Record resolved MCP server identity in frozen peer manifests

[CBEPX]

Summary

The frozen peer tool manifest records exact tool IDs, transport, safety decision, and a secret-redacted hash of MCP configuration/source metadata. That detects config changes, but not every implementation change behind an unchanged command or URL (for example npx ...@latest or a remote endpoint updated in place).

The current guarantee is therefore configuration identity plus live capability re-probe, not immutable MCP implementation provenance.

Evidence

• serverFingerprint() hashes the redacted configuration and source detail (scripts/lib/mcp-capabilities.mjs:111-120).
• manifestRecord() stores that config fingerprint but no initialized MCP serverInfo name/version (scripts/lib/mcp-capabilities.mjs:686-695).
• probeMcpCapabilities() already performs MCP initialize and tools/list, so bounded server metadata may be available without adding another server launch.

Desired outcome

Make implementation-provenance limits explicit and preserve the strongest bounded identity already returned by the live MCP handshake.

Acceptance criteria

• Record secret-free initialized serverInfo name/version, when provided, in diagnostics and the frozen manifest.
• Re-probe and detect a changed reported identity before Claude execution, or explicitly mark it as informational if compatibility requires that policy.
• Mark unversioned or unidentifiable providers as such; do not describe config fingerprints as artifact pinning.
• Do not persist environment values, headers, credentials, raw config, queries, or unrestricted server output.
• Keep exact tool-ID safety and destructive-veto behavior unchanged.
• Add focused stdio and HTTP tests for stable, changed, missing, and malformed server identity.

Provenance

Non-blocking follow-up from the live v1.7.3 Fable design/research qualification.