From a2db6a4069273ede442a4d32981d90d6e4c44f34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2026 04:03:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[MEDIUM?=
 =?UTF-8?q?]=20Fix=20input=20validation=20missing=20in=20exported=20functi?=
 =?UTF-8?q?ons?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Added strict type, length, and bounds validation at the beginning of exported functions to fail securely using stop(..., call. = FALSE).
---
 .jules/sentinel.md | 4 ++++
 R/icci.R           | 4 ++++
 R/vuongtest.R      | 7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index bc5c6e1..a3c71af 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -12,3 +12,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Raw `stop()` and `warning()` calls without `call. = FALSE` in `llcont.R` and `vuongtest.R` exposed execution stack/call details when raised.
 **Learning:** While some instances of `stop()` inside `tryCatch()` were previously fixed to hide the call stack, other standalone exceptions and warnings still leaked call context. Security must be consistently applied across the entire codebase.
 **Prevention:** Always set `call. = FALSE` when using `stop()` or `warning()` to enforce a secure-by-default boundary and prevent internal execution paths from being disclosed to the end user.
+## 2024-05-18 - Missing Input Validation in Exported Functions
+**Vulnerability:** User inputs passed to exported functions like `vuongtest` and `icci` lacked strict type and length validation (e.g., `nested=c(TRUE, FALSE)`).
+**Learning:** R's lazy evaluation and conditional structures (like `if`) can cause raw errors (e.g., "condition has length > 1") deep inside the logic when unvalidated inputs are processed, bypassing top-level `stop(..., call. = FALSE)` safeguards and leaking internal execution context.
+**Prevention:** Always strictly validate the type, length, and bounds of user inputs at the very beginning of exported functions using `stop(..., call. = FALSE)` to ensure a secure boundary and prevent information disclosure.
diff --git a/R/icci.R b/R/icci.R
index f22278a..323f3a9 100644
--- a/R/icci.R
+++ b/R/icci.R
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
 #' @export
 icci <- function(object1, object2, conf.level=.95, ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont) {
 
+  if (length(conf.level) != 1 || !is.numeric(conf.level) || is.na(conf.level) || conf.level <= 0 || conf.level >= 1) {
+    stop("The 'conf.level' argument must be a single numeric value between 0 and 1.", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA
diff --git a/R/vuongtest.R b/R/vuongtest.R
index 2bdfbf6..ddf2390 100644
--- a/R/vuongtest.R
+++ b/R/vuongtest.R
@@ -98,6 +98,13 @@
 #' @export
 vuongtest <- function(object1, object2, nested=FALSE, adj="none", ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont, score1=NULL, score2=NULL, vc1=vcov, vc2=vcov) {
 
+  if (length(nested) != 1 || !is.logical(nested) || is.na(nested)) {
+    stop("The 'nested' argument must be a single logical value (TRUE or FALSE).", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+  if (length(adj) != 1 || !is.character(adj) || !(adj %in% c("none", "aic", "bic"))) {
+    stop("The 'adj' argument must be a single string ('none', 'aic', or 'bic').", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA

From b8502ac1dfcf4833e549fdee81c321c2b07a680a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2026 04:06:30 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[MEDIUM?=
 =?UTF-8?q?]=20Fix=20input=20validation=20missing=20in=20exported=20functi?=
 =?UTF-8?q?ons?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Added strict type, length, and bounds validation at the beginning of exported functions to fail securely using stop(..., call. = FALSE).