips, and the body names the loaded policy version.
# That is policy content, so policy:read rather than the system:read its
# sibling diagnostics routes use. Spec system-rbac AC-25.
x-required-permission: policy:read
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EvaluateAlertRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Policy decision
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/PolicyDecisionResponse'}
'401':
description: Caller is anonymous
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks policy:read
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/diagnostics:enqueue-test-job:
post:
operationId: postDiagnosticsEnqueueTestJob
x-required-permission: system:config_write
summary: Stage-0 queue demo; enqueues a no-op job processed by the in-process worker
responses:
'202':
description: Job accepted; worker will drain
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EnqueueTestJobResponse'}
/api/v1/admin/policies:reload:
post:
operationId: postAdminPoliciesReload
summary: Reload signed policy files from the configured directory
x-required-permission: policy:reload
responses:
'200':
description: Per-type reload outcomes
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/PoliciesReloadResponse'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks policy:reload
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/diagnostics:require-remediation-execute:
post:
operationId: postDiagnosticsRequireRemediationExecute
summary: Stage-0 RBAC+license demo; requires remediation:execute (RBAC) + premium_diagnostics (license)
x-required-permission: remediation:execute
x-required-feature: premium_diagnostics
parameters:
- name: Idempotency-Key
in: header
required: true
schema: {type: string, minLength: 1, maxLength: 255}
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoRequest'}
responses:
'200':
description: Echoed
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/EchoResponse'}
'402':
description: License does not include remediation_execution
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks remediation:execute
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/auth/me/permissions:
get:
operationId: getAuthMePermissions
summary: Effective permissions for the calling identity
responses:
'200':
description: Permission list
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/AuthMePermissionsResponse'}
/api/v1/auth/permissions:registry:
get:
operationId: getAuthPermissionsRegistry
summary: Full RBAC registry (categories, permissions, built-in roles)
responses:
'200':
description: Registry
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/PermissionsRegistryResponse'}
/api/v1/users:
get:
operationId: getUsers
summary: List users
x-required-permission: user:read
responses:
'200':
description: User list
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UsersListResponse'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks user:read
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
post:
operationId: postUsers
summary: Create a user
x-required-permission: user:write
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserCreateRequest'}
responses:
'201':
description: User created
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserResponse'}
'400':
description: Validation or policy failure
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks user:write
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/users/{id}:
get:
operationId: getUserByID
summary: Fetch a user
x-required-permission: user:read
parameters:
- {name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: {type: string, format: uuid}}
responses:
'200':
description: User
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserResponse'}
'404':
description: User not found
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
delete:
operationId: deleteUserByID
summary: Soft-delete a user
x-required-permission: user:delete
parameters:
- {name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: {type: string, format: uuid}}
responses:
'204':
description: Deleted
'404':
description: User not found
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'503':
description: >-
server.error. retryable true: a lock wait exceeded its limit and the
transaction rolled back, so the user was not deleted. retryable false:
the commit outcome is unknown.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
/api/v1/users/{id}/roles:assign:
post:
operationId: postUserRolesAssign
summary: Assign a role to a user
x-required-permission: role:assign
parameters:
- {name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: {type: string, format: uuid}}
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserRoleAssignRequest'}
responses:
'204':
description: Role assigned
'400':
description: Unknown role id
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
/api/v1/users/{id}/roles:unassign:
post:
operationId: postUserRolesUnassign
summary: Remove a role from a user
x-required-permission: role:assign
parameters:
- {name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: {type: string, format: uuid}}
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserRoleAssignRequest'}
responses:
'204':
description: Role removed (idempotent)
/api/v1/users/{id}:reset-password:
post:
operationId: postUserResetPassword
summary: Admin-reset a user's password (own or another's)
description: |
Sets a user's password on administrator authority - no current
password required. The new password runs through the role-aware
policy + breach screen; the target's active sessions are revoked so
they must re-authenticate. RBAC: admin:user_manage. Spec api-users.
x-required-permission: admin:user_manage
x-audit-events: [admin.user.password_reset]
parameters:
- {name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: {type: string, format: uuid}}
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserPasswordResetRequest'}
responses:
'204':
description: Password reset; the target's sessions were revoked
'400':
description: New password rejected by policy (too short/long/breached)
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks admin:user_manage permission
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'404':
description: User not found
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'503':
description: >-
server.error. retryable true: a lock wait exceeded its limit and the
transaction rolled back, so the change was not applied. retryable
false: the commit outcome is unknown, and the change may or may not
have been applied.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
/api/v1/users/{id}:disable:
post:
operationId: postUserDisable
summary: Disable a user account
description: |
Marks the account disabled: it can no longer authenticate (login is
rejected) and the user's active sessions are revoked immediately. An
admin cannot disable their own account (lockout prevention, 409).
RBAC: admin:user_manage. Spec api-users.
x-required-permission: admin:user_manage
x-audit-events: [admin.user.disabled]
parameters:
- {name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: {type: string, format: uuid}}
responses:
'200':
description: The disabled user
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserResponse'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks admin:user_manage permission
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'404':
description: User not found
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'409':
description: Cannot disable your own account
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'503':
description: >-
server.error. retryable true: a lock wait exceeded its limit and the
transaction rolled back, so the change was not applied. retryable
false: the commit outcome is unknown, and the change may or may not
have been applied.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
/api/v1/users/{id}:enable:
post:
operationId: postUserEnable
summary: Re-enable a disabled user account
description: |
Clears the disabled flag so the user can authenticate again with a
fresh login (sessions revoked while disabled stay dead). RBAC:
admin:user_manage. Spec api-users.
x-required-permission: admin:user_manage
x-audit-events: [admin.user.enabled]
parameters:
- {name: id, in: path, required: true, schema: {type: string, format: uuid}}
responses:
'200':
description: The re-enabled user
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/UserResponse'}
'403':
description: Caller lacks admin:user_manage permission
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'404':
description: User not found
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'}
'503':
description: >-
server.error. retryable true: a lock wait exceeded its limit and the
transaction rolled back, so the change was not applied. retryable
false: the commit outcome is unknown, and the change may or may not
have been applied.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope'
/api/v1/roles:create:
post:
operationId: postRolesCreate
summary: Create a custom role
x-required-permission: role:write
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema: {$ref: '#/components/schemas/CustomRoleCreateRequest'}
responses:
'201':
description: Custom role created
content:
application/json: