diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index cd4a16a..6dbcd6f 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ It's built single-user and tailnet-only. The defenses:
 - **Optional identity gate** — set `COLLIE_TRUSTED_USER` to reject anyone but you.
 - **Optional per-device gate** — behind a proxy that injects a device-identity header, set
   `COLLIE_DEVICE_HEADER` + `COLLIE_DEVICE_ALLOWLIST` so only allowlisted devices can drive agents;
-  any other device is read-only. Off by default; revoke a device by dropping it from the list.
+  any other device is read-only, and so is a request that arrives without the header at all. Off by
+  default; revoke a device by dropping it from the list.
   See [Deployment variants](#deployment-variants) for the proxy this requires.
 - **Same-origin gate + strict CSP**; pane output renders as React text nodes, never `innerHTML`.
 - **Optional Host allowlist** — set `COLLIE_PUBLIC_HOSTS` to the exact host(s) you serve on (e.g.
@@ -407,17 +408,32 @@ This is the right choice unless you specifically need per-device control.
 Use this when some devices should **drive** agents and others should be **read-only** — e.g. your
 phone can reply, but a shared/less-trusted device can only watch. Collie reads an opaque device id
 from a request header (`COLLIE_DEVICE_HEADER`) and checks it against `COLLIE_DEVICE_ALLOWLIST`:
-allow-listed → full access, any other id → read-only, header absent → treated as the on-host
-operator (full access).
+allow-listed → full access, any other id → read-only, header absent → read-only as well.
 
-That last rule is the catch: **device-auth only works behind a reverse proxy that authenticates the
+Treating an absent header as read-only is the point: switching this on is you asserting that your
+proxy sets the header on every request, so a request without one did not come through that proxy and
+must not drive a terminal. **Device-auth only works behind a reverse proxy that authenticates the
 device and injects the header.** It is not a standalone flag.
 
-> ⚠️ **Do not enable `COLLIE_DEVICE_HEADER` on plain `tailscale serve`.** An *absent* header means
-> full access, and `tailscale serve` injects only its own `Tailscale-*` headers — it *forwards* an
-> arbitrary `X-Device-Id` untouched. So a remote request with no header gets full access (the gate
-> is a no-op), and a client that *sets* `X-Device-Id: my-phone` itself is trusted (spoofable).
-> Sound only behind a proxy that does both things below.
+Note what "read-only" means here: the gate covers writes (replies, keys, uploads, pane and tab
+create/close). Reading panes, polling the snapshot and listing sessions stay open to any caller that
+gets past the same-origin and Host checks, exactly as they do for a device that is simply not on the
+allowlist. Pane text can contain anything your agents printed, so the header is not a confidentiality
+boundary.
+
+Two consequences worth knowing before you turn this on:
+
+- **The bridge's own loopback URL becomes read-only.** `http://127.0.0.1:$COLLIE_PORT` bypasses your
+  proxy, so the PWA loaded from it sends no device header and shows its read-only state. Drive the
+  herd through the proxied URL instead.
+- **To drive a pane from the host by hand**, send an allowlisted id yourself, against the loopback
+  bridge rather than the public URL (the proxy's mandatory override in point 2 below would replace
+  your header): `curl -H 'X-Device-Id: my-laptop' http://127.0.0.1:$COLLIE_PORT/api/...`
+
+> ⚠️ **Do not enable `COLLIE_DEVICE_HEADER` on plain `tailscale serve`.** `tailscale serve` injects
+> only its own `Tailscale-*` headers and *forwards* an arbitrary `X-Device-Id` untouched, so a
+> client that *sets* `X-Device-Id: my-phone` itself is trusted. Spoofing is what makes this unsound,
+> and only a proxy that **overrides** the header (point 2 below) closes it.
 
 Your fronting proxy **must**:
 
@@ -458,7 +474,8 @@ location / {
 
 Revoke a device by dropping its id from `COLLIE_DEVICE_ALLOWLIST` and
 `systemctl --user restart collie`. With the header set but the allowlist **empty**, every device is
-read-only (fail-closed).
+read-only (fail-closed), and so is a request that arrives without the header. In that state nothing
+can drive a pane, including a hand-made `curl`; recovery is an `.env` edit plus a restart.
 
 ### Variant C — reverse proxy as the only front door (no Tailscale)
 
diff --git a/bridge/server.test.ts b/bridge/server.test.ts
index 329255b..1daf915 100644
--- a/bridge/server.test.ts
+++ b/bridge/server.test.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import {
   cacheControlFor,
   checkAccess,
   deviceAuth,
+  guard,
   isHostAllowed,
   normalizeTabLabel,
   paneReadResponse,
@@ -342,21 +343,73 @@ describe("deviceAuth — per-device authorisation", () => {
     });
   });
 
-  test("feature on, header absent: authorised and unchanged (on-host loopback operator)", () => {
+  test("feature on, header absent: refused", () => {
     const c = cfg({ deviceHeader: HDR, deviceAllowlist: ["phone"] });
     expect(deviceAuth(req({ host: "h" }), c)).toEqual({
       enforced: true,
       device: null,
-      authorized: true,
+      authorized: false,
     });
     // A blank/whitespace header value is treated as absent, not as a device named "".
     expect(deviceAuth(req({ host: "h", "x-device-id": "  " }), c)).toEqual({
       enforced: true,
       device: null,
-      authorized: true,
+      authorized: false,
     });
   });
 
+  // The absent-header case has no loopback exemption, and a loopback-looking Host must not create
+  // one by the back door: Host is set by the caller and rewritten by the proxy, so it attests
+  // nothing. This pins that no future "but it came from localhost" shortcut sneaks in here.
+  test("feature on, header absent: a loopback Host does not buy an exemption", () => {
+    const c = cfg({ deviceHeader: HDR, deviceAllowlist: ["phone"] });
+    for (const host of ["127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1:8787", "localhost", "[::1]:8787"]) {
+      expect(deviceAuth(req({ host }), c).authorized).toBe(false);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+// deviceAuth being right in isolation proves nothing if the wiring in guard() regresses, and that
+// wiring is where the whole gate lives: it consults deviceAuth for "write" and deliberately not for
+// "read". Both halves are asserted here, so neither the gate nor the read-only scope can drift
+// silently. The write cases carry a matching Origin so checkAccess passes and the device decision is
+// the only thing under test.
+describe("guard applies the device gate to writes only", () => {
+  const HDR = "x-device-id";
+  const c = cfg({ deviceHeader: HDR, deviceAllowlist: ["phone"] });
+  const write = (headers: Record<string, string>) =>
+    guard(req({ host: "collie.ts.net", origin: "https://collie.ts.net", ...headers }), c, "write");
+  const read = (headers: Record<string, string>) =>
+    guard(req({ host: "collie.ts.net", ...headers }), c, "read");
+
+  test("write with no device header is refused with 403", () => {
+    const denied = write({});
+    expect(denied).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(denied!.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  test("write with a non-allowlisted device is refused with 403", () => {
+    const denied = write({ "x-device-id": "intruder" });
+    expect(denied).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(denied!.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  test("write with an allowlisted device proceeds", () => {
+    expect(write({ "x-device-id": "phone" })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  // The scope of the gate, stated as a test rather than only in prose: a header-less caller keeps
+  // READ access (it is read-only, not rejected outright). If someone later tightens this, it should
+  // be a deliberate change with this test updated, not an accident.
+  test("read with no device header still proceeds (read-only, not rejected)", () => {
+    expect(read({})).toBeNull();
+    expect(read({ "x-device-id": "intruder" })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  test("with the feature off, a write with no device header proceeds", () => {
+    expect(guard(req({ host: "127.0.0.1:8787" }), cfg(), "write")).toBeNull();
+  });
+
   test("feature on, allowlisted device: authorised and attributed (header is trimmed)", () => {
     const c = cfg({ deviceHeader: HDR, deviceAllowlist: ["phone", "laptop"] });
     expect(deviceAuth(req({ host: "h", "x-device-id": " phone " }), c)).toEqual({
diff --git a/bridge/server.ts b/bridge/server.ts
index 1bc89c6..46e914c 100644
--- a/bridge/server.ts
+++ b/bridge/server.ts
@@ -852,8 +852,11 @@ export function isHostAllowed(host: string, cfg: Config): boolean {
  * (same-origin / CSRF + optional Tailscale identity). A `"write"` request — one that types into a
  * terminal or creates panes — must additionally come from an authorised device (see
  * {@link deviceAuth}). Returns a 403 Response to short-circuit on denial, or null to proceed.
+ *
+ * Exported for tests: {@link deviceAuth} being correct in isolation proves nothing if this wiring
+ * regresses, and the write/read asymmetry below is exactly what a device gate stands or falls on.
  */
-function guard(req: Request, cfg: Config, level: "read" | "write"): Response | null {
+export function guard(req: Request, cfg: Config, level: "read" | "write"): Response | null {
   const gate = checkAccess(req, cfg, level);
   if (!gate.ok) return text(gate.reason, 403);
   if (level === "write" && !deviceAuth(req, cfg).authorized) {
@@ -869,19 +872,31 @@ function guard(req: Request, cfg: Config, level: "read" | "write"): Response | n
  * so a direct client can't forge it (the same trust basis as the Tailscale identity header). Matrix:
  *
  *   - feature off (no header configured) → not enforced, fully authorised (today's behaviour).
- *   - header absent                      → authorised, unchanged. The proxy injects the header for
- *                                          real device traffic; an absent header is the on-host
- *                                          loopback operator (same tolerance as a missing identity).
+ *   - header absent                      → read-only, same as an unlisted device. Configuring the
+ *                                          header is the operator asserting that the proxy sets it
+ *                                          on every request, so a request without one did not come
+ *                                          through that proxy and must not drive a terminal.
  *   - header present, value allowlisted  → authorised; the session is attributed to that device.
  *   - header present, value not listed   → read-only. The "unknown" sentinel is never authorised,
  *                                          and an empty allowlist makes every device read-only — a
  *                                          fail-closed default for a security toggle you turned on.
+ *
+ * "Read-only" is the whole scope of this gate, deliberately: {@link guard} consults it only for
+ * `"write"`, so a header-less caller still reads panes. That is the existing design (a read-only
+ * device is meant to watch), and this function does not change it. What changes is that a missing
+ * header no longer counts as the operator.
+ *
+ * The absent-header case deliberately has no loopback exemption. It looks like the natural place for
+ * one, but every supported front door is a proxy co-located with the bridge (tailscale serve and the
+ * documented reverse proxies all connect to 127.0.0.1), so a loopback peer says nothing about
+ * whether the caller is the operator on the host or a remote client whose proxy failed to inject the
+ * header. Driving a pane from the host is still one flag away: send an allowlisted id yourself.
  */
 export function deviceAuth(req: Request, cfg: Config): DeviceAuth {
   if (!cfg.deviceHeader) return { enforced: false, device: null, authorized: true };
   const raw = req.headers.get(cfg.deviceHeader);
   const device = raw?.trim() ? raw.trim() : null;
-  if (!device) return { enforced: true, device: null, authorized: true };
+  if (!device) return { enforced: true, device: null, authorized: false };
   const authorized = device !== "unknown" && cfg.deviceAllowlist.includes(device);
   return { enforced: true, device, authorized };
 }