From 76ec1f54feae82f47dd673df4e1507cb82651f01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 23 Aug 2026 04:03:29 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[MEDIUM]=20?=
 =?UTF-8?q?Fix=20Information=20Disclosure=20via=20Unvalidated=20Arguments?=
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Added strict type, length, and bounds validation at the very beginning of the exported functions (vuongtest, icci) to fail securely with `call. = FALSE`.
---
 .jules/sentinel.md | 4 ++++
 R/icci.R           | 4 ++++
 R/vuongtest.R      | 7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index bc5c6e1..eae27cd 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -12,3 +12,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Raw `stop()` and `warning()` calls without `call. = FALSE` in `llcont.R` and `vuongtest.R` exposed execution stack/call details when raised.
 **Learning:** While some instances of `stop()` inside `tryCatch()` were previously fixed to hide the call stack, other standalone exceptions and warnings still leaked call context. Security must be consistently applied across the entire codebase.
 **Prevention:** Always set `call. = FALSE` when using `stop()` or `warning()` to enforce a secure-by-default boundary and prevent internal execution paths from being disclosed to the end user.
+## 2024-08-23 - Prevent Information Disclosure via Unvalidated Arguments in Exported Functions
+**Vulnerability:** Unvalidated arguments (`nested`, `adj` in `vuongtest`, `conf.level` in `icci`) passed to exported functions could trigger raw R errors deep inside internal logic (e.g., `the condition has length > 1`, `missing value where TRUE/FALSE needed`), leaking internal execution contexts.
+**Learning:** In R, native control flow functions like `if` are strict and evaluate to raw unhandled errors when given `NA` or vectors of length > 1, bypassing top-level `stop(..., call. = FALSE)` safeguards.
+**Prevention:** Always strictly validate the type, length, and bounds of user inputs (e.g., checking for length 1 and `!is.na()`) at the very beginning of exported functions to fail securely with `call. = FALSE`.
diff --git a/R/icci.R b/R/icci.R
index f22278a..2d4fb60 100644
--- a/R/icci.R
+++ b/R/icci.R
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
 #' @export
 icci <- function(object1, object2, conf.level=.95, ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont) {
 
+  if (!is.numeric(conf.level) || length(conf.level) != 1 || is.na(conf.level) || conf.level <= 0 || conf.level >= 1) {
+    stop("Argument 'conf.level' must be a single numeric value between 0 and 1", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA
diff --git a/R/vuongtest.R b/R/vuongtest.R
index 2bdfbf6..bcb185a 100644
--- a/R/vuongtest.R
+++ b/R/vuongtest.R
@@ -98,6 +98,13 @@
 #' @export
 vuongtest <- function(object1, object2, nested=FALSE, adj="none", ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont, score1=NULL, score2=NULL, vc1=vcov, vc2=vcov) {
 
+  if (!is.logical(nested) || length(nested) != 1 || is.na(nested)) {
+    stop("Argument 'nested' must be a single logical value (TRUE/FALSE)", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+  if (!is.character(adj) || length(adj) != 1 || is.na(adj) || !(adj %in% c("none", "aic", "bic"))) {
+    stop("Argument 'adj' must be one of 'none', 'aic', or 'bic'", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA