diff --git a/docs/automation-threat-model.md b/docs/automation-threat-model.md
index 653693ee4..adc1b5d9b 100644
--- a/docs/automation-threat-model.md
+++ b/docs/automation-threat-model.md
@@ -128,13 +128,13 @@ The security objective is to prevent a lower-trust domain from converting its ou
 
 **Threat:** publisher creates a PR but loses the response, then broad cleanup closes/deletes another actor's resource.
 
-**Controls proposed by PR #80:** unique cryptographic publication marker, exact branch/head/base match, numeric PR identity, unique recovery only, conditional branch cleanup.
+**Controls implemented on protected `main`:** the non-executing publisher uses a cryptographic publication marker, requires exact proposal head and expected base identity, accepts only a positive numeric pull-request identity, and recovers a lost/malformed create response only when a fully paginated head-scoped search yields exactly one PR whose head, base, and marker all match the current publication. Cleanup re-runs that unique recovery before closing a PR and couples remote-branch cleanup to the exact proposal head. Closed, unmerged PR #80 is historical lineage only; it is not the current implementation owner or evidence authority.
 
 ### T-A08 Proposal branch race
 
 **Threat:** another actor creates same remote branch between inventory read and push, or advances it before cleanup.
 
-**Controls proposed by PR #80:** expected-absence branch creation lease and exact-created-head deletion lease; no check-then-unguarded-push or unconditional delete.
+**Controls implemented on protected `main`:** branch creation uses Git's explicit expected-absence lease (`--force-with-lease=<ref>:`), and remote cleanup uses an exact-created-head deletion lease (`--force-with-lease=<ref>:<proposal_head>`). There is no check-then-unguarded push or unconditional branch deletion. Closed, unmerged PR #80 is retained only as historical provenance.
 
 ### T-A09 Queue race after generation
 
@@ -233,4 +233,4 @@ These remain external evidence and must not be closed with documentation-only ch
 
 ## 9. Rationale and references
 
-Primary-source rationale and APA 7 references for GitHub OIDC, SLSA source identity, NIST SSDF, Cloudflare capability/state semantics are maintained in `docs/doctoring/architecture-trust-boundaries.md`. Git conditional ref-update and publisher-specific rationale is maintained in the active PR #80 doctoring and should be integrated without duplicating mutable implementation claims after that PR lands.
+Primary-source rationale and APA 7 references for GitHub OIDC, SLSA source identity, NIST SSDF, Cloudflare capability/state semantics are maintained in `docs/doctoring/architecture-trust-boundaries.md`. Git conditional ref-update and publisher-specific rationale for the protected implementation are maintained in `docs/doctoring/atomic-product-publisher-lease.md`. Closed, unmerged PR #80 is historical development lineage only and does not define current control status or implementation authority.
diff --git a/test/ci-exact-head-contract.test.ts b/test/ci-exact-head-contract.test.ts
index 7112b158d..82a00e724 100644
--- a/test/ci-exact-head-contract.test.ts
+++ b/test/ci-exact-head-contract.test.ts
@@ -6,8 +6,13 @@ const workflowPaths = [
   ".github/workflows/reviewer-ci.yml",
 ] as const;
 
+const requiredVerificationWorkflowPaths = [
+  ...workflowPaths,
+  ".github/workflows/patch-validator-image.yml",
+] as const;
+
 /** Read one authoritative pull-request verification workflow as plain text. */
-function readWorkflow(path: (typeof workflowPaths)[number]): string {
+function readWorkflow(path: string): string {
   return readFileSync(path, "utf8");
 }
 
@@ -107,4 +112,11 @@ describe("pull-request verification exact-head checkout contract", () => {
       "- name: install (hash-pinned dependencies)",
     );
   });
+
+  it("does not suppress required exact-head evidence for documentation-only changes", () => {
+    for (const path of requiredVerificationWorkflowPaths) {
+      const workflow = readWorkflow(path);
+      expect(workflow).not.toContain("paths-ignore:");
+    }
+  });
 });
diff --git a/test/documentation-architecture-contract.test.ts b/test/documentation-architecture-contract.test.ts
index 4a7222c3d..9baf45415 100644
--- a/test/documentation-architecture-contract.test.ts
+++ b/test/documentation-architecture-contract.test.ts
@@ -123,6 +123,25 @@ describe("authoritative Noema documentation graph", () => {
     expect(automationOwnership).not.toContain("stacked target branch does not trigger");
   });
 
+  it("keeps protected publisher race controls code-current in the threat model", () => {
+    const threatModel = document("docs/automation-threat-model.md");
+    const publisher = readFileSync(
+      ".github/workflows/hourly-product-development.yml",
+      "utf8",
+    );
+
+    expect(publisher).toContain(
+      'git push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/${branch}:" origin "HEAD:refs/heads/${branch}"',
+    );
+    expect(publisher).toContain(
+      'git push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/${branch}:${proposal_head}" origin ":refs/heads/${branch}"',
+    );
+    expect(publisher).toContain("recover_created_pr_number");
+    expect(publisher).toContain("publication_marker");
+    expect(threatModel).toContain("**Controls implemented on protected `main`:**");
+    expect(threatModel).not.toContain("not implemented on protected `main`");
+  });
+
   it("keeps immutable workflow-source trust separate from revision-local canonical-byte hardening", () => {
     const architecture = document("ARCHITECTURE.md");
     const traceability = document("docs/TRACEABILITY.md");