From 3e274dd8d12ced1541890aa90c9fb3514e493db8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 04:15:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Add input validation for exported functions

---
 .jules/sentinel.md | 5 +++++
 R/icci.R           | 4 ++++
 R/vuongtest.R      | 7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index bc5c6e1..74da0bd 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -12,3 +12,8 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Raw `stop()` and `warning()` calls without `call. = FALSE` in `llcont.R` and `vuongtest.R` exposed execution stack/call details when raised.
 **Learning:** While some instances of `stop()` inside `tryCatch()` were previously fixed to hide the call stack, other standalone exceptions and warnings still leaked call context. Security must be consistently applied across the entire codebase.
 **Prevention:** Always set `call. = FALSE` when using `stop()` or `warning()` to enforce a secure-by-default boundary and prevent internal execution paths from being disclosed to the end user.
+
+## 2024-10-18 - Prevent Information Disclosure via Unvalidated Arguments
+**Vulnerability:** Missing type, length, and bound validations on arguments passed to exported functions (`vuongtest()` and `icci()`) allowed malformed inputs (e.g., `NA` or invalid types) to reach internal logical conditions (`if(nested)`), leaking internal execution contexts via raw R errors.
+**Learning:** Unvalidated arguments in exported functions can bypass top-level `stop(..., call. = FALSE)` safeguards and trigger raw R errors deep inside internal logic.
+**Prevention:** Always strictly validate the type, length, and bounds of user inputs at the very beginning of exported functions to fail securely with `call. = FALSE`.
diff --git a/R/icci.R b/R/icci.R
index f22278a..61ab16e 100644
--- a/R/icci.R
+++ b/R/icci.R
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
 #' @export
 icci <- function(object1, object2, conf.level=.95, ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont) {
 
+  if (!is.numeric(conf.level) || length(conf.level) != 1 || is.na(conf.level) || conf.level <= 0 || conf.level >= 1) {
+    stop("The 'conf.level' argument must be a single numeric value strictly between 0 and 1.", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA
diff --git a/R/vuongtest.R b/R/vuongtest.R
index 2bdfbf6..33985e4 100644
--- a/R/vuongtest.R
+++ b/R/vuongtest.R
@@ -98,6 +98,13 @@
 #' @export
 vuongtest <- function(object1, object2, nested=FALSE, adj="none", ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont, score1=NULL, score2=NULL, vc1=vcov, vc2=vcov) {
 
+  if (!is.logical(nested) || length(nested) != 1 || is.na(nested)) {
+    stop("The 'nested' argument must be a single logical value (TRUE or FALSE).", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+  if (!is.character(adj) || length(adj) != 1 || is.na(adj) || !(adj %in% c("none", "aic", "bic"))) {
+    stop("The 'adj' argument must be a single character string: 'none', 'aic', or 'bic'.", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA

From 697c20edd17ab1645c94aae8d76b04345725f78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 14:49:25 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Add input validation for exported functions


From 86cf29c47c094f39d6749234887d65033b53abf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 02:30:54 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Add input validation for exported functions