From b450f8b92f26ba33f4e0ff43948fd2a81fe615c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 04:12:30 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Add input validation to exported functions

- Added strict type, length, and bounds checking to `vuongtest` and `icci` arguments (`nested`, `adj`, `conf.level`).
- This prevents malformed inputs from bypassing top-level `stop` safeguards and triggering raw R errors deep inside internal logic, which could leak internal execution contexts.
- Updated Sentinel journal with the learning.
---
 .jules/sentinel.md | 5 +++++
 R/icci.R           | 4 ++++
 R/vuongtest.R      | 7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index bc5c6e1..0d3716c 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -12,3 +12,8 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Raw `stop()` and `warning()` calls without `call. = FALSE` in `llcont.R` and `vuongtest.R` exposed execution stack/call details when raised.
 **Learning:** While some instances of `stop()` inside `tryCatch()` were previously fixed to hide the call stack, other standalone exceptions and warnings still leaked call context. Security must be consistently applied across the entire codebase.
 **Prevention:** Always set `call. = FALSE` when using `stop()` or `warning()` to enforce a secure-by-default boundary and prevent internal execution paths from being disclosed to the end user.
+
+## 2024-07-25 - Prevent Information Disclosure via Unvalidated Arguments
+**Vulnerability:** Top-level exported functions (`vuongtest`, `icci`) did not validate user arguments (like `nested`, `adj`, `conf.level`). Passing malformed inputs bypassed the secure `stop(..., call. = FALSE)` checks and caused raw R exceptions to be thrown deep inside nested calls (e.g., matrix operations or internal conditional evaluations), leaking the internal execution context/call stack.
+**Learning:** Security boundaries (like `call. = FALSE`) are only effective if inputs are sanitized before they trigger internal system errors. Unvalidated inputs can act as an attack vector to force internal state disclosure.
+**Prevention:** Always validate the type, length, and valid bounds of user-supplied arguments at the very beginning of exported functions to fail fast and securely with a controlled error message.
diff --git a/R/icci.R b/R/icci.R
index f22278a..843affd 100644
--- a/R/icci.R
+++ b/R/icci.R
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
 #' @export
 icci <- function(object1, object2, conf.level=.95, ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont) {
 
+  if (!is.numeric(conf.level) || length(conf.level) != 1 || is.na(conf.level) || conf.level <= 0 || conf.level >= 1) {
+    stop("conf.level must be a single number between 0 and 1", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA
diff --git a/R/vuongtest.R b/R/vuongtest.R
index 2bdfbf6..4ea75fc 100644
--- a/R/vuongtest.R
+++ b/R/vuongtest.R
@@ -98,6 +98,13 @@
 #' @export
 vuongtest <- function(object1, object2, nested=FALSE, adj="none", ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont, score1=NULL, score2=NULL, vc1=vcov, vc2=vcov) {
 
+  if (!is.logical(nested) || length(nested) != 1 || is.na(nested)) {
+    stop("nested must be a single TRUE or FALSE value", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+  if (!is.character(adj) || length(adj) != 1 || is.na(adj) || !(adj %in% c("none", "aic", "bic"))) {
+    stop("adj must be 'none', 'aic', or 'bic'", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA