From dd8da2a6f450ed375f4478ce3a8af91087667a55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Divit Mittal <64.69.76.69.74.m@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 04:57:00 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] docs(security): add vulnerability policy --- SECURITY.md | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+) create mode 100644 SECURITY.md diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b24b11 --- /dev/null +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +# Security Policy + +Thank you for helping keep CiteStage and its users safe. + +## Supported Versions + +CiteStage is currently a research/MVP artifact. Security fixes are accepted for the `main` branch and the latest tagged release, if one exists. + +## Reporting a Vulnerability + +Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues. + +To report a vulnerability, contact the maintainer directly by email or open a private GitHub security advisory if the repository has advisories enabled. Include: + +- A concise description of the issue and its impact. +- Steps to reproduce, proof-of-concept corpus/query data, or affected files. +- Whether the issue can expose private corpus material, traces, generated reports, local files, or CI credentials. +- Any suggested mitigation or patch, if available. + +The maintainer will acknowledge reports as soon as possible and coordinate a fix or disclosure timeline based on severity. + +## Security Expectations + +- Never commit secrets, private corpora, private traces, generated reports with sensitive excerpts, or `.env` files. +- Keep fixture-based evaluation deterministic and safe to run locally and in CI. +- Redact sensitive corpus excerpts from bug reports, screenshots, traces, and diagnosis output. +- Treat StageTrace JSON, repair plans, and report artifacts as potentially sensitive when they come from private documentation. +- Prefer least-privilege GitHub tokens and CI permissions when adding workflows or integrations. + +## Scope + +In scope: + +- Secret exposure in examples, corpora, traces, reports, logs, or CI output. +- Unsafe handling of private corpus content or generated diagnosis artifacts. +- Vulnerabilities in CLI behavior that can overwrite unexpected files, read secrets, or mis-handle untrusted corpus input. +- Supply-chain concerns in build, Nix, Cargo, or APM metadata. + +Out of scope: + +- Publicly known dependency advisories without a CiteStage-specific exploit path. +- Findings that require malicious local shell access beyond the repository's documented command surface. +- Availability-only reports against public services not controlled by this project.