diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index a350f561..5eae00c5 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # Changelog
 
 ## Unreleased
+- [BE] 🔏 **서명된 waiver 레코드 (6차 증분)**: `app.spec.waiver_record`를 추가했습니다. `sign_waiver(waiver, *, signer, signed_at, key_id, key)`는 waiver 본문을 깊은 복사한 뒤 서명 메타데이터(`_meta`)를 접어 넣은 정규 JSON에 HMAC-SHA256(`WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO = "hmac-sha256"`)을 계산해 `{"waiver", "signature": {"algo","signer","signed_at","key_id","value"}}`를 돌려주므로, 서명자·시각을 바꿔도 본문 변조와 동일하게 서명이 깨집니다. `verify_waiver_signature(record, *, key)`는 `hmac.compare_digest`로 상수 시간 검증하며, 본문·메타 변조나 잘못된 키는 `False`, 서명 누락·비`hmac-sha256` `algo`는 `ValueError`입니다. 정규형은 모든 레벨에서 키를 정렬하므로 키 순서만 다른 waiver도 검증됩니다. 비밀 키는 호출자가 공급하며 저장·로깅·반환하지 않습니다. DB·네트워크·파일시스템 접근 없는 순수 함수쌍. 테스트 20종(왕복·필드별 변조·잘못된 키·JSON 왕복·결정성). 인용: NIST FIPS 198-1, RFC 8785.
 - [BE] 🔗 **이행 종속성(3NF) 평가 (5차 증분)**: `app.spec.transitive_dependency_assessment.assess_transitive_dependencies(snapshot, *, declared_functional_dependencies=None, waivers=None)`를 추가했습니다. 카탈로그 근거만으로는 `non_key_reference_cluster`(후보 키가 아닌 다중 FK + 비프라임 서술 컬럼 = 이행 종속성의 구조적 전제, 근거 등급 `inferred`)를, 호출자가 `{"relation","determinant","dependent"}` 형태로 명시한 함수 종속성으로는 `transitive_dependency_via_declared_fd`(비슈퍼키 결정자 → 비프라임 종속자 = 실제 3NF 위반, 근거 등급 `declared`)와 짝을 이루는 `candidate_3nf_split` 제안(`proposed`, 자동 적용 없음)을 탐지합니다. 컬럼명으로 종속성을 추론하지 않으며, 해석 불가한 명시 FD는 `unresolved_declared_fds`에 사유와 함께 보고합니다. 순수 함수·DDL/IO 없음. 골든 픽스처 13종.
 - [BE] 📄 **평가 리포트 HTML 뷰 (4차 증분)**: 두 스키마 품질 평가 엔드포인트에 `?format=html`을 추가했습니다. `app.spec.assessment_html.render_assessment_html`이 정규화·hot-partition 리포트를 접근성 있는 정확값 HTML 표로 렌더링합니다 — 모든 셀은 `html.escape(quote=True)`로 이스케이프, 상태는 색상이 아닌 텍스트 라벨(`[declared]`, `risk: review`), finding 종류별 `<table>` + `<caption>` + `<th scope>`, 외부 CSS/JS·스크립트 없음. 미조회/미인가 시엔 `format`과 무관하게 uniform JSON not-found를 유지합니다. 악성 relation 이름 이스케이프 등 테스트 포함.
 - [BE] 🔥 **Hot-partition·성장 평가 (3차 증분)**: `app.spec.hot_partition_assessment` 분석기와 `GET /api/snapshots/{uuid}/hot-partition-assessment` 읽기 전용 엔드포인트를 추가했습니다. 카탈로그 근거(선언 키·컬럼 타입/기본값·PostgreSQL 파티션 메타데이터)와 선택적 명시 capacity profile만 사용하며 라이브 워크로드를 가정하지 않고 데이터를 표본하지 않습니다. Append-heavy 테이블·무한 보존·단조 증가 키 hot-page·파티션 키가 UNIQUE에 빠진 경우·write/read 편중 축을 근거 등급(`observed`/`declared`/`inferred`/`proposed`)과 함께 탐지하고, capacity profile이 있거나 카탈로그로 선언된 신호일 때만 구체 조치를 `proposed`로 승격합니다. DDL·쓰기 없음. 골든 픽스처 10종 + 리포트/엔드포인트 테스트. EXPLAIN pruning 픽스처는 후속 증분(#947).
diff --git a/backend/app/spec/waiver_record.py b/backend/app/spec/waiver_record.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1d4cdac5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/app/spec/waiver_record.py
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+"""Tamper-evident signing for normalization-assessment waiver records.
+
+The assessment modules in this package (:mod:`app.spec.normalization_assessment`
+and :mod:`app.spec.transitive_dependency_assessment`) accept caller-supplied
+*waivers*: small records that say "this finding is a deliberate, reviewed
+exception, not a defect". Today those waivers are trusted as-is. For an audit
+trail an enterprise buyer can rely on, a waiver needs to be **tamper-evident**:
+a reviewer signs it once, and anyone can later check that neither the waiver
+body nor the "who signed it / when / with which key" metadata was altered
+afterwards.
+
+This module does exactly that and nothing more:
+
+* :func:`sign_waiver` takes a waiver ``dict`` plus the signer identity, an
+  ISO-8601 timestamp, a key id, and the secret key bytes. It returns a new
+  record ``{"waiver": <deep copy>, "signature": {...}}`` whose ``signature``
+  carries an HMAC-SHA256 over the canonical JSON of the waiver *with the
+  signature metadata folded in*, so changing the signer or the timestamp
+  invalidates the signature just as changing the waiver body would.
+* :func:`verify_waiver_signature` recomputes that HMAC from ``record["waiver"]``
+  and ``record["signature"]`` and compares it in constant time.
+
+The secret key never leaves the caller: this module neither stores it, logs
+it, nor puts it (or any plaintext derived from it) into the returned record.
+It is a pure function pair with no database, network, or filesystem access.
+
+References (APA 7th):
+
+* National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2008). *The keyed-hash
+  message authentication code (HMAC)* (FIPS PUB 198-1).
+  https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.198-1
+* Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., & Erdtman, S. (2020). *JSON Canonicalization
+  Scheme (JCS)* (RFC 8785). RFC Editor.
+  https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8785
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+from copy import deepcopy
+from typing import Any
+
+WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO = "hmac-sha256"
+"""Identifier stored in every signature; the only algorithm this module accepts."""
+
+_META_FIELDS = ("signer", "signed_at", "key_id")
+
+
+def _canonical(waiver: dict[str, Any]) -> bytes:
+    """Return a deterministic byte string for ``waiver``.
+
+    Keys are sorted at every level and separators are tight, so two dicts that
+    are equal as Python objects produce identical bytes regardless of the order
+    their keys were inserted. ``default=str`` lets values such as ``datetime``
+    or ``Decimal`` serialize instead of raising; the same Python value always
+    stringifies the same way, which is all a signature needs.
+    """
+
+    return json.dumps(
+        waiver, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), default=str
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _require_non_empty_str(value: object, field: str) -> str:
+    """Return ``value`` unchanged, or raise :class:`ValueError` naming ``field``."""
+
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+        raise ValueError(f"{field} must be a non-empty string")
+    return value
+
+
+def _expected_value(waiver: dict[str, Any], meta: dict[str, str], key: bytes) -> str:
+    """Compute the HMAC-SHA256 hex digest over the waiver plus its signature meta."""
+
+    return hmac.new(
+        key, _canonical({**waiver, "_meta": meta}), hashlib.sha256
+    ).hexdigest()
+
+
+def sign_waiver(
+    waiver: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    signer: str,
+    signed_at: str,
+    key_id: str,
+    key: bytes,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return a signed, tamper-evident copy of ``waiver``.
+
+    Args:
+        waiver: The waiver body to sign. It is deep-copied into the result, so
+            the caller's dict is never mutated and later edits to it do not
+            affect the signed record.
+        signer: Who approved the waiver (a person or system identity). Required,
+            non-empty.
+        signed_at: When it was approved, as an ISO-8601 string. Required,
+            non-empty; this module records it verbatim and does not parse it.
+        key_id: Which signing key was used, so a verifier can pick the right
+            secret without trial and error. Required, non-empty.
+        key: The secret key bytes for the HMAC. Required, non-empty. Never
+            stored, logged, or echoed back in the result.
+
+    Returns:
+        ``{"waiver": <deep copy of waiver>, "signature": {"algo", "signer",
+        "signed_at", "key_id", "value"}}`` where ``value`` is the HMAC-SHA256
+        hex digest binding the waiver body to the three metadata fields.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: If ``signer``, ``signed_at``, or ``key_id`` is not a
+            non-empty string, or if ``key`` is empty / not ``bytes``.
+    """
+
+    meta = {
+        "signer": _require_non_empty_str(signer, "signer"),
+        "signed_at": _require_non_empty_str(signed_at, "signed_at"),
+        "key_id": _require_non_empty_str(key_id, "key_id"),
+    }
+    if not isinstance(key, (bytes, bytearray)) or not key:
+        raise ValueError("key must be non-empty bytes")
+
+    return {
+        "waiver": deepcopy(waiver),
+        "signature": {
+            "algo": WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO,
+            **meta,
+            "value": _expected_value(waiver, meta, bytes(key)),
+        },
+    }
+
+
+def verify_waiver_signature(record: dict[str, Any], *, key: bytes) -> bool:
+    """Return ``True`` iff ``record``'s signature matches its waiver body.
+
+    Recomputes the HMAC-SHA256 from ``record["waiver"]`` and the ``signer`` /
+    ``signed_at`` / ``key_id`` inside ``record["signature"]``, then compares it
+    to the stored ``value`` with :func:`hmac.compare_digest` (constant time).
+    Any change to the waiver body or to a signature metadata field makes this
+    return ``False``; a wrong ``key`` also returns ``False``.
+
+    Args:
+        record: A record produced by :func:`sign_waiver` (or one claiming to
+            be). Must have a ``waiver`` dict and a ``signature`` dict whose
+            ``algo`` is :data:`WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO`.
+        key: The secret key bytes to verify against.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: If ``record`` is missing ``waiver`` or ``signature``, if
+            either is not a dict, or if the signature's ``algo`` is not
+            :data:`WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO`.
+    """
+
+    if not isinstance(record, dict) or "signature" not in record:
+        raise ValueError("record must contain a 'signature'")
+    waiver = record.get("waiver")
+    signature = record["signature"]
+    if not isinstance(waiver, dict) or not isinstance(signature, dict):
+        raise ValueError("record 'waiver' and 'signature' must both be objects")
+    if signature.get("algo") != WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO:
+        raise ValueError(f"unsupported signature algo: {signature.get('algo')!r}")
+
+    meta = {field: str(signature.get(field, "")) for field in _META_FIELDS}
+    expected = _expected_value(waiver, meta, bytes(key))
+    return hmac.compare_digest(expected, str(signature.get("value", "")))
diff --git a/backend/tests/test_waiver_record.py b/backend/tests/test_waiver_record.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3108fb8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/test_waiver_record.py
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+"""Tests for :mod:`app.spec.waiver_record` — signed, tamper-evident waivers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+
+from app.spec.waiver_record import (
+    WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO,
+    sign_waiver,
+    verify_waiver_signature,
+)
+
+_KEY = b"unit-test-secret-key-0123456789ab"
+_OTHER_KEY = b"a-different-secret-key-0123456789"
+
+
+def _waiver() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return a representative waiver body (matches the assessment-module shape)."""
+
+    return {
+        "scope": {"relation": "sales.invoice_line", "kind": "candidate_3nf_split"},
+        "owner": "data-architecture-guild",
+        "reason": "denormalized on purpose for the reporting read model",
+        "review_date": "2026-09-01",
+        "expiry": "2027-03-01",
+    }
+
+
+def _sign(waiver: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Sign ``waiver`` (or the default) with fixed metadata for reuse in tests."""
+
+    return sign_waiver(
+        waiver if waiver is not None else _waiver(),
+        signer="reviewer@example.test",
+        signed_at="2026-09-02T10:00:00Z",
+        key_id="waiver-key-2026-09",
+        key=_KEY,
+    )
+
+
+def test_round_trip_verifies_true() -> None:
+    """A freshly signed record verifies against the same key."""
+
+    record = _sign()
+    assert record["signature"]["algo"] == WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(record, key=_KEY) is True
+
+
+def test_signing_does_not_mutate_caller_waiver() -> None:
+    """The caller's dict is deep-copied, not referenced, by the signed record."""
+
+    original = _waiver()
+    record = _sign(original)
+    original["reason"] = "changed after signing"
+    assert record["waiver"]["reason"] == "denormalized on purpose for the reporting read model"
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(record, key=_KEY) is True
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["owner", "reason", "review_date", "expiry"])
+def test_tampering_a_waiver_field_fails_verification(field: str) -> None:
+    """Editing any waiver body field after signing is detected."""
+
+    record = _sign()
+    record["waiver"][field] = "tampered"
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(record, key=_KEY) is False
+
+
+def test_tampering_nested_scope_fails_verification() -> None:
+    """Editing a nested waiver value is detected too."""
+
+    record = _sign()
+    record["waiver"]["scope"]["relation"] = "sales.something_else"
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(record, key=_KEY) is False
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("field", ["signer", "signed_at", "key_id"])
+def test_tampering_signature_metadata_fails_verification(field: str) -> None:
+    """Changing who/when/which-key without re-signing is detected."""
+
+    record = _sign()
+    record["signature"][field] = "tampered"
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(record, key=_KEY) is False
+
+
+def test_tampering_signature_value_fails_verification() -> None:
+    """A doctored HMAC digest does not verify."""
+
+    record = _sign()
+    record["signature"]["value"] = "0" * 64
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(record, key=_KEY) is False
+
+
+def test_wrong_key_fails_verification() -> None:
+    """Verification with a different secret key returns False, not an error."""
+
+    record = _sign()
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(record, key=_OTHER_KEY) is False
+
+
+def test_missing_signature_raises_value_error() -> None:
+    """A record without a signature is a programming error, not a False."""
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="signature"):
+        verify_waiver_signature({"waiver": _waiver()}, key=_KEY)
+
+
+def test_unsupported_algo_raises_value_error() -> None:
+    """Only HMAC-SHA256 is accepted; anything else is rejected loudly."""
+
+    record = _sign()
+    record["signature"]["algo"] = "hmac-sha1"
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="algo"):
+        verify_waiver_signature(record, key=_KEY)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", ["", None, 0])
+def test_blank_metadata_is_rejected_at_signing(bad: object) -> None:
+    """signer / signed_at / key_id must each be a non-empty string."""
+
+    for field in ("signer", "signed_at", "key_id"):
+        kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "signer": "s",
+            "signed_at": "t",
+            "key_id": "k",
+            "key": _KEY,
+        }
+        kwargs[field] = bad
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match=field):
+            sign_waiver(_waiver(), **kwargs)
+
+
+def test_empty_key_is_rejected_at_signing() -> None:
+    """An empty signing key is refused."""
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="key"):
+        sign_waiver(
+            _waiver(),
+            signer="s",
+            signed_at="t",
+            key_id="k",
+            key=b"",
+        )
+
+
+def test_canonical_form_is_key_order_independent() -> None:
+    """Two waivers equal as dicts but built in different key order verify alike."""
+
+    a = {"alpha": 1, "beta": {"x": 1, "y": 2}}
+    b = {"beta": {"y": 2, "x": 1}, "alpha": 1}
+    record_a = _sign(a)
+    # Swap in the differently-ordered but equal body; signature must still hold.
+    record_a["waiver"] = b
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(record_a, key=_KEY) is True
+
+
+def test_record_survives_json_round_trip() -> None:
+    """Serializing and reloading the record does not break verification."""
+
+    record = _sign()
+    reloaded = json.loads(json.dumps(record))
+    assert verify_waiver_signature(reloaded, key=_KEY) is True
+
+
+def test_signing_is_deterministic() -> None:
+    """Signing the same inputs twice yields the same digest."""
+
+    assert _sign()["signature"]["value"] == _sign()["signature"]["value"]
diff --git a/docs/doctoring/normalization-and-functional-dependency-assessment.md b/docs/doctoring/normalization-and-functional-dependency-assessment.md
index 0aa75993..276cbb4b 100644
--- a/docs/doctoring/normalization-and-functional-dependency-assessment.md
+++ b/docs/doctoring/normalization-and-functional-dependency-assessment.md
@@ -145,6 +145,34 @@ Waivers use the same `scope` shape as `assess_normalization`. Row-level FD
 discovery from table data stays out of scope (it needs profiling, which
 belongs in a separate service).
 
+## Signed waiver records — landed
+
+`app.spec.waiver_record` makes a waiver **tamper-evident** so an auditor can
+trust one without re-reviewing it. It is a pure function pair with no
+database, network, or filesystem access.
+
+- `sign_waiver(waiver, *, signer, signed_at, key_id, key)` returns
+  `{"waiver": <deep copy>, "signature": {"algo", "signer", "signed_at",
+  "key_id", "value"}}`. `value` is an HMAC-SHA256 (`algo` is the constant
+  `WAIVER_SIGNATURE_ALGO = "hmac-sha256"`) over the canonical JSON of the
+  waiver **with the signature metadata folded in** as `_meta`, so altering
+  the signer or the timestamp invalidates the signature exactly as altering
+  the waiver body does. The caller's dict is deep-copied, never mutated.
+- `verify_waiver_signature(record, *, key)` recomputes that HMAC from
+  `record["waiver"]` and the `signer` / `signed_at` / `key_id` in
+  `record["signature"]` and compares it with `hmac.compare_digest`
+  (constant time). Any edit to the body or the metadata, or a wrong key,
+  returns `False`; a missing signature or a non-`hmac-sha256` `algo` raises
+  `ValueError`.
+- Canonical form sorts keys at every level, so a waiver rebuilt in a
+  different key order still verifies. The secret `key` is supplied by the
+  caller and is never stored, logged, or echoed into the record.
+
+What remains deferred: **persisting** these signed records (with owner,
+review date, scope, expiry) alongside the assessment run, and key
+rotation / `key_id` resolution — that is storage-layer work tracked with
+the persisted-assessment-run item below.
+
 ## Deferred (later bounded increments on #947)
 
 - **Row-level functional-dependency discovery** — profiling a sample of
@@ -154,7 +182,9 @@ belongs in a separate service).
   non-color-only HTML rendering, and the `assessment_run` /
   `capacity_profile` / `partition_candidate` / `remediation_action` records
   persisted with tool/commit provenance.
-- **Persisted, signed waiver records** with owner, review date, scope, expiry.
+- **Persisted signed waiver records** — the signing / verification core has
+  landed (`app.spec.waiver_record`, above); storing the signed records with
+  owner, review date, scope, and expiry is the remaining storage-layer step.
 
 ## Rust boundary decision — DEFERRED
 
@@ -191,3 +221,10 @@ https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-5540-7
 Lucchesi, C. L., & Osborn, S. L. (1978). Candidate keys for relations.
 *Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 17*(2), 270-279.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0000(78)90009-0
+
+National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2008). *The keyed-hash
+message authentication code (HMAC)* (FIPS PUB 198-1).
+https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.198-1
+
+Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., & Erdtman, S. (2020). *JSON Canonicalization Scheme
+(JCS)* (RFC 8785). RFC Editor. https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8785